Listing Price and Non-Price-Taking behavior in market mechanisms with differential information by Fioriniello, Annamaria
Listing Price and Non-Price-Taking behavior
in market mechanisms with differential
information
University of Naples Federico II
Department of Economics and Statistics
Phd in Economics
XXX Cycle
Marco Pagnozzi
Maria Gabriella Graziano
Annamaria Fioriniello
academic year 2017/2018
1
Contents
List of Figures 2
1 The evolution of Ipo: theory 6
1.1 Under-pricing phenomenon: Uniform Price Auction for Ipo . . . . . 7
1.1.1 Asymmetric information Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.1.2 Control and Ownership theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1.3 Procedural theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1.4 Behavioral explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 The process of quotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.1 Agents of the Initial public offering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 The evolution of Ipo Process 21
2.1 The IPO in the history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1.1 Italian situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Description of Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Description of the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.2 Analysis of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 The best Ipo mechanism 39
3.1 The revenue function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1.1 Risk propensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 The profit function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 The dual problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1
List of Figures
2.1 Process of pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Box Plot Underpricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Underpricing in Milan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Underpricing in HongKong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Underpricing in Nasdaq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Underpricing in Euronext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.7 Underpricing in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.8 Underpricing in London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.9 Underpricing in Nyse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.10 Underpricing in relation with Offerprice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.11 Underpricing in Bookbuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.12 Underpricing in Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2
Abstract
This work investigates the optimal initial public offering mechanism (IPO) com-
paring the book-building, the fixed price offer and the auction to understand if
the supremacy of the first mechanism is economically justified or if there are other
motivations behind.
In the first chapter, a survey of the theories concerning the underpricing and a
general overview of the market evolution are presented. Later, let us present a
theoretical model in which the listing methods are compared basis on the firm’s
profit. It examines what are the key variables studied by the issuer to decide
the mechanism maximizing its revenue. The information cost and the reservation
utility of the investors turn out the most significant variables.
3
Introduction
Despite the economic and political uncertainty, the global Ipo market never stops
to expand. This trend makes it interesting for the economic field such that the
researchers’ attention is focused on this phenomenon and any aspect: the reason to
become public, the underpricing’s shares and, mostly, they would crown the best
method among the three popular mechanisms: the book-building, the fixed price
offering and the auction. A controversial aspect that influences the mechanisms
is the phenomenon of underpricing. It could be perceived as a market anomaly
because it takes place when the offer price is lower than the market price. In this
way, the new issues underperform the market, bringing substantial high returns
on the first trading day for investors, but theoretically a lower listing profit for the
firm. Some economists suggest that the auction process might be more accurate
in terms of price definition and more fair in the allocation of new shares [20], but,
despite that, at the end of 1990’s, the book-building emerged, becoming the dom-
inant mechanism.
The auction method returned renowned with Google, in 2004 ([9]). The company
announced that it would become public through the auction, instead of the U.S.
trend. At the time, Google was a famous and attractive firm, already before the
listing. Therefore, the expectation on the auction was a strong overpricing for the
optimistic circumstances. Indeed, initially, the estimated price range for share was
$108 to $135, but its high evaluation decreased the price of the other technologi-
cal companies. Under these new conditions, Google had to review downwards its
range as consequence an underpricing. With this background, even if Google could
be an important example of the auction’s efficiency, it is excluded by literature for
its anomalous history.
The question generally accompanies the book building method and so the natural
question is: Do the advantages of the Book Building justify the progressive disap-
pearance of the auction mechanism?.
Now, let us describe the structure of the thesis. The analysis begins with the main
theories that explain the underpricing phenomena: Asymmetric information, Con-
trol and Ownership, Procedural theory and Behavioral explanation. Each theory
focuses on a particular step of the listing procedure or on a particular group of
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agents involved in the mechanism. Then, for having a complete overview, the pro-
cess of an initial public offering is accurately described, for each procedure, there
is a detailed description of strengths and weaknesses point.
Later, a dataset of listed firms is described and commented. It collects 903 ob-
servations across several financial markets: Nasdaq, Milan, London, Paris, Hong
Kong, Thailand and Nyse and it is organized by the offer price, by the first price
after the listing, by the underpricing and by the number of shares. All these vari-
ables are taken into account for understanding if there are some aspects which
influence incisively the underpricing and consequently the profit of the issuer.
The last chapter, on the basis of the conclusion of the first one, elaborates a the-
oretical model. In this last one, the mechanisms are divided into two groups: the
insider and the outsider method of price’s definition, comparing the book-building
and the fixed price offering with the auction. The involved agents are the firm and
the investors, leaving aside the other figures: market authorities, banks and so on.
The issuer has the goal to maximize its profit representing by function increasing
in price and quantity, while the investors have the aim to access to the shares
acquisition, if and only if their participation constraint holds.
The key variable is the information cost, sustained by the firm or the investors
according to the mechanisms.
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Chapter 1
The evolution of Ipo: theory
The first chapter focuses on the evolution of the financial market and on a draft
of the theories about the underpricing nature. Its goal is finding the best method
among the book- building, the fixed price offering, the auction in terms of under-
pricing and of interests for the several agents involved in the listing process. It is
structured as follows:
• In the first section, there is a description of the main theories:
– Asymmetric information ([7], [26]). It is conceived as the classical prob-
lem of unbalance information among the agents involved in an economic
process (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, as usual, the insider members (the
firms and underwriter banks) have an informational advantage over out-
side members (the investors);
– Control and Ownership ([8]). The separation between ownership and
control produces a condition with conflict of interest between the owner
and the manager. Their purpose may diverge because the first one
pursues the profit maximization, while the second one often has the
aim to improve his reputation also through unscrupulous strategies;
– Procedural theory ([17]). This theory considers how the mandatory
disclosure and the regulation of the financial market impact on the
issuer firm decision;
– Behavioral explanation ([25]). It is a new line of thought in economic
theory. Usually, the financial world assumes that the agents are wealth
maximizers and rational. However, they are human beings with emotion
and feeling that influence their decision. This aspect translates into an
unexpected first valuation of the shares;
• Then, the most diffused methods of listing: Fixed price offer, Auction and
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BookBuilding are exposed and analyzed, underlying similarities and differ-
ences.
1.1 Under-pricing phenomenon: Uniform Price Auc-
tion for Ipo
Ritter (1998) stated an initial public offering (IPO) occurs when a security is sold
to the general public for the first time, with the expectation that a liquid market
will develop. It is a placement of financial securities, in particular, equity shares,
aimed at the first flotation of a company on a stock exchange market.
The academic theory [5] suggests the following motivations for going public:
1. Cost of capital. The Ipo becomes a strategic mechanism to finance immedi-
ate growth projects both inside and outside the company, as well as to feed
net working capital or fixed capital, depending on the precise needs of the
company. In this way the company can strengthen its financial structure,
allowing it to become more solid and structured. Likewise, it may at least
partially diversify its sources of capital and at the same time reduce depen-
dence on expensive bank financing. It should be noted that the Floatation
process presents the way for a possibility of continuous capital procurement,
not only relegated to the initial phase: a company in difficulty may indeed
return to the capital market even later;
2. Creation of an exit route. Through the listing, the shares become not only
hypothetical transaction objects, but they allow the possibility to liquidate
their investment when the shareholders consider it appropriate, but can also
act as a currency. The price of the same ones indeed gives liquidity to shares
that have a precise market value. In particular, this last aspect translates
into the possibility, given to the newly quoted company, to acquire other
companies, or in any case to conduct transactions of various kinds, using an
alternative source to money in the payment of the transaction: the share
unit;
3. A Reassurance for the stakeholders. A listed company has stringent disclo-
sure requirements that make it more transparent to the public. The several
steps that must necessarily be overcome to gain the entry to the capital mar-
ket, such as the delicate Due Diligence process and official approval by of the
competent institution, reassure customers and suppliers about its business
soundness and the correctness of the disclosed data;
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4. Skills. The passage from a not listed list on a listed company increases
its prestige and reinforces its image. Obviously, this can be a trigger for
attracting qualified professionals, eager to achieve greater visibility through
a prominent role in the newly-listed company
At the same time, the decision to become public is accompanied by some disad-
vantages:
1. Influence of the market. The trend, both negatively and positively, influ-
ences the company’s listing and the firm becomes vulnerable to exogenous
variables. In this way, the price, which should be an objective representation
of the company’s value since decreed by the market, it could actually assume
values that do not reflect the quality of the company;
2. Disclosure requirements. It will equip with expensive management systems
information and monitoring of compliance, subtracting huge resources that
could be employed in the process of investment in a more profitable way.
In addition. as already mentioned, a company that is willing to be listed
must disclose some information that, until privately managed, should not be
disclosed. This Disclosure and loss of privacy actually occur not only when it
is for the first time listed on the market, but also continuously, as an essential
requirement to maintain "listed" status;
3. Loss of control. It is implied that if a firm decides to take advantage with the
investing public as a capital procurement channel, this action is subject to
a sequential loss of control and dilution of ownership. What manifests itself
is a natural redefinition of the ownership structure, in particular with a re-
formulation of the majority shareholder who, following the listing, may have
lost their role as "blockholders". In this sense we often witness situations
in which, driven by the need to satisfy the requests of the new substitutive
shareholders, managers make more projected decisions to achieve significant
performance in the short term, which however prove unsuccessful if ana-
lyzed over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, this greater fragmentation of
ownership can constitute an obstacle to normal and fluent business manage-
ment: for example, to undertake activities such as the acquisition of another
company, it is now necessary to obtain approval from the various sharehold-
ers. At the same time, an overly widespread and decision-free ownership can
facilitate the arrival of hostile takeovers;
4. Deployment of forces and time. The IPO involves significant costs that the
firm is forced to support both in the phase of preparation for listing both
subsequently. In particular, the direct costs refer to the standard costs that
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must be incurred from the issuer: sales commissions, fees for legal advice as
well as for auditing, expenses for accounting service, transaction costs and
last but not least, the time spent by management in assisting step by step
the whole procedure. This last one qualifies as opportunity cost and is much
more difficult to quantify if compared with other costs, purely monetary.
Taking into account all these aspects and much more, the shares are put on the
market at an offer price, showing, in the most of the case, an under price. The
issuer undervalues, more or less consciously, its shares positioning himself in a
highly unfavorable situation because, in absence of underpricing, he could collect
the same amount of funds by issuing a lower quantity of shares.
The underpricing is computed as the difference between the Ipo price and the
market price of the first trading day after the closure of the initial public offering.
Associated with this concept, there is the notion of Money left on the table. It is
defined as the first-day price increase multiplied by the number of shares issued
and constitutes opportunity cost of going public for issuing firms.
Money left on the table = (Pipo − P1day) ∗ (Number of shares).
The underpricing goes to "clash" with the concept of an efficient market. It af-
fects the IPO worldwide: this is not a circumscribed phenomenon, although the
magnitude of the same is affected by multiple factors related to the geographical
element. The aim is to identify the causes of this phenomenon. In this regard,
four explanatory theories are exposed:
1. Asymmetric information theory;
2. Control and ownership theory;
3. Procedural theory;
4. Behavioral theory.
Besides looking through these ones, the accent will be placed on the listing
mechanism. The focus changes because the point is to understand if the issuer
company, choosing the listing method, chooses also the underpricing level. The
most important and diffused ones are:
1. Book-building method (BM);
2. Fixed Price offering (FPO);
3. Uniform Price auction (UPA)1.
1Uniform-price auctions are often referred to in the financial press, less descriptively, as
Dutch auctions and elsewhere as nondiscriminatory auctions, competitive auctions, or single-
price auctions.
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1.1.1 Asymmetric information Theory
The basic assumption is extremely intuitive: what is theorized here is that one
of the actors has more information than the remaining ones. Rock (1986) [26],
starting from the famous concept of "The Market for Lemons" by Akerlof (1970),
argues that the information disparity exists within the same group of investors,
thus excluding in this scenario the considerations on the figure of the issuer that on
the underwriter. In his opinion, some investors are more informed about the real
value of the shares than other investors. In this sense, a double-track situation is
revealed: on the one hand, in the underpriced IPOs, the demand comes from both
the group of participants and it is, therefore, necessary to carry out a rationing of
the shares offered. On the contrary, in situations of overpriced IPOs, obviously,
the most informed investors don’t participate, leaving instead the totality of the
"beneficial" share allotment of the less informed counterpart.
Therefore, the "Winner’s Curse" is revealed because it might seem a victory
for the less informed about the informed when the reality is very different.
Obviously, the less informed investors once suffered the overpricing, decide to
not participate in further IPO. Rock (1986) however considers the presence of less
informed investors numerically fundamental. It is precisely from this observation
that the concept of underpricing is inserted. It is described in the Rock model
(1986) as a necessary tool to simultaneously attract less informed investors and
thus preserve the liquidity of the financial market: it is therefore used to guarantee
an expected positive in any case.
Related to Informational Asymmetry, it is the model, that of the Principal-
Agent, which finds application not only in the context of the IPOs, but also in all
those situations in which there is a delegation relationship: an agent that works
for a principal in a context of information asymmetry that may occur in a pre and
post-contractual form. Normally it refers to the model of Jensen Meckling (1976)
which, however, looks as reference the manager-owner relationship, in this case,
the model is applied to the first quotation process: specifically to the information
asymmetry between issuer and underwriter. The last one could use the allocative
mechanism to his own advantage, giving the shares mainly to those subjects who
hold key roles within the various companies, the so-called Executives, in the hope
that they would in future turn to them to start a possible own investment activity.
To avoid this problem of incorrect behavior, it is necessary to implement a contract
between Principal and Agent that pivots on the incentive scheme. Specifically, the
underwriter makes appropriate use of the more information that he divulges in
favor of all investors. In this contract, the underpricing reveals like a gift for the
executive that buys shares at a lower price.
In the asymmetric information theories, two phenomena reveal
1. Winner’s curse[11]. Assuming a bad deal and an information asymmetry, the
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demand is reduced to that of less informed investors. It, therefore, revealed
a "Winner’s curse" because, although at first view, it could be considered
a victory for the less informed about the informed, the reality was very
different. The first ones buy shares of an unsuccessful firm and if they know
about it, they would keep away from the IPO.
2. Free rider problem [21]. It has like consequence a moral hazard problem.
Higher is the information production, higher is the incentive for new bidders
to not collect any information. This happens because the new investors hope
that the previous bidders have just decided the clearing price, making the
correct and fair analysis about the firm. On average, the effect of this prob-
lem is the reduction of the incentive of other investors to produce information
and in this way, the IPO becomes less efficient in terms of price’s determi-
nation. The fact that a less amount of information would be produced in an
equilibrium with free riders means that less underpricing would be necessary
to compensate the expense of the informed bidders. The free rider problem
leads to a hypothetical overpricing.
The fundamental difference between the winner’s curse and the free rider problem
is that the winner’s curse does not lead people to bid more than they really believe.
On the contrary, with the free rider problem, the investors could deliberately bid
an excessive amount, since the point is to make an offer blindly high enough to
be first in line for the shares, rather than devoting time and resources to come up
with a reasonable bid.
1.1.2 Control and Ownership theory
Another theory, which explains the underpricing phenomenon, is that one of Con-
trol and Ownership, which focuses on the conflict of interests among the parties in
the underwriting process.
The starting idea from which the theory of Brennan and Franks starts (1997) [8]
is extremely intuitive: according to it, the managers of the companies deliberately
underpriced the actions of their company in order to maintain the control over
it and avoiding any monitoring action by external parties. The underpricing is
a fundamental tool used in this specific case in order to create an excess on the
demand side: in fact, proposing to the primary market with an extremely advanta-
geous offer price, managers distribute the totality of the shares among a plurality
of subjects, all particularly interested in seeing the appealing deal. Auspiciously,
it is difficult that many small shareholders implement a monitoring action. In this
situation, emerges the problem of free riding: being the act of monitoring a public
good whose implementation benefits all shareholders, no one would employ their
own assets at this purpose, aware that all the investors may have benefits from it.
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On the basis of these considerations, this theory asserts not only that the
underpricing is strategic, since it allows the creation of an excess of demand, but
at the same time that the managers have the possibility to shrewdly allocate
the shares among the different candidates, selecting the more harmless, the less
relevant. They propose also an alternative way to control the company: the issue
of non-voting share for not losing the power. However, the Stock Exchange Market,
in general, discourages this issuance to avoid discrimination among shareholders.
1.1.3 Procedural theory
The third theory is the Procedural one. As the name suggests, it deals with all the
aspects regarding the procedure. It is consistent with the assumption that many
companies are subject to legal liability and lawsuits.
It is basically a theoretical theory that interprets the underpricing as a tool adopted
by companies, to reduce the probability of being denounced by their own investors,
dissatisfied with the post IPO performances recorded by the shares. Proposed by
Lougue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), they study the phenomenon almost as if it
were an insurance form adopted by the company, hence the further appellation
Insurance or Lawsuit Avoidance Hypothesis.
1.1.4 Behavioral explanations
It focuses the accent on the feeling of investors, on the emotional aspect. Not being
robots, their drivers are the emotions, from that it asserts the existence of irrational
investors (or sentiment or noise trader) which follows the feeling in the economic
decision. The context of financial markets, especially the process of first quota-
tion, represents an extremely fertile situation for the proliferation of behavioral
irrationality: already the impossibility of evaluating the company and its shares
based on its history (since non-existent) or on the few and fragmented information.
In this view, it compensates, in the worst of the case, a failed investment. The
irrationality refers to the fact that the trader may be optimistic without any good
economic reason for being it. The starting point of these theories is, as the name
implies, refusing one of the main features of all the models mentioned so far: the
rationality of the various subjects involved in the first listing process. This refers
to the investors, motivated by logically irrational motivations when they have to
choose how to invest. Starting from all that, the Welch (1992) [25] theory of the
Information Cascades seems to be potentially able to explain the phenomenon. It
would be optimal for the firms to exploit the sentimental investors’ surplus. It is a
very intuitive theoretical vein, based on a process of taking the cascade decisions.
Welch, through his studies, argues that investors who enter into the transaction
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only after the time of first listing, consider the work performed by their predeces-
sors, regardless of opinions and information about the firm. With this assumption,
it is clear that the role played by early investors is extremely important, as well
as strategic, for the company itself. At the light of what has been illustrated the
underpricing is explained as a "Premium" that the "first" investors demand as a
reward for starting up, through their equity acquisitions, to the positive cascade.
1.2 The process of quotation
The focus of my research is not on the previous theory, but it is on the listing
procedure and how it can affect the underpricing, so if there exists a relation
between the flotation’s method of share and the devaluation of the company.
The common procedure for an initial public offering, whatever the mechanism is,
is composed of three step[4]:
1. Flotation process of shares and meeting between the firm and possible in-
vestors through an underwriting bank.
2. Initial listing and shares allocation at the determined price. The mechanisms
that lead to the setting of an offer price are multiple and crucial since it is
crucial to the success of the IPO: in particular, in the price determination
process, the underwriter figure can be the undisputed protagonist.
This phase differs according to the mechanism:
a. Fixed price offer;
b. Auction[2] or offer for subscription by tender;
c. Book building.
3. Allocation of the shares among the several investors.
In the first step, there is often an important role of the underwriters. They usu-
ally are investment banks that have IPO specialists on staff. These organizations
collaborate with the issuer to ensure, first of all, that all regulatory requirements
are satisfied. It organizes the flotation process of the firm’s share and puts the
issuer firm in contact with the various parties concerned: market authorities, com-
munication agency, investment company, auditors and possibly legal advisers. Its
commitment is contractually defined.
According to the bank, the firm decides the number of the share and the type of
procedure.
This is the first step common to all procedures.
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The definition of the price and the allocation of shares among the investors under-
lines the difference between the book building, auction and fixed price offering.
a. Starting from the fixed price listing method, called fixed price regime, it re-
veals a situation in which the price is previously set arbitrarily, even before
the collection of orders from investors and their intentions, both institutional
and retail. The allocation of the shares needs to implement adequate alloca-
tion mechanisms:
1. There may be cases in which a certain profile of fairness is maintained,
applying the so-called fair rules. These mechanisms take the form of a
pro-rated allocation, that is, one opts to satisfy the requests of all the
participants, within certain limits and not for the whole until the offer
is exhausted. However, investors, aware of the aforementioned mech-
anism, could anticipate this move and adopt incorrect behavior: that
is, they could do request for a quantity much higher than that actually
desired so that, into the allocation phase, they obtain the amount really
desired;
2. however, there may be cases in which the shares are assigned according
to mechanisms that are not strictly transparent: in some countries,
for example, when securities are placed, retail investors are privileged,
which, as is well known, represent the weak and minority link, without
no possibility of monitoring action;
3. there are also situations in which the institutional actors are favorite.
b. In the book building method, the figure of the underwriting bank has a
role more central than in the other two procedures. Indeed, in this case,
the bank conducts all the steps of the listing and of the share allocation.
At the beginning, the investment bank, styles a list of investors admitted
to participation: these will be invited to take part in the procedure with
the official mode. Usually, this phase involves exclusively institutional in-
vestors: the reasons for excluding the retail counterpart are indeed several.
In particular, there could be a great problem of management to administer
a plurality of requests coming from this category of investors, often small
in amount and not even particularly representative of the actual corporate
value. Once identified the subjects admitted to the book-building procedure
is the duty of the underwriter, always in agreement with the issuer, identify
a price range within which the price should fall the offering price. After hav-
ing selected the subjects admitted to the listing procedure and identified the
relative price range, the marketing phase begins (in this case the so-called
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road shows, which indeed are only of this type of issuing method). The
underwriter bank, for determining the price of a unit share, makes several
and precise analysis. The offer price is normally set in an amount up to a
maximum of 20% in rising or falling compared to the last price range.
Concretely, the most used valuation methods are the discounted future cash
flows system (Discounted Cash), the market multiples method and the EVA
(Economic Value Added).
– Starting from the first computation method (DCF), it is not only one
of the most widespread and accredited methods in the financial field,
but it also one of the more rational and exhaustive in the definition
of an appropriate business value. It computes the current value of the
net operating cash flows that the company will be able to obtain in the
future discounted by an interest rate equal to the weighted average cost
of capital for that specific company, representative of both its finan-
cial and operating risk (so-called Weighted Average Cost of Capital or
WACC).
– The second method is an approach that is completely out of long and
complex mathematical formulas, as is the case with the DCF method.
It computes the value of the listed company comparing it with similar
companies, already present in the regulated market, and similar to the
issuer on the basis of characteristics pertaining to the risk, profitability,
growth opportunities, size and industrial sector.
– The last method is the EVA. It is defined like the "economic profit"
and it aims to identify the extra value produced by the firm in favor
of shareholders. This performance parameter is very close to the true
wealth produced by the company, in terms not only of accounting profit,
but of the economic value actually achieved: at the base of this method
there is the idea that the company in addition to covering the costs with
the revenues, it must also be able to remunerate the risk supported by
the different stakeholders involved, and be able to repay the interest on
the invested capital.
During the phase of price definition, the underwriter publishes the purchasing
intention of the interested investors in an order book (from that, the name
"book building").
Once the price has been fixed, the bank distributes the shares. Unlike what
is described for fixed price regime, only discretionary rules are applied; no
residual space therefore for fair rules.
c. The last listing method is the auction. It is a system in which, after setting a
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minimum price below which it is not permissible to go down, the investors are
required to indicate their quantity and their maximum price: subsequently,
on the basis of the different offers collected, decreed the actual final price,
such as to exhaust the available offer The introduction of a reservation price
will affect three aspects.
1. The issuing firm can protect itself from selling at a very low price in
the IPO, avoiding a devaluation. It makes sure that the offering price
is higher than the reservation price, deterring the investors;
2. There is a possibility of IPO failure when the firm sets a high reservation
price;
3. The information production is less because there is less attention of the
bidders to analyze the firm and the market, thus they have a starting
point.
The auction method can take place without the intervention of external
subjects, but on the basis of easy automated computer systems that allow the
meeting between supply and demand, in compliance with the price-quantity
parameters set by rules specified ex-ante : in this case it is commonly referred
to as Internet-based auction mechanism, a very diffuse reality.
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Table 1.1: Bid in Uniform Price Auction
Bidders Share Bid
∑
q
Investor A 200 25 200
Investor B 250 18 450
Investor C 150 20 600
Investor D 200 20 800
Investor E 150 30 950
Table 1.2: Share Allocation in Uniform Price Auction
Bidders Share Final Allocation
∑
q
Investor A 200 168.42 168.42
Investor B 250 210.53 378.95
Investor C 150 126.32 505.27
Investor D 200 168.42 673.69
Investor E 150 126.32 800
The determination of price in the uniform price auction can be easily de-
scribed by an example with only 5 bidders and an available number of shares
equal to 800.
In table 1.1, there is the description of the pair quantity-price offered for
each investor.
In table 1.2, it is shown how takes place the final allocation. The auction
finishes with the bidder D.
Each bidder obtains a percentage of shares computed on the maximal avail-
able quantity:
800 : 950 = 0, 84%.
Of course, this last procedure shows clearly the allocation and the determi-
nation of price.
The announcement of price-quantity takes place on a technological platform
created for the event. The procedure is open to everyone and it is very easy
to participate thus it is totally automated.
Using an easy system, it is possible to explain the mechanism. If the demand
is greater or equal than the number of the shares, the market price will be
pm, otherwise the price will be zero and there is no market, in this way the
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auction procedure will re-begin with other parameters:{
D(p) ≥ 1, p = pm
D(p) < 1, p = 0
The number of shares is normalized to 1.
The Mise en Vente
A particular Ipo auction is diffused in France: Mise en Vente.
It operates as follows: five days prior to the initial public offering, the offered
quantity of share and the reservation price are set jointly by the bank, the
broker and the firm. On the day of the IPO, investors submit limit orders
to their brokers. The latter transmits these orders to the stock exchange
market. The total demand function is computed and graphically plotted by
the auctioneer, who is the "Bourse officielle". As a function of this demand,
the auctioneer sets the IPO price. As in the Book Building method, there
is no formal explicit algorithm mapping demand into prices. But, the price
adjustment, in the Mise en Vente, exhibits strong empirical regularities, with
a very low underpricing. So, in this modified auction, it seems that the power
is equally distributed between the firm and the bank and it is respected the
intrinsic value of firm.
These results derive from an empirical study of 92 Mise en Vente happened
between 1983 and 1996. The Ipo’s present an underpricing2 in average equal
to 13% while in the United States with the Book Building method, it was
on 17,35% ([22]).
1.2.1 Agents of the Initial public offering
After having described all the features of the procedure, each method should
be evaluated with respect to the different point of view of all the partici-
pant to the Ipo mechanism. The figures are various and numerous: sellers,
underwriters, institutional investors, retail investors, market authorities and
so on. The literature states the superiority of one method considering one
of this point of view, but not all simultaneously, considering the presence of
2In this case, it is computed as
log
stock market clearing price
IPO price
.
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interests’ conflicts. Each candidate profile has a best specific mechanism in
response to their own needs:
– Issuing Firm. The book building method is suited for young, unknown
and risk companies thus these companies need someone accompanies
them in the listing and furthermore it is difficult to acquire information
for investors under these conditions, getting into a under-subscription.
Auction and FPO mechanisms are more suited for mature companies
(Chemmanur and Liu, 2003)[10]. The auction is preferred by well-
known firms having sufficient attraction not to have recourse to a firm
commitment or a fixed priced contract. In this case, in fact, the issuer
has the sureness that the auction will be fine and the investors, both
retail and institutional, will be able to evaluate the firm value and so
given a price for the shares.
– Investors. The institutional investors are better advised to use the fixed
price offering or the book-building method. With a FPO, the flotation
price is often more undervalued in relation to the basic share value than
with an auction procedure and, since all orders are taken and rationed
in proportion to the quantity demanded, large investors are assured
of getting shares with good profit potential. With the book-building
method, professional investors could hope to be rewarded for services
provided to the underwriter (e.g. regular share subscription, honest
disclosure of their buying intentions, price support).
For the retail investors, in the majority of the case, the book-building
procedure is closed and in the fixed price offering they are penalized for
the amount of order.
At the same time, they need enough information to evaluate the shares.
So, for them, the best method is a mix between auction and bb in
the way in which they minimize the risk of overvaluation and a fair
allocation rate.
– The underwriter. The book-building method results to be the best
procedure for the underwriter to which it gives great control over the
IPO process as well as larger placing and brokerage commissions. At
the contrary, in the other two case, its role is marginal and also its
commission.
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Conclusion
This chapter, as already amply stressed in several points, aims to provide first
of all an overview of the different strands of historically formulated explana-
tory theories to explain the phenomenon of IPO Underpricing. Secondly, the
objective is to understand if they can find an unequivocal response to the
phenomenon of underpricing and the evolution of the book building.
To proceed in this direction, we have provided a clear and orderly overview
of theories and a description of the listing process. It has shown a plurality
of theories: information asymmetry, control ownership, procedural theory,
behavioral theory. In the next chapter, through a descriptive analysis of the
data, we will try to understand if the theories apply to reality and if they
can give an answer the initial questions.
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Chapter 2
The evolution of Ipo Process
Up to this point of the present work we have focused on illustrating in detail
the characteristics of the IPO Process, while at the same time offering an
in-depth overview of the studies that have investigated the causes. The
contribution of external academics and researchers, who have attempted to
unravel Underpricing through their papers, has undoubtedly been significant,
but not sufficient. So, here we analyze the trend of the domestic and foreign
market.
The chapter is organized as follows:
– The first section describes the Ipo in the history from 1994 to 2004,
with a particular accent on the Italian situation. In this description,
there is the evidence of the Italian market to follow the trends of the
US market;
– In the second section. there is a description of the main financial mar-
ket both Western and Eastern, considering the main peculiarities of
each of them. Here, there is a careful analysis of the overpricing and
underpricing peaks.
Certainly, to analyze the various IPO procedures used in Europe, it was
difficult to identify the identical listing mechanisms for which the terminology
differed from one country to another. A clear codification of IPO procedures,
available to broadcasters in Europe, would facilitate the process of opening
up the public on a European scale.
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2.1 The IPO in the history
Auctions were used in Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK in the
1980s, and in Argentina, Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey in the 1990s, but
they were abandoned in all these countries well before book building was
introduced. Auctions were required for many years in Japan, yet quickly
vanished once book building was allowed. In France, auctions were popular
in the first half of the 1990s. On the regulated exchanges, they gradually
lost market share to a restricted form of book building over several years,
then dried up quickly in 1999 when a more standard form of book building
was allowed.
In Latin America, auctions have been used in the majority of the case in
Brazil and Peru. This last market was very quiet for much of the last decade,
with delisting outnumbering listings in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Thus,
out of 46 countries, auctions have been tried in more than 20, and yet all
except France, Israel1, Taiwan and the US2 seem to have abandoned them
entirely, and auctions are rare events in these last four countries. Book
building gains in popularity and it is the dominant method in 34 of the
463. Fixed price public offer is still used in smaller countries and for smaller
offerings, and is common for the retail tranche of hybrids.
The panel shows the context from 1994 to 2004.
It underlines the increasing popularity of the book-building method and the
market decline in varying degrees of the other two procedures. From 1995 to
1997 a little more than 60% of flotation was carried out through the book-
building method, while this percentage rose to over 90% for the 1998-2000
and 2001-2004 periods. Conversely, since 1995, fixed price offerings and auc-
tions have fallen increasingly out of favor: together they represent less than
5% of flotations for the 2001-2004 period as against nearly 40% for 1995-
1997. However, the auction method seems to have held up better than fixed
price offerings against book-building during the speculative phase. Its capac-
1In Israel, the auction was the only method until 2003.
2In 1999, WR Hambrecht introduced the OpenIPO auction mechanism in the United States
to compete with the book-building approach, which effectively had complete control over IPO
issuance. Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht was the lead underwriter in 19 auctioned
IPOs.
3The sample is composed by Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, U.S., Australia, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Kenya, Israel.
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Table 2.1: Ipo in the history
Total Period Sub-Period
1995-2004 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2004
Number % Number % Number
FPOs 139 7.67 71 23.28 60 5.31 8 2.12
Auctions 96 5.30 46 15.08 45 3.98 5 1.33
Book-building 1,577 87.03 188 61.64 1,025 90.71 364 96.55
Total 1,812 100 305 16.83 1,130 63,36 377 20.81
ity to limit initial underpricing during hot market periods could explain the
fact that, without offering a serious challenge to the book-building method,
it remained in relatively frequent use in the 1998-2000 period[4], even if the
method has been abandoned. In Italy, there are no auctions in the last years.
Many fixed price offerings were used in Turkey and many auctions in France.
Particular is the result of Portugal and United Kingdom where the auction
Ipo’s are equal to zero.
For the other countries, the most popular method is Book Building.
The sample concerns the period of analysis before the Euronext and so the
requirements to became public were different by countries. The differences in
Turkey and France can be explained by the different legislation conditions of
the market. For example, in both countries the auctioneer can be the stock
market company and not only the lead bank. So this table isn’t credible
because the data are not harmonized.
Since 2003, European countries can be easily compared because they are
subject to the same legislation. It is Directive 2003/71/EC transposed by
the countries belonging to the EU. Called European passport, it indicates
the prospectus to show to the public in the event of a public offering. In gen-
eral, it envisaged new rules which would allow raising capital easily. Also, it
has strengthened the protection for investors by a clear offer and complete
statements to take rational decisions.
2.1.1 Italian situation
The Italian market is very poor of information about these procedures and
its evolution. Indeed, the unique Italian studies are given by Borsa Italiana
in few Bit Notes, [16], [15], [24]. This aspect is linked to another one: the
majority of the Italian firms declared to have available scarce information on
the characteristics of the markets, on the societies and on the operation of
the process of quotation (4 enterprises on 5)[15].
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Figure 2.1: Process of pricing
Despite the unclear information, the underpricing has been decreasing show-
ing a better efficiency of the pricing process. The price process has deeply
changed during the last years, from the auctioned Ipo disappeared in the
late 1980s and the fixed price offering disappeared in the mid-1990s until the
listing of Enimont4 in 1989. With this firm, there was the publication of a
range price in a document with a lower and upper bound. It was a pioneer
of the Book-building method. In 1999, there was another innovation: for the
first time, a firm was listed without the publication of an offer price, it was
the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. The retail investors didn’t know the
price was binding.
The Italian market shows a tendency towards that one of United State mar-
ket where the going public process occurs with the book-building method.
Indeed, Del Favero (1986), Faema (1986) and Finarte (1986) were the last
Ipo auction.
4Enimont S.p.A. was a very important Italian firm, result of the most relevant fusion and
alliance between the public chemistry and that one private.
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2.2 Description of Markets
The principal exchange markets have different mechanisms. Following, for
each one, there is a description of the procedure:
– Hong Kong. The permitted listed methods are:
∗ Offer for Subscription: An offer to the public by, or on behalf of,
an issuer of its own securities for subscription.
∗ Offer for Sale: An offer to the public by, or on behalf of, the holders
of securities already in issue or agreed to be subscribed.
∗ Placing: The obtaining of subscriptions for, or the sale of securities
by, an issuer or intermediary primarily from or to persons selected
or approved by the issuer or the intermediary.
∗ Introduction: An application for listing of securities already in issue
where no marketing arrangements are required.
– London. The permitted listed methods are:
∗ Public offering: GDRs5 are offered to institutional investors and
listed on an international stock exchange outside the issuer’s home
market. The offering will be underwritten by an investment bank.
∗ Listing: Issuers can list their GDRs without raising capital known
as an introduction. By listing, issuers will have access to a wider
group of institutional investors as well as increasing their visibility
and name recognition
∗ Placing (or private placement): A placing is usually a more selective
process whereby GDRs are offered to a small number of selected
institutions. While this route gives the issuer more control over the
distribution, it can restrict the shareholder base and naturally limit
liquidity.
– Thailand. There are two main methods of underwriting, they are as
follow:
∗ Firm underwriting: The underwriter must sell all securities. Fail-
ing to do so, the underwriter shall buy all unsold/undistributed
securities. This way, the company can ensure that the full amount
of capital can be sought.
5Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs) are negotiable certificates issued by depositary banks
which represent ownership of a given number of a company’s shares which can be listed and traded
independently from the underlying shares. These instruments are typically used by companies
from emerging markets and marketed to professional investors only.
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∗ Best effort underwriting: The underwriter uses its best efforts to
sell as many securities as possible. When the underwriter is unable
to distribute/sell all shares, the underwriter isn’t obliged to buy the
unsold securities. Normally, the fee for this method is lower than
that for the first method.
– Euro Paris. The sale of shares in an IPO may take several forms:
∗ Initial Public Offering: The equity securities of the company are of-
fered for subscription to institutional and retail investors. The IPO
process is used when the company seeks to raise capital. This type
of listings is used when the company offers its equity securities to
the public. For a Public Offering of equity securities, a prospectus
approved by the Competent Authority is required.
∗ Private placement: It involves an offering of equity securities to
a selected base of professional/qualified investors. An approved
prospectus is not required except if the equity securities are ad-
mitted to listing and/or trading on a Regulated Market. For the
first admission to trading on Alternext, the company must provide
the Listing Execution team or the EMS CA team with an informa-
tion document, which must be drafted in accordance with the same
standards as those for a prospectus.
∗ Direct listing: A direct listing simply consists in making securities
tradable (no capital raising). An approved prospectus is not re-
quired except if the company seeks for a listing on a Regulated Mar-
ket. Notice that when the company’s equity securities are already
admitted to trading on another EU-regulated Market for more than
18 months, the EU Prospectus Directive’s pass-porting process (a
facility for issuers wishing to publicly offer securities or admit se-
curities to trading on a Regulated Market in a Member State other
than their home Member State’s Regulated Market) is available.
– Nasdaq. The common methods include:
∗ Best efforts contract: The underwriter agrees to sell as many shares
as possible at the agreed-upon price. All-or-none contract: contract
the underwriter agrees either to sell the entire offering or to cancel
the deal.
∗ Firm commitment contract: The underwriter guarantees the sale
of the issued stock at the agreed-upon price. For the issuer, it is
the safest but the most expensive type of the contracts, since the
underwriter takes the risk of sale.
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∗ All-or-none contract: Contract the underwriter agrees either to sell
the entire offering or to cancel the deal.
∗ Bought deal: Form of financial arrangement often associated with
anInitial Public Offering. It occurs when an underwriter, such
as aninvestment bankor a syndicate, purchasessecuritiesfrom anis-
suerbefore a preliminary prospectus is filed. The investment bank
(orunderwriter) acts asprincipalrather thanagentand thus actually
"goes long" in the security. The bank negotiates a price with the
issuer (usually at a discount to the currentmarket price, if applica-
ble).
– Nyse. The kind of listings are:
∗ Listing in conjunction with an initial public offering (a classical
Book-building procedure).
∗ Listing in conjunction with a carve-out transaction: A carve-out
is the partial divestiture of a business unit in which a parent com-
pany sells minority interest of a child company to outside investors.
A company undertaking a carve-out is not selling a business unit
outright but, instead, is selling an equity stake in that business or
spinning the business off on its own while retaining an equity stake
itself. A carve-out allows a company to capitalize on a business
segment that may not be part of its core operations.
∗ Listing in conjunction with a spin-off transaction: A spinoff is the
creation of an independent company through the sale or distribu-
tion of new shares of an existing business or division of a parent
company. A spinoff is a type of divestiture. Businesses wishing to
streamline their operations often sell less productive or unrelated
subsidiary businesses as spinoffs.
All these markets are described by a panel collected the date of the interval
2010-2014. In this way, the Italian scenery can be analyzed with respect the
evolution of the principal market of the world, both Western and Eastern
and analyzing both the vibrancy of the national market that the proceeds
are used.
The period is the interval 2010 - 2014. The decision about the period is
linked to the fact that I would drop the influence of the economic events
of the crisis in 2007 which represents a period of high uncertainty on the
financial market. It is large enough to obtain an amount of information such
that the anomalies will be negligible.
The sample derives from the database of Thomson Reuters Eikon and by the
stock market websites.
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The operations will be divided according to:
– Equity Deal Number;
– Offer Price;
– Offering Technique;
– Price 1 Day After Offer;
– Listing Date;
– Exchange of Listing.
2.2.1 Description of the data
I have micro panel data with a number of observations N = 903 and with
T=5 (t0=2010,t1=2011,t2=2012,t3=2013,t4=2014) subdivided as follows:
– In 2014, we have 324 observations;
– in 2013, we have 262 observations;
– in 2012, we have 140 observations;
– in 2011, we have 169 observations;
– in 2010, we have 222 observations;
From the data of Thomson Reuters Eikon, the initial public offerings are
subdivided in:
– Offer for Subscription: A method of selling shares in new issue. The
issue is aborted if the offer does not raise sufficient interest from in-
vestors.
– Offer for Sale: A method of bringing a company to the stock market by
selling shares in a new issue. The company sponsor offers shares to the
public by inviting subscriptions from investors:
a. Offer for sale by fixed price - the sponsor fixes the price prior to
the offer.
b. Offer for sale by tender - investors state the price they are willing
to pay. A strike price is established by the sponsors after receiving
all the bids. All investors pay the strike price.
A prospectus, containing details of the sale, must be printed in a na-
tional newspaper.
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– Firm Commitment: In a firm commitment, underwriters act dealers and
are responsible for any unsold inventory. The dealer profits from the
spread between the purchase price and the offering price Also known as
a "firm commitment underwriting".
– Placement: A placement is the sale of securities to a small number of pri-
vate investors that is exempt from registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the Regulation D as are fixed annuities.
This exemption makes a placement a less expensive way for a company
to raise capital compared to a public offering. A formal prospectus is
not necessary for a private placement, and the participants in a private
placement are usually large, sophisticated investors such as investment
banks, investment funds and insurance companies.
– Best efforts: Best efforts relieve underwriters from responsibility for any
unsold inventory if they are unable to sell all the securities.
– Negotiated Sale: In a negotiated sale, the underwriter, selected by the
issuing entity before the sale date, will perform the financing for the
issue. Lower quality issues generally reap the greatest benefit from
this type of underwriting technique as the underwriter works with the
company to sell the issue to the market. When the underwriter and the
issuer work together to clearly explain the issue, they will often receive
a better rate in the market for the issuer. Negotiated sales allow for
greater flexibility to when the issue is released so that it can be better
timed in the market to get the best rate.
– Open Offer: Open IPO offers to sell unseasoned shares through a Dutch
auction. In its advertising (for example on its website: www.openipo.com),
it emphasizes that the use of this standard uniform price, market clear-
ing auction ensures that IPO offering prices are fixed by the market and
reflect what people are truly willing to pay for the stock. It also advises
that investors should make a bid at the maximum price at which they
are comfortable owning shares of the issue.
– Auction: The seller sets a reservation price p, the investors submit
demand functions, and the IPO price is set in order to equate supply
and demand.
– Wit Capital: It follows a somewhat more standard strategy. It seeks to
entice individual investors to bid in IPOs, but it does not contribute in
a major way to the price discovery mechanism. The latter is in large
part operated by the lead managers of the IPOs in which Wit Capital
participates. These lead managers, which are major investment banks,
such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, or Merrill Lynch, determine
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the IPO price based on the traditional Book Building process, which is
more focused on large institutional investors.
The several methods have to be classified or almost reconnected to the two
principal mechanisms: BookBuilding and Auction. The fixed price offering
is included in the first one type. This decision is made in order to divide the
procedure following the discriminant of insider/outsider method:
- It is an insider method when the formation of the price is defined by
the agents involved in the decision to go public (bank and issuer).
- It is an outsider method when the formation of the price is defined by
the market: agents not involved in the decision to go public, but only
affected.
The underpricing is defined:
(pi1 − pi0)
pi0
where pi1 is the price the first day after the Ipo and pi0 is the offer price.
2.2.2 Analysis of data
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Underpricing 0.163 1.384 903
Number 2.4*108 1.9*108 903
Offer Price 2.016 5.608 903
Price 1Day Af 2.179 6.144 903
Table 2.2 collects the key variables described through the mean and the stan-
dard deviation„ showing a strong volatility of the First Price Day After. This
value is clearly correlated to the underpricing and so it is more significant
with respect to the volatility of the shares’ number.
The BoxPlot describes the trend of the underpricing of all 903 observations.
It shows an anomalous value in correspondence of an underpricing equal to
35$. It coincides with the Ipo of FSBancorp. Inc. Its issuer price was 10$
against the price of the first day after 45$. The firm listed on Nasdaq with
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the BookBuilding procedure. FS Bancorp, Inc. operates as a bank holding
company for 1st Security Bank of Washington that provides banking and
financial services to families, businesses, and industry niches in Puget Sound
area communities, Washington. The company offers various deposit instru-
ments, including checking accounts, money market deposit accounts, savings
accounts, and certificates of deposits.
The Italian Market is less active with respect the others ones and it underlines
only two cases of a strong underpricing:
1. The Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen SA is a traded insurance company
and is one of the largest financial institutions in Poland. It is also one
of the top insurance companies in Central and Eastern Europe. Its offer
price has been 105,975 against the 1 day after price 113,373. The strong
difference can easily be explained: the company had many interests in
the success of the operation and putting the investors in a favorable
situation given his position of financial intermediary. Indeed, usually,
the financial institutions are eliminated from the analysis. The reason
is that the depositors often have the right to purchase the shares with
priority. More, being customers of the bank, they have a lower Ipo
price.
2. The Brunello Cucinelli is an Italian fashion firm. Its great underpricing
is justified with the strong relationship that Brunello Cucinelli had de-
veloped with the banks. Indeed, also as private company, he illustrated
the business budgets to the banks that sustained him [12].
The Hong Kong market shows a large number of initial public offering, with
a very tight range [−0.3; 1]. Indeed, the strongest underpricing reaches the
value 1, very distant from the maximum of the Western world.
The Nasdaq exhibits a significant underpricing with the RocketFuelInc com-
pany in 2013 [28], [27]. Its offer price was $29 against $59, 95 for share the
first day after the initial public offering. In this case, the success didn’t ex-
plain through particular relationship with banks, indeed the unique possible
reason was that the interesting market of the public company: the A.I. and
the strong growth of the firm in the last years.
The Euronext is a quite equilibrated stock market. It presents a small range
in which there are underpricing and overpricing situation in the same size.
Mauna Kea Technologies obtained an underpricing equal to 6, 186. It is a
medical device company and it was at the forefront of medical innovations, a
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true pioneer. These features explain why there was an underpricing so strong.
The market exhibits also an overpricing with a French start up Viadeo, the
biggest online network for job seekers in China and in France. Its competition
with LinkedIn could have generated a failure and so, for having 171 million
euros to capitalization, it decided to increase the final price.
Thailand is the more stable market of all presented. The range is [−0, 089; 0, 797]
for all the operation.
The London Exchange Market has an underpricing very moderate. The
greater underpricing was only of $3, 323 for Bet-fair Group Ltd. It was an
online gambling company founded in 2000.
In the New York Stock Exchange, the OaktreeCapitalGroupLLC lived a
particular situation: an undersubscription of shares and an underpricing. It
is specialized in alternative investment and its peculiarity maybe scared the
investors. This event shows that a strong underpricing is not an assurance
against the unsold shares.
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Figure 2.2: Box Plot Underpricing
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Figure 2.3: Underpricing in Milan
Figure 2.4: Underpricing in HongKong
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Figure 2.5: Underpricing in Nasdaq
Figure 2.6: Underpricing in Euronext
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Figure 2.7: Underpricing in Thailand
Figure 2.8: Underpricing in London
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Figure 2.9: Underpricing in Nyse
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Figure 2.10: Underpricing in relation with Offerprice
36
Figure 2.11: Underpricing in Bookbuilding
Figure 2.12: Underpricing in Auction
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Conclusion
This chapter shows that the topic is very controversial. The literature doesn’t
show any final statement in favor of a procedure, indeed, each theory has
some lacks because none, at the same time, considers all aspects.
Unfortunately, our data doesn’t explain what is the best mechanism thus
the number of auction is very limited in proportion to the book-building
procedure. On 903 observation, only 149 firms use the auction mechanism
to become public, the others use the placement method.
The table 2.3 that the book-building method is better in terms of mean and
standard deviation, even if it shows some strong maximum. The problem
of the data is the low number of auctions in the last years. For this reason,
we overcome the empirical analysis to a theoretical model, explained in the
following chapter.
Table 2.3: Summary description
Underpricing Mean Std. Dev. N
Auction 1.373 1.182 149
Book-building 0.149 0.477 754
The analysis of the theories and the evolution of the Ipo did not provide
any significant information on the phenomenon of underpricing and on the
superiority of one procedure over another one. For this reason, the next
chapter will try to give an answer on what is the best method using another
approach.
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Chapter 3
The best Ipo mechanism
The aim of this chapter is to develop the resolution to the problem of the
best Ipo method, based on the theoretical analysis of the previous literature
review. There are two principal problems of the listing process: the maxi-
mization of the proceeds of the firm and the efficient sale of the shares to the
investors.
The chapter is subdivided in the following key points:
– The first section describes the features of the revenue function for the
firms in each mechanism. The decision variable is p the offer price for a
unit share. The revenue function is analyzed also for what concerns the
risk degree. Each mechanism has a particular function deriving from
the loving or averse risk function. The risk degree is evaluated both
from the supply side and from the demand side, considering, obviously,
their own peculiarities;
– The second section incorporates the cost of an initial public offering and
it works out the profit function. The key configuration cost considered
is the informational one, keeping in the dark the others kind of cost;
– The third section re-works the considerations of the first and second
section and it presents the model. The focus is on the construction of
a model which makes endogenous the information cost structure. It
refers to an optimization problem with the participation constraint of
the investors. From its resolution, we get the indifference condition;
– The last section focuses on the main open questions and the results of
the model.
At the end of this chapter, the success of the book-building will assume
another lecture with respect to the previous theories.
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3.1 The revenue function
Several academics, as seen in the previous paragraph ([13], [19], [18]), studied
and are studying the Ipo mechanism. A critical analysis of their works allows
me to find some significant differences between the fixed price offering/book-
building1 and the auction.
The main difference lies in the price determination. Its definition is an es-
sential phase. Indeed, it must satisfy a plurality of subjects, unfortunately
bearers of conflicting interests: the investors, the issuer and the underwriter.
Furthermore, it represents the value of the company that is going to be
listed, a value that encompasses the profitability of its future strategies and
the ability to generate sufficient income to satisfy potential shareholders.
For the previous considerations, I’ll decide to build a model in which the
price has the central role and the several listing mechanisms can be divided
into two groups: the insider and outsider ones, according to the price setting.
The determinant is the endogeneity or the exogeneity of the final price, i.e. if
it is defined by an internal subject or by the market. Based on this criterium,
the procedures are subdivided as follows:
– The book-building procedure and the fixed price offering are considered
an insider method: the price is specified by actors internal like the issuer
firm or hired by it. Indeed, it is not a question of the easy equilibrium
price resulting from the meeting between the demand and the supply
as usually occurred in the goods’ market. The decision could be due
to the fact that only the internal actors like the issuer firm and the
underwriter bank know the real fair value of the shares, contrary the
demand side could consider some aspects misleading of the reality2.
– The auction is considered an outsider method since the price is speci-
fied by the market. The mechanism conducts a transparent definition
of price. On the other hand, it leads the investors versus two nega-
tive phenomena: the winner’s curse and the free-riding problem and
therefore the price could suffer some situation totally unrelated to what
concerns the firm’s value.
Starting from these conditions, let see in more depth way, the price definition
and how it influences the revenue value.
1In the following pages, the two methods are joined under the same word: book-building.
2In a period of crisis, investors could underestimate the company, with the risk for it to obtain
a too low profit. Or, at favorable times of the market, they could overestimate the company,
remaining subsequently disappointed causing a fall in the price of the shares.
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In the insider procedure, the revenue is given by E = p ∗ Q where p is the
unitary price of a share and Q is the number of the shares listed on the
market. The price is a determined value, deriving from analytical methods
such as the Discounted Cash Flow, the Eva or in a totally discretionary
mechanism.
Unlike in the auction method, the revenue depends on the value V that the
bidders assign to the firm and it is equal to E(V, p) = p(V ) ∗ Q. So, in
this case, the determination of the price depends on the valuation of the
investors, external subjects that carry out personal analyzes on the solidity
and profitability of the deal and then, they identify a monetary value for the
share.
What however does not change within the revenue analysis, is the number
of shares proposed to the market. There is no indication that the listing
method can justify a variation on the shares’ quantity.
In both cases, investors have the same treatment. Everyone pays the same
final price p and it is a blind procedure in which everyone moves simultane-
ously assuming the impossibility of tacit or explicit collusion.
Given these features, the revenue of the issuer in the two cases is respectively:
Ebb = p ∗Q for BB.
Ea = p(V ) ∗Q for Auction.
Sometimes, the auctioned firm may impose a reservation price pr to protect
itself from a too low profit: p(V ) ≥ pr. That means the revenue structure
becomes: {
p(V ) ∗ q if p(V ) ≥ pr
0 otherwise
The valuation V of investors is the same in the two procedure because the
mechanism doesn’t affect their beliefs on the firm.
3.1.1 Risk propensity
The risk degree of the two procedure is different The decision-making process
of actors, combining different behaviors, leads to a different risk attitude On
this aspect, there are two lines of thought.
A first line, with main exponents Chemmanuer and Liu[10], considers the
two mechanisms as follows:
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i. Risk averse in the auction mechanism. Auction will be preferred by
well known firms having enough attraction for not recurring to a book
runner or a fixed price contract. Indeed, if an issuer isn’t enough famous
on the financial markets, there is a high probability to fail.
ii. Risk loving in the book-building mechanism. This method is suitable for
young and high risk companies, needing to be guided and accompanied
during the listing procedure.
On the other hand, the second line of thought, given by Sherman[18], makes
different assertions:
i. Risk loving in auction method. The firm doesn’t have references about
the investors, their liquidity and solvency and there is a lack of infor-
mation about the number of participants. All these aspects increase
the uncertainty of the success and so the connected risk. Therefore, the
firms, use this listing method, are risk seeking;
ii. Risk adverse in book-building mechanism. The firm has all the informa-
tion about the investors and the number of participants. The analysis
is conducted by an investment bank which possesses all the capabilities
to make an accurate elaboration of truthful data. This analysis has a
cost C > 0 that may be identified with the contract cost.
Aligned with the firms’ vision, there is a change also in the investors’ per-
ceived risk degree. Their perceptions changes with respect the quantity and
quality of information about the firms:
i. In the BB method, the information about the solidity of the company
are fixed up from the book-runner, after numerous studies of the market
and an analysis of the balances sheet. The bank has all the abilities to
pick up a truthful analysis thanks to a specialist Ipo group;
ii. In the auction method, the analysis of firm’s solidity must be conducted
by the investors, which, with difficulty, have to elaborate data for un-
derstanding the real value of the issuer. Notice that, the bank, in this
case, has a marginal role (see the first chapter) and the investors make
autonomously an evaluation. This self-analysis has a cost Ca ∈ [c, c]
and it is strictly positive.
At the light of that, let us conclude that the auction mechanism has a bigger
risk to fail for the uncertainty about the investors evaluation. So, summa-
rizing my conclusion about the risk propensity, let us obtain:
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– The auction mechanism is more hazardous. It is a method intrinsically
influenced by the information of the bidders: the winner’s curse and
the free rider are the biggest problems of the procedure success. But,
in the Ipo auction, this risk is amplified because of financial markets
volatility. It has the power to modify easily and quickly the price for
share.
– The BB mechanism has a lower risk. The firms and the investors are
accompanied by all the steps by a specialized figure. In this way, both
agents are confidants: the issuer firm knows that its offer price reflects
the market demand and it is protected by unsold shares with particular
underwriting contract; while the investors believe that the Ipo price
reflects the real solidity of the firm.
3.2 The profit function
To formulate our problem, in addition to the revenue function, it’s necessary
to design the features of the profit function. Indeed, previously, the focus
was only on the revenues leaving out the Ipo’s cost.
The issuing firm, both in auction and in book building, has to support several
costs which can be resumed into three groups [14]:
– Advisory counsel. An Ipo is a very complex process. It involves inter-
action with stock markets and securities agencies to change the firm’s
legal incorporation and to apply for the shares’ listing.
– Filing and listing fees. Any firm must pay a fee to the stock exchange
market. More, it is obliged to pay an annual fee to remain listed.
– Corporate resources. The initial public offering is the result of strong
and hard work of several months prior to the offer date. The resources
for directing public companies are higher than those ones of private
companies in terms of management’s skills, time and wage.
The previous expense items won’t be included in the analysis of the profit
function because they are common to any firm whatever it is the listing pro-
cedure3.
3The cost can be separated also in two kinds: direct and indirect. The direct cost are
standard cost and they are represented by fees, sales commissions, fees for legal advice as well
as for auditing, expenses for accounting service, transaction costs. On the other side, there are
the indirect cost. They are much more difficult to quantify, if compared with other costs, purely
monetary. They are correlated to the the time spent by management in assisting step by step
the whole procedure.
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For our analysis, the relevant cost is the information cost which differs be-
tween the two kinds of procedure in the figure that sustains it. The informa-
tion concerns the features of the public firms. It includes the balance sheet,
the rating, the main operations, the structure of ownership, the solidity,
the liquidity, the competitive position, the corporate purpose, the consumer
target and the forecast on the profit after the listing. So, they are all the
information considered relevant not only related on the characteristics of the
offer, but also on the economic-financial position of the company.
In the book-building, the issuer firms recruit a staff to make these analy-
ses, signing a contract with a bank-runner under the payment of a fee C.
The underwriter draws up a document with all the tax, legal and financial
information necessary for fulfilling the Due Diligence function and then he
makes available the information prospectus. The cost C is a parachute for
the issuer. The greatest risk: unsold shares falls on the underwriter. The
issuer firm won’t then worry about the subsequent disposal of the shares to
the public of investors: if the sale fails in this sense, the weight of this failure
will fall completely on the underwriter.
In the auction, the procedure information is not charged to the issuing firm,
but to the investors. They must independently collect information on issuer
financial soundness to propose an offer that represents in a truthful and
realistic way the value of the company.
However, some information is made publicly available. It is a practice that
the business strategies are announced as well as the motivations underlying
these choices in a document. It must be submitted to the supervisory author-
ity that manages and controls the market (in the case of US, the judgment is
entrusted to the SEC, in the domestic context it is the Consob) and must be
made public before the offer and the issue of the security, so that investors
can use it as a decision tool [Borsa Italiana S.p.A. (2001)].
So, for the auction case, the firm has only to define the shares whole, the
reservation price and to respect the legal obligations, it avoids to spend
other resources4. To the light of these considerations, the profit for the
bookbuilding firm and for the auctioned one are respectively:
pibb = p ∗Q− C
pia = p ∗Q
4Notice that in our assumption, the auctioned firm is more risky because it doesn’t hire any
bank to support itself along the procedure.
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3.3 The dual problem
The model considers the views’ point of the issuer firm. It assumes homo-
geneity of the firms that participate to the Ipo’s and a homogeneity within the
investors. The maximization problem consists in an objective function, rep-
resented by the firm’s revenue and in an investors’ participation constraint5.
They participate to the listing mechanism if their benefits are greater or
equal than the cost of participation.
p ≤ V − u BB participation constraint .
p ≤ V − Ca − u Auction participation constraint .
The requested above notations represent:
– p is the unitarian price. It is the monetary expenditure for buying one
unit share;
– V is the evaluation of the shares from the bidders (or investors);
– u is the reservation utility6. In BB method, the notation is u, while in
the other one, the notation is u;
– Ca is the information cost. It is inserted in the participation constraint
because it may be prevented ex-ante, using its expected value. It can
move into an interval [c, c] ⊂ R+. The information cost is uniformly
distributed and its probability density function and cumulative distri-
bution function are respectively:
P (Ca) =

0 for Ca < c
1
(c−c) for c ≤ Ca ≤ c
0 for Ca > c
.
D(Ca) =

0 for Ca < c
Ca−c
(c−c) for c ≤ Ca ≤ c
0 for Ca > c
.
5The participation constraint represents the constraint that must be satisfied for an agent to
decide to participate or not to an economic process. Participation takes place when the agent
obtains a utility at least equal to that which he would have if he did not participate in the
economic process.
6The minimum level of utility that must be guaranteed by a contract to make it acceptable
to an agent in contract theory
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The profit of the firm is:
pi =
{
p(V ) ∗Q for auction
p ∗Q− C for BB .
In the auction, there are no cost or at least no relevant costs for the firms,
in the BB method, the firm has to sustain the contract cost C with the
underwriter bank.
The assumption about the investors’ reservation utility captures the fact
that the auction is riskier and the investors require a higher utility when
they participate to the last listing method.
u = u+ k with k ∈ R++.
This specification is explained by the fact that the auction choice is riskier
and so they claim a higher utility. Substituting in the constraint:
pa ≤ V − Ca − (u+ k).
The optimization problem of the firm in BookBuilding procedure is:
max
pbb
log(pbb ∗Q− C)
subj. to pbb ≤ V − u
The profit pibb is equal to the difference between the revenue Ebb = pbb ∗Q and the
contract’s cost C. Notice that we consider a concave utility function, risk averse.
The optimization problem of the firm in Auction procedure is:
max
pa
(pa ∗Q)2
subj. to pa ≤ V − (u+ k)− Ca
Here, the profit pia is represented only by the revenue Ea = pa ∗ Q because we
consider the other costs supported by the firm very low and so irrelevant for the
analysis. Notice that it is a convex function, risk loving.
However, the form of functions is nevertheless irrelevant because both functions
are increasing in p. This means that the optimization could be analyzed also un-
der a common utility function, instead of the differentiation between concave and
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convex form. {
log(pa ∗Q) for auction
log(pbb ∗Q− C) for BB
The solutions of the problems are respectively:
pbb = V − u.
pa = V − (u+ k)− Ca.
The firm’s revenue in the book-building is higher than in auction when:
Ebb > Ea if Ca + k > 0.
Since Ca+ k is always greater than zero, the firm always gains more with the first
method than with the second one.
The information cost Ca is the crucial value to understand what profit is higher.
It is linked to k, that is the difference of reservation utility u and u. Wider is the
difference, greater is the risk in the auction procedure.
Indeed, substituting the Ca with its expected value c+c2 and omitting the real
number, the inequality becomes:
c+ c > u− u.
What is important for each firm, it isn’t the revenue E, but the net profit pi. Under
this point, the conclusion could be different:
pibb = V − u− C.
pia = V − (u+ k)− Ca,
The choice of firm is not more clearly unequivocal. Indeed, the firm choices the
book-building procedure when:
pibb > pia ↔ Ca > k + C.
or the auction method when:
pibb < pia ↔ Ca < k + C.
The firm’s profit is greater in the first case when the cost of the auction for the
investors is greater than the difference of reservation utility and the contract’s cost.
The two procedure are indifferent for the issuer when:
Ca = k + C Indifference condition (3.1)
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that is:
Ca − u = C − u
Ca − C = u− u
So, substituting the expected value of the cost of the information cost in the
indifference condition, let’s obtain:
c+ c = k + C.
In any case, the information cost has to be compensated by the reservation utility,
falling in the investors’ cost. The model explains when a procedure is better than
the other one. The key variables are the costs and the reservation utility. When
the information’s cost is too high, the firm will choose the book-building. This is
a consequence of the fear to fail. If the auction has a high possibility to fail for
lack of investors, the issuer will decide to list with a more reassurance method.
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Conclusion
Under the indifference condition, we can conclude that any information cost is
paid by the investors. Indeed, even if the firm pays the contract cost, it moves the
price upward for covering it. Rearranging the indifference condition let us get the
relationship between the prices:
k = pbb − pa − C.
Thus k is a strictly positive number for hypothesis:
pbb ≥ pa + C.
The book-building price results higher than the auction price. The investors situ-
ation is unfavorable in both cases: or they pay their own information cost or they
pay the cost for the issuer and the revenue of the bank runner: it is a negative
externality of the relationship between the firm and the underwriter. Furthermore,
it is an inefficiency of the market because the price doesn’t reflect the value of the
share as should be in a financial market.
Some implications of our model are exposed below:
• The model predicts that, under indifference condition, the equilibrium price
of the firm is higher in the book building method. The gap between the
placement price and the auction price is wider, higher is the contract cost of
the bank runner.
• The model shows that the book-building offering price aggregates the infor-
mation production cost and so it doesn’t reflect the intrinsic value of the firm,
but it involves some indirect procedural cost. On the other hand, a higher
price reflects a strong positive signal of the firm to the market because the
issuer availed himself of a very competent bank (considering the contract cost
proportional to the bank’s reputation).
• The firm doesn’t have particular benefits of selling equity with the auction
rather than the book-building method.
• The investors don’t have incentive to acquire a low amount of shares in the
book-building procedure because they prefer to buy a great amount to spread
the information cost on the quantities. Therefore, the investors that take part
in the placement method have a strong financial capacity.
Under these explanations, the exponential trend of book-building mechanism isn’t
justified because the firms would have the same profit also under the auctioned
Ipo given some conditions. Thus, at a first glance, the book-building procedure is
useful when the information asymmetry is significant. However, in this way the
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price doesn’t fulfill its role anymore: valorizing what it sells.
The best choice for the firm and the investors would be to transfer the information
cost with a specific function to a third subject: a financial authority.
Unfortunately, this figure is still alive. Organizations such as Consob in Italy,
SEC in U.S. are not able to ensure an efficient performance to the market. They
shall have the responsibility of a sufficient information production.
Is it necessary that investors support a cost of information in the auction?
Probably, everything lies in the distrust of the market towards the supervisory
bodies. Hence, since they are not reassured by the controls and analyzes carried
out by the appropriate organisms, they decide to spend monetary resources, time
and skills in the collection of information that should theoretically already be
available.
Indeed, if the cost that the company sustains for the contract with the under-
writer is justifiable in the fear of the bankruptcy of the company that intends to
list, the information cost of investors cannot be justified in objective situations.
It resides in their fear of being "cheated" by the institutions and they decide to
"work on their own".
We could conclude that therefore the bookbuilding method is nowadays pre-
dominant with respect to the method of the auction, which instead pursues the
law of the market, as a response of economic agents to fear. It overcomes the
problem of unsold shares of the company and solves the problem of the lack of
investor information by offering a complete and careful overview of the economic
and financial situation of the company.
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Abstract
This work considers an exchange economy with a finite number of agents and
a finite number of goods where the agents are arbitragers. The general equilib-
rium theory borrows the notion of arbitrage to the finance for showing how the
consumers move in an economy closer to the real world with uncertainty and differ-
ential information. The first chapter describes the notion of arbitrage, its evolution
during the years through the eyes of several authors. The second chapter analyses
the main aspects of a differential information economy, studying the concept of
core and competitive equilibrium in the ex-ante, in the interim and in the ex-post
stage. In the last chapter, the arbitrage condition becomes the guideline for defin-
ing new notions of competitive equilibrium when the economy is characterized by
uncertainty and differential information.
4
Introduction
The Walrasian equilibrium has a long tradition in economic theory. One crucial
concept is the auctioneer. Under this figure, the agents cannot influence the price
system. The assumption implies that firms and consumers are price-takers and
they accept the equilibrium passively. My work is directed to identify a new
mechanism for arriving to a competitive equilibrium. To reach this goal, I’ll use
the concept of re-contracting.
One of the scholars discussing the limits of competitive equilibrium notion is
Morgenstern. He pointed out 13 points of criticism in the classical economic theory
[26]:
1. Control of economic variables. The equilibrium is obtained only through
the control of some variables such as the profit, the utility, the cost. The
economic theory maximizes the previous functions, not considering the in-
teraction among agents and considering a complete control in any situation.
But, empirically, it is clear that there are some decision makers that influence
the maximization problem, i.e. the State.
2. Revealed Preference Theory. It asserts that it is possible to understand, by
observing the goods’ choice of individuals under a budget constraints, their
preferences, i.e. if an agent has to compare the goods x, y, z and he chooses
sequentially y, x, z, he reveals y  x  z. But, this assumption says nothing
about the nature of the three goods. Indeed, if one of the previous items
is a durable good and the other two ones are not, the situation is totally
different because the choice is influenced by this aspect: for instance, one
item may be acquired for first only because it is cheaper than the durable
good, not because it is preferred. Furthermore, if the agent buys all the
goods, the order of acquisition could be a consequence of his proximity to
these ones. For these reasons, the revealed preference theory has some lacks
if it is applied to the real world.
3. Pareto Optimum. The idea of Pareto is that an optimum of a society or of
a group of individuals may be reached when, by improving the utility of one
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individual, no one else’s position is deteriorated. So, Pareto compares the
utilities of different individuals and the exchange of commodities. The limits
are:
a. No information is given about the nature and the amount of trades, i.e.
some goods could be available only until a maximum amount or there
could be some restrictions about their trades;
b. The agents could not be honest about their own preferences. Therefore,
the reached optimum doesn’t maximize the utility of all actors involved
in the economic process.
4. Tâtonnement1 (French word for "trial and error"). It indicates a process by
which the equilibrium prices are determined through the matching between
demand and supply. This means that, starting from an initial agreement,
the process will change until the market clearing. In this way, the goods
are exchanged many time, forgetting that infinite trade is not possible for
any kind of good (i.e. services or perishable goods don’t have a reversible
supply). Besides this criticism, there will be other unsolved questions such
as: how many trades are permitted, how many commodities and so on.
5. The Walras Pareto Fixation. With the last two points, the doctrine asserts
that an economic system reaches a general equilibrium by a process of "free
competition" producing the optimum equilibrium. But the term "competi-
tion" is misleading. It doesn’t consider human interactions and the agents
are helpless in the face of reality. The term fixation refers to the set of given
prices, wages, interest rates which are not affected by agents’ behavior and
so, they don’t follow the law of market.
6. Allocation of Resources. The theorists of competitive equilibrium don’t con-
sider the existence of monopoly, duopoly or monopolistic competition. This
is a great leak empirically, no other market forms are admitted besides the
perfect competition. The figure of governments is not considered and so the
possibility of public procurement. More, not all exchanges take place un-
der monetary disbursement. Indeed, other allocations can take place in a
dynamic way i.e. inheritance and gift. The Walrasian theory reaches the
optimum through a static process and it is blocked to the present with any
view on the future.
7. Substitution. When the goods are substitutable, they have the same value
for the agents. In reality, the value of an object is not defined by its sub-
1This point will be analyzed in the following paragraph.
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stitutability, but especially for the relation that it has with the other com-
modities. This problem is expressed by all swans are white by finding one
black swan2. To follow this statement, Morgenstern produces some mathe-
matically escamotage proving that not all substitutable goods have the same
value.
8. Demand and Supply. These curves are constructed with no time period
for which they are valid. However, time period may be different due to
the different nature of goods. Sometimes, the consumption time is regular,
in other cases, it doesn’t follow a cyclic interval. In addition, the demand
functions have the same elasticity. The market demand cannot be calculated
by adding individual demand because there are some unexplainable human
behavior not captured by this methodology, i.e. two women want to buy
a dress, but if one woman buys it before the other one, the second woman
doesn’t want to purchase it anymore. The two individual demands cannot
be summed to compute the market demand.
9. Indifference Curve. These lines are simply given. No explanation is given
about the formation of the preferences on which they are based. Furthermore,
they don’t involve some political processes changing the order of curves, i.e.
law, voting, authority. Also, some individuals can have the same preferences,
but not the same utility representation, i.e. someone could have finer utility
scales than others.
10. Theory of the firm. In this case, the gap between the reality and the theory
may be very huge. For example, the productivity is linked only to physical
notion and so it is not possible to compute that one of a school, a law firm or
of an artist. Many other aspects are absents: the location of an enterprise,
the quality control process, the management role and so on.
11. Back to Cantillon3. The effect of monetary policy is not contemplated. More,
the intermediaries function is not present and this is a strong limit when the
agents are faced with the purchase of a durable good.
12. Personal and Function Distribution. The traditional equilibrium theory as-
serts that there are not undistributed resources and that the marginal pro-
ductivity explains how the goods are distributed. So, it presents a connection
2It derives from a latin expression. It refers to an unexpected event.
3Richard Cantillon was an eighteenth-century economist who raised the idea of monetary
non-neutrality also known as "Cantillon Effects". Cantillon and his followers emphasized that
changes in the quantity of money progress over the economy in a step-by-step fashion and lead
to wealth redistributions and to real effects on production processes.
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between the supply (productivity) and the demand (allocation). The hy-
pothesis is not realistic, as it emerges by distinguishing between the personal
and functional distribution. The first one refers to the individual income or
households, the second one to the productivity of the inputs such as labor,
capital and so on. The two kinds of distribution derive from two different
processes and they can’t be overlapped. Indeed, the actual prices of goods
depend on the productivity of the previous period, the actual personal in-
come determines the input prices of the next period. The price formation is
not static and so, it is impossible to explain it with the productivity theory.
13. Theory relevance. All the previous points underline that reality is clouded by
the theory. The new theory should underline the relevance of the empirical
data also in the mathematical model.
These critical points emerged during the 1970’s accompanied by several criticisms
of other authors. As suggested above, the more interesting for the aim of this
work is the one concerning the term "competition" and its identification with
"price-taking" behavior. Morgestern underlines as the term "competition" refers,
in common meaning, to a situation in which there is a fight to get ahead or at
least to hold one’s place; while in economic theory it is used in the opposite way:
a quiet situation in which everyone always arrives to the equilibrium.
Precisely, agents choose their strategies independently one to each other only
considering their budget constraints. Under a "price-taking" behavior assumption,
they passively accept trade conditions and prices imposed by the market.
Arrow summarizes this idea as follows: "There exists a logical gap in the usual
formulation of the theory of perfectly competitive economy, namely, that there is
no place for a rational decision with respect to prices as there is with respect to
quantities"(1959). According to Arrow, the identification of perfectly competitive
markets with price-taking assumption leads to no other alternative than the ex-
istence of the so-called Walrasian auctioneer as an explanation of the source of
equilibrium prices.
Therefore, in order to describe reality, first of all, any model has to take into
account imperfect competition. This suggestion, due to Arrow again, has lead to
the questioning of general equilibrium approach. This is, for example, the case
of applied economic models. In order to deal with a systematic treatment of
imperfectly competitive markets, one is logically led to get rid of the existence
of the auctioneer in favor of a strategic behavior [2]. The perfect competition,
understood as a market in which the price is formed through an invisible hand
that matches demand and supply, is reconsidered giving rise to new theories.
The important difference between the two lines of thought is the abandonment
of the hypothesis that the agents are price-takers.
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The theorists of imperfect competition criticize the classical view of competitive
equilibrium for two main reasons: the explicit treatment of decentralized exchange
and money’s function. These criticisms show that there is no institution in the
economy that could participate to encourage the equilibrium and that the money
is not present in the sense that the agents rely also on their own endowments and
allocations without no possibility of leading or borrowing money. Walras expresses
clearly that the money is only a pure economic device and therefore, he decides to
exclude it from his theory.
So, the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium is based on two main hypotheses:
price-taking behavior and no exchange out of equilibrium. It is founded on two
elements:
1. The numéraire: It is the common measure of relative prices of the goods.
It is equal to the marginal rate of substitution in equilibrium. The price
never changes and the consumers always acquire a bundle of goods, it never
happens that they acquire only one good otherwise it would not be possible
to construct the marginal rate.
2. The tâtonnement: As explained before, it is the process of exchange related
to find the market clearing price for all commodities, giving rise to general
equilibrium.
Walras affirms that, if the process takes place under perfect competition, agents
cannot exchange at a different numéraire. For this reason, he justifies the existence
of a calculator (auctioneer or others4) which determines the quantities and the
market price.
The opposition between strategic behavior and the presence of auctioneer, that
underlines the characteristic approach of imperfect competitive models, resumes
the criticisms to Walras theory on prices formulated by Edgeworth.
The Edgeworth’s approach to economic theory is totally different from the one
of Walras. With the aim of describing economies and markets, he moves from the
analysis of agents’ behavior. Then, he considers perfect competition not as an
assumption, but as a special consequence of agents’ interactions. The Edgeworth’s
criticism focuses on the absence of agents’ strategic behavior and on their price-
taking attitude. His theory does not assume these premises, but it considers perfect
competition as the result of neutralization of strategic behavior [2]. In particular,
4The Walrasian auctioneer is the person conducting the Walrasian auction who effectively
matches supply and demand based upon the bids provided by the economic agents. Such an
auctioneer renders the process of finding trading opportunities perfect and cost-free, which results
in perfect competition in the market. In contrast, outside of a Walrasian auction, there might
exist a "search problem" in which there is a cost for finding a partner to trade with and additional
transaction costs when one meets such a partner.
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Edgeworth develops the concept of the "final settlement". It is a situation in
which there is no way for at least two agents of establishing a new better contract.
In the final settlement, the emphasis is on the outcomes which are immune to
recontracting.
Later, it is accepted, during the 1970’s, that the Edgeworth’s analysis and
view on perfect competition can be reconciled with the Walras’s theory through
the connection between the final settlement and the core. This reconciliation is
formalized by the Debreu-Scarf theorem.
0.1 Reconciliation between Walras and Edgeworth
Quoting Hildebrand:"Since an economy with a finite number of agents is not per-
fectly competitive, Edgeworth introduced a new concept of equilibrium, the "final
settlement" or in a today’s language, the core. The "limit theorem" expresses that
under " perfect competition" these two concepts coincide". Under this different
interpretation, Edgeworth’s approach makes explicit the conditions, only implicit
in Walras, under which a perfectly competitive allocation emerges from the agents’
interactions. A task that is left to the auctioneer by Walras.
The Debreu and Scarf’s idea has been resumed by Aumann: "The definition
of competitive equilibrium assumes that the traders allow market pressures to de-
termine prices, and that they then trade in accordance with these prices, whereas
that of core ignores the price mechanism and involves only direct trading between
the participants. Intuitively, one feels that money and prices are no more than a
device to simplify trading, and therefore the two concepts should lead to the same
allocations. It is to be expected that this will not happen in finite markets, where
the notion of competitive equilibrium is not really applicable; and, indeed, though
any equilibrium allocation is always in the core, the core of a finite market usually
contains points that are not equilibrium allocations. But, when the notion of perfect
competition is built into the model, that is, in a continuous market, one may expect
that the core equals the set of equilibrium allocations. That this is indeed the case is
the main result of this paper. It has long been conjectured that some such theorem
holds; the basic idea dates back at least to Edgeworth. The usual rough statement is
that the core approaches the set of equilibrium allocations as the number of traders
tends to infinity. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to lend precise meaning
to this kind of statement, to say nothing of proving it. Very recently, Debreu and
Scarf did succeed in stating and proving a theorem of this kind in a brilliant and
elegant fashion" Under these assertions, the convergence theorem is interpreted as
the proof that perfect competition can be obtained as a limit economic situation in
which there are many agents. Linked to the concept of great number, the replica
economy occurs. It is an expedient to have a large economy as an illustration of
10
Edgeworth’s mechanism of recontracting. The convergence of an economy with a
great number of agents to a perfect competitive situation has been developed in
the 20th century economics as the general Edgeworthian framework.
In contrast with the commonly accepted reconciliation between the two ap-
proaches built on Debreu Scarf equivalence theorem, the confrontation between
Edgeworth’s and Walras’s theories has been considered as a methodological mis-
understanding by many scholars (see [2], [13]). Even if the two theories have been
placed side by side, there are some significant differences between them. The first
difference is given by the point of view: the French economist has an individual
point of view while the second one has the focus on the actions of a group introduc-
ing the blocking coalitions. In this way, the set of actions available to individuals is
replaced by the actions of a coalition the view. of cooperative games. Furthermore,
the very notion of cooperative games implies that the coalition may be interpreted
as a collective decision body. Within this collective body, individual strategies are
subject to the distributional rule imposed by the coalition. However, even if there
are many analogies with game theory, the Edgeworth’s idea does not really follow
it in any aspect. He establishes a difference between a group of agents entering
voluntarily in a series of bilateral contracts and a collective decision body that he
calls a combination.
In opposition to the purely individual logic of these bilateral arrangements,
a combination depends on a collective logic: the distributional rules established
among their members impose a form of collectivization of private property. He
explains the way in which a combination may be a source of imperfect competition.
So, he introduces only the concept of blocking coalition, but he recognizes the
possibility of the imperfect competition. Another breaking point between the
two academics is represented by the conception of the price system. In Walras’
theory, there is a unique price system determined by a sort of calculator, in the
Edgeworth’s studies, there are several exchanges bilaterally defined and different
one from the others. The final settlement is the result of a contracting process, in
which the price will be defined only at a second time.
The richness of Edgeworth’s theoretical background falls down in modern the-
ory with the above mentioned theorem. If there exists a convergence in terms of
the result (namely the final allocation) of the perfect competitive situation be-
tween Edgeworth and Walras, there is no possible reconciliation in terms of the
exchange mechanism that allows obtaining these results.
Edgeworth’s theory of re-contracting cannot give content to the elusive notion
of tâtonnement as an actual economic process. The only way to match the two
theories is considering the unique price as an assumption and not as a consequence
of the market. A large number of agents allows the possibility to neutralize the
arbitrage and the conclusion is that the general equilibrium price vector is given by
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the institutional framework. Finally, there is the construction of the core concept:
it is a mathematical representation of final settlement, a solution with few data and
a less level of reality description, without an institutional structure. A result with
many mistakes: Walras has a market with perfect information, an auctioneer that
imposes a price vector and no conjectures of agents about the behavior of others,
while Edgeworth underlines the importance of information flow5 for arriving to
the equilibrium and of cooperation among agents.
This is the background of competitive equilibrium theory with price taking
behavior. It is strongly influenced by an overlapping created by the Convergence
Theorem that connects the core concept with the competitive equilibrium.
The evolution of imperfect competition
The evolution of the literature that we are presenting, moves from an economy with
a given price system [28], inserts the concept of re-contracting process to determine
the equilibrium until to obscure the price system in favor of the interaction among
the agents. The agents’ active role determines the equilibrium price: from passive,
their behavior becomes active under a no - price taking attitude.
Schmeidler and Vind describe a finite exchange economy with a given price
system (exogenous as in classical competitive model), but also with the concept
of fair net trade that, in view of the budget set, maximizes the agents’ utility.
The fairness refers to the increments in the commodities of two (or more) agents
deriving from an exchange process between them. They define a net trade as a
function f : N → RL whereN is the set of the agents and L the set of commodities.
The net trade is any change in the holdings of some or all agents that leaves each
of them with a non-negative quantity of each good f(i) + ei6 ≥ 0 The net trade is
balanced when the sum of the increments for each good is zero, i.e.: if the function
f is such that
∑
i∈N f(i) = 0.
The net trade is said to be fair when each agent considers his net trade at least
as good as the net trade of any other agent. A fair net trade is a Walrasian net
trade if there exists p ∈ RL \ {0} such that:
pf(i) = 0
for all i ∈ N .
So, a net trade f is competitive if there exists a price p in RL such that for all
agent i in N , the net trades are balanced and fair. They use this concept instead of
the classical allocation, considering the possibility of recontracting for the agents.
5The information flow is important because under it individuals are in condition to re-contract
and so to communicate.
6The initial endowment of agent i ∈ N .
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Makowski and Ostroy [21] introduce another way to get the competitive equi-
librium: the sequential elimination of arbitrage opportunities of the agents that
we briefly describe here. They think that for those prices in which the agents
cannot improve their utility, the market has its own equilibrium and the vector
price system is that arising in equilibrium. So, they consider a model of perfect
competition in which the prices are constructed endogenously, by the actions of
each agent. To implement this procedure, they consider that the possibilities of
arbitrage are based on the differences of the marginal rate of substitution. The
result is called "the flattening effect of large number".
They represent the arbitrage by means of the formation of an opportunity set
S which is a convex cone while the price emerges as the supporting hyperplane to
a convex cone7 .
For any set S and points x, y ∈ S, y is visible from x if the line segment
[x, y] ⊂ S. S is star shaped (with center x) if any point in it is visible from x. All
convex sets are star shaped, but not conversely. The concept is represented in the
following figure.
Figure 1: Star shaped
The panel (a), (b) are star shaped with center x, (c) is not star shaped because
only the darker shaded portion is visible from x.
Given an agent of type t = (u, e, x), where u is the utility function, e the ini-
tial endowment and x the allocation consumption, he will accept any exchange’s
offer that will leave him at least at the previous utility level. But the arbitrag-
gists are only able "to see" visible exchanges from x, and accordingly, from their
perspective, the set of the possible exchanges with an individual type t is given
7The cone property distinguishes the arbitrage approach to competitive equilibrium from
Walrasian equilibrium: price emerges as the supporting hyperplane to a convex cone rather than
the supporting hyperplane to a convex set.
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by:
A(t) = {z : u(x− z) ≥ u(x) & x− z is visible from x}.
A(t) is the set of all the possible trades of type t that prefers the allocation x given
his own preferences and endowment. It is the set of the arbitrage opportunities
of the individual of type t, while z represents the arbitrager’s point of view: if
zh > 0, the arbitrager receives zh units of commodity h from an individual of type
t. Otherwise, is zh < 0, the arbitrager doesn’t lead to exchange.
The crucial concept is that the agents have only "local knowledge" about others’
preferences, i.e. each agent observes only a part of all the possibilities of arbitrage.
A group is a vector of types (t1, ...ti, ...tn). G(µ) represents the set of possible
groups that any arbitrager can form, given the allocation µ. So, it is composed by
all vectors (t1, ..., ti, ..tn) that satisfy the following features:
1. The number of arbitragers is finite;
2. for any individual i, ti ∈ supp(µ);
3. for any type t, µ(i : ti = t) > 1 only if µ(t) > 0.
The interpretation is that an arbitrager can make offers only to a finite number
of agents and he can exchange with "several" individuals of the same type only if
that type is an atom in µ. The trading possibilities of an arbitrager at µ are given
by:
K(µ) = {z : for some group (t1, ..ti, ..tn) ∈ G(µ)
z =
n∑
i=1
zi, zi ∈ A(ti)}.
An individual i can reach the bundle z if and only if there is a group of individ-
uals willing to trade z with him in aggregate. The exchange is acceptable if each
individual trade zi is visible to the arbitrager starting from the initial allocation
µ.
At an arbitrary allocation µ, agents may have several reservation price and so
they may get a gain from the trade: buying low and selling high as in the finance
field.
The allocation µ is arbitrage free, if:
K(µ) ∩RL++ = ∅.
The arbitrage possibilities set K(µ) contains no "free lunches".
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Figure 2: Trading possibilities form a convex cone.
This theory evolves with McLennan and Sonnenschein [24]. They study the
abstract equilibrium in which the choice sets are generated from additive sets of
net trades. Let W ⊆ RL be the set of net trades that can be obtained, let Z be
the set of finite sums of elements of W , alternatively, Z is the smallest superset of
W that is closed under vector addition.
They consider an economy ξ = (Xi,i, ei)i∈N where Xi is the commodity
space, i is the preference relation, ei is the initial endowment and N the set of
the agents.
Theorem 0.1.1. Let the preference relation i. For i ∈ N , let Xi ⊆ RL+ be open,
let ui : Xi → R be an utility function. Suppose that x is an allocation and e is
the initial endowment such that
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ei. Assume that there is a set
Z ⊆ RL with the following properties:
i. 0 ∈ Z = Z + Z: possibility not to trade;
ii. xi − z i xi implies z ∈ Z;
iii. zi i (ei + Z) ∩Xi.
Then x is a Walrasian equilibrium.
z is a net trade that has the same features of a bundle and z ∈ W ⊂ Z.
These authors propose the possibility to reach an equilibrium obtained through
the additive net trade. The additivity on Z is imposed to justify the possibility
that agents are not prevented from trading each other repeatedly.
All these studies fall under the breakup with the past following trends:
• The rise of game theory. It analyzes interactive decision making. Unfor-
tunately, they don’t have the features of the general classical equilibrium
model. Indeed, in a strategic game, all the endogenous variables are chosen
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by the players and any strategy gives a unique feasible outcome. These fea-
tures are absents in Walras theory, thus the prices are exogenous or, at least,
determined by an auctioneer. Moreover, it may happen that some strategy
profiles (as the bundles chosen when there is an excess of demand) don’t lead
to a feasible outcome.
• Founding a rational background for perfect competition. The competitive
equilibrium theory does not define in which situation it can be appropriate,
i.e. it is applied when there are two agents as well as there are million agents.
This means that the equilibrium is forced because any situation is enforced
to be directed towards the perfect competition also when its features are
not present. The last aspect is justified in the literature with the distinction
between limit theorem and theorems in the limit. The perfect competition
is an idealized state, but all the markets are approximated to it when the
number of agents grows up to a significant amount. In the limit, there is
an insignificant weight of individuals’ actions. The theorem in the limit
characterizes the precise condition under which the perfect competition is
used.
The most relevant works to support the rationality of a competitive equilibrium
and a cooperation among agents which are of interest for our work, are represented
by:
• "Recontracting and Competition" of Dagan N. (1996);
• "Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior" of Serrano R. and
Volij O. (2002).
The authors show that an allocation is competitive if and only if the agents choose
the final allocation in an admissible set that is constructed endogenously by their
arbitrage desire. The concept is presented introducing the idea of interactive choice
set (ICS ).
Dagan, [5], starting from a review of the theories of the Edgeworth’s box
and Walrasian equilibrium, eliminates the price assumption and imposes a re-
contracting condition, similar to the concept of final settlement. He shows that
the core of this arbitrage economy matches to the shrunk core of replica economies,
using the large number expedient as Debreu and Scarf with the convergence theo-
rem. His results are retaken by Serrano and Volij [31] which introduce the concept
of interactive choice set, an introspective way to determine the final allocation:
with Dagan, the agents are choice-set takers, with Serrano-Volij, they are actively
engaged in the construction of the best allocation. The new focus is on the intro-
spective approach of the equilibrium construction.
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We notice that both approaches by Serrano-Volij and Dagan assume that there
is no uncertainty about the state of nature in which the consumption takes place.
Moreover, it is assumed that each agent perfectly knows the other agents’ features.
So in the next pages, the first part is focused on the review of the principal as-
pects of the above mentioned theories to make the thesis self-contained. Then,
uncertainty and differential information will be introduced, as in [6], together with
interactive algorithm for the construction of competitive equilibria.
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Chapter 1
An introspective way for the
competitive equilibrium
This chapter focuses on a new way to build the competitive equilibrium (the arbi-
trage free-equilibrium). Its goal is an exposition of theories which put the emphasis
on the active role of the economic agents as opposed to those based on a price-
taker behavior. Under this approach, almost all the authors focus on the pure
exchange economies except Dagan ([5]). Therefore we will introduce an extension
to production economies of the arbitrage free equilibrium.
Chapter 1 focuses on these topics:
a. The representation of the abstract and arbitrage free equilibrium with a
particular attention to the interactive choice set ([31], [5]) in the first section.
Within this section, we shall present a characterization of equilibria with and
without short sales.
b. The relationship of the arbitrage free-equilibrium with the equivalence result
and the replica economies ([4], [34], [15]) in the final part. This is a crucial
point because it drives the main results of the thesis.
Notice that all the equilibrium notions introduced in Section 1.1 assume that the
choice set is given and not constructed.
1.1 The abstract equilibrium and the choice set
In [5], Dagan proposes a new notion: the abstract equilibrium. This kind of
equilibrium is based on the hypothesis of:
1. Market clearing;
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2. optimization of agent’s utility;
3. re-contracting condition among agents.
The third hypothesis is new when compared with classical approach to com-
petitive equilibrium concept and expresses the freedom of agents to re-contract.
Let ξ be a finite exchange economy (Xi,i, ei)i∈N where N is a finite non-
empty set of agents; for all i ∈ N , Xi ⊆ RL+ is the consumption set of agent i, i
(denoted also by Ri) is the preference relation of agent i on Xi and ei is the initial
endowment of agent i.
An allocation (xi)i∈N is a list where for all i, xi ∈ Xi and∑
i∈N
ei =
∑
i∈N
xi.
For each agent i ∈ N , let us define the strict preference relation Pi as follows: for all
x, x
′ ∈ Xi, xPix′ if and only if xRix′ and not x′Rix. The construction of Pi makes
it irreflexive. Let us define the weakly preferred set by Ri(x) = {x′ ∈ Xi : x′Rix}
and the strictly preferred set by Pi(x) = {x′ ∈ Xi : x′Pix}, ∀x ∈ Xi. An abstract
equilibrium is a list (xi, Ci)i∈N where (xi)i∈N is an allocation and (Ci)i∈N denotes
the family of the choice sets of consumers, that is Ci ⊂ RL satisfies the following
properties for all i ∈ N :
1. ei ∈ Ci, interpreted as the possibility of no trade;
2. xi ∈ Ci, i.e. the feasibility of actual trade;
3. Ci ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅ that is the optimality of xi among the consumption choices
for agent i in the choice set Ci.
Then, an abstract equilibrium fixes for each agent i a consumption bundle and a
choice set.
Notice that a Walrasian equilibrium can be considered as a particular abstract
equilibrium. Given a price p ∈ RL \ {0}, it is enough to define for all i ∈ N ,
Ci = {x ∈ RL : px ≤ pe} the budget set of agent i. We shall say that equilibrium,
(xi, Ci)i∈N satisfies the re-contracting condition if for any j ∈ N, i 6= j, the choice
sets respect the following condition:
Ci ⊃ Ci + Cj −Rj(xj). (1.1)
The re-contracting condition (RC) states that agent i may offer any bundle
in the choice set Ci to other agent j in order to obtain by agent j any bundle in
the choice set Cj. Of course, agent j, which expects to receive xj, will accept any
other bundle in Rj(xj). The meaning of this condition in equilibrium is that all
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the agents have the possibility to trade (or re-contract), but they do not decide to
use this possibility because they are already maximizing.
The following theorem gives a new interpretation of Walrasian equilibrium.
Theorem 1.1.1. ([5]) Let ξ = (Xi,i, ei)i∈N be an economy with at least two agents
that satisfy the following assumptions:
A1. For all i ∈ N , Xi is closed and convex.
A2. For all i ∈ N , for all x ∈ Xi, P (xi) is open relative to Xi.
A3. For all i ∈ N , for all x ∈ Xi , for all δ > 0
[x′ ∈ Xi : |x′ − x| < δ] ∩ Pi(xi) 6= ∅,(local non satiation)
A4. For all i ∈ N , ei ∈ int(Xi).
or alternatively, the assumptions A1- A2 and the following hypothesis A5:
A5. For all i ∈ N , Xi = RL+ and for all x, x ∈ Xi
x < x′ implies x′ ∈ Pi(x) and
∑
i∈N ei  0.
Then an allocation (xi)i∈N of ξ is a Walrasian allocation if and only if it is an
abstract equilibrium that satisfies the re-contracting condition.
It is therefore clear that we are no more in a situation in which prices are
quoted and agents are price takers, but it is a model in which agents are choice
set takers. Under this point of view, the auctioneer doesn’t decide the final price,
but his role is to let the agents communicate with each other.
Theorem 1.1.2. stated below is the link between the equilibria expressed like
sets of net trades and the abstract equilibrium. The sets of net trades are those
studied by Andrew McLennan and Hugo Sonnenschein in [24].
Theorem 1.1.2. ([5]) Let ξ = (Xi,i, ei)i∈N be an economy.
1.1.2.1 Let (xi)i∈N be an allocation and Z ⊂ RL be a set of net trades that
satisfies the conditions:
i. 0 ∈ Z = Z + Z;
ii. xi − ei ∈ Z;
iii. (xi + Z) ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅;
iv. xi −Ri(xi) ⊂ Z.
20
For all i ∈ N , let Ci = ei +Z. Then (xi, Ci)i∈N is an equilibrium that satisfies the
re-contracting condition:
Ci ⊃ Ci + Cj −Rj(xj).
1.1.2.2. Let (xi, Ci)i∈N be an equilibrium that satisfies the re-contracting condition.
If there are at least two agents in the economy, then there exists a set Z such that
for all i ∈ N,Ci = ei + Z and the conditions i-iv are satisfied
The conditions used by McLennan and Sonnenschein [24] can be interpreted as
follows: the first condition expresses the possibility of not contracting, the second
one is the feasibility, the third one expresses the optimality of the net trade Z and
the last condition asserts the re-contracting condition. This theorem, called "com-
pleteness of the auctioneer", implies that all agents have the same opportunities
represented by the set Z. It is possible to get access to trade opportunities which
are cost-free like in the perfect competition of Walrasian framework.
1.1.1 Characterization of the core
The concept of core is based on the one of blocking coalition. A coalition S is a
non-empty subset of N . An S -allocation is a list (xi)i∈S where for all i ∈ S, xi ∈ Xi
and
∑
i∈S ei =
∑
i∈S xi.
An allocation (xi)i∈S is a core allocation if there does not exist a coalition S
and S- allocation (x′i)i∈S such that for all i ∈ S, x′i ∈ R(xi) and for some i ∈ S,
xi ∈ Pi(xi).
The coalition concept and the blocking mechanism enter in the model because
of the following new formulation of re-contracting condition.
An abstract equilibrium (xi, Ci)i∈N satisfies the weak-recontracting condition
if for all i ∈ S and for all coalitions S with i 6∈ S:
Ci ⊃ ei +
∑
j∈S
ej −
∑
j∈S
Rj(xj). (1.2)
The weak re-contracting condition WRC presents clearly some differences with
respect to the re-contracting condition RC.
1. It focuses on multilateral trades while the RC on bilateral trades. The
concept of group emerges like in Edgeworth box.
2. It involves the notion of initial endowments while the first one only uses the
choice set. So, the idea is to move from the initial situation to a better
situation.
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However, using equation 1.1, it is possible to arrive to the following statement:
Ci ⊃ Ci +
∑
j∈S
Cj −
∑
j∈S
Rj(xj). (1.3)
In this way, the two conditions become more similar.
The following theorem connects the core notion with the WRC.
Theorem 1.1.3. [5] Let ξ = (xi,i, ei)i∈N be an exchange economy. An allocation
(xi)i∈N may be supported by an equilibrium that satisfies the weak re-contracting
condition if and only if it is a core allocation.
The weak re-contracting condition considers the agent i which trades with all
the agents j ∈ S. In analogy, the core refers to a coalition S in which all the
members trade among them for arriving to the equilibrium. Both notions build
on the coalition concept.
1.1.2 Production economies
Dagan translates the concept of abstract equilibrium with RC to the case of
economies with production.
A private ownership production economy is a triple ξ = [(Xi,i, ei)i∈N , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)(ij)∈N×J ],
where (Xi,i, ei)i∈N is an exchange economy, J is a finite set of producers, (Yj)j∈J
is the family of production sets where Yj ⊂ RL and θij is the share distribution
of profits to the consumers in the firm where ∀(i, j) ∈ N × J, θij ≥ 0,
∑
i∈N θij =
1,∀j ∈ J and J ∩N = ∅ (no consumer is a firm and no firm is a consumer).
An allocation is a pair [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] where xi ∈ Xi,∀i ∈ N, yj ∈ Yj,∀j ∈ J
and ∑
j∈J
yj +
∑
i∈N
ei =
∑
i∈N
xi.
Let ξ = [(Xi,i, ei)i∈N , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)ij∈N×J ] be an economy. An abstract equi-
librium is a triple [xi, yj, Ci] where [(xi)i∈N , (yi)j∈J ] is an allocation; for all i ∈
N,Ci ⊂ RL is the agent i’s choice set that satisfies:
1. ei +
∑
j∈J(θijyj) ∈ Ci;
2. xi ∈ Ci;
3. Ci ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅ or Ci ∩Xi has an empty interior.
With respect to the exchange economy, the only condition modified is the first one
which, now involves the share of profits of consumer i in the firm j.
The three conditions can be explained as follows:
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• Condition 1. is interpreted as the possibility of not trading;
• condition 2. expresses feasibility;
• the last condition 3. implies that the choice set maximizes the agent i’s utility.
A particular case of abstract equilibrium [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J , (Ci)i∈N ] is again rep-
resented by the Walrasian equilibrium. There exists a price vector p ∈ RL \ {0}
such that for all i ∈ N,Ci = {x ∈ RL : px ≤ p(ei +
∑
j∈J θijyj)} and for all j ∈ J
and for all y′j ∈ Yj, pyj ≥ py′j.
In the case in which [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J , (Ci)i∈N ] represents a quasi Walrasian equi-
librium, the condition 3. is satisfied in the form Ci ∩Xi has an empty interior.
The re-contracting condition with firm is given for all i ∈ N and j ∈ J by:
Ci ⊃ Ci + Yj − yj. (1.4)
It asserts that each consumer re-contracts with each firm by offering it a plan in
exchange of another feasible plan.
The re-contracting condition with firms and with consumers can be resumed
as follows:
Ci ⊃ Ci +
∑
k∈S
Rk(xk) +
∑
j∈J
(Yj − yj). (1.5)
∀i ∈ N, ∀S ⊂ N, i 6∈ S.
Theorem 1.1.4. [5] Let ξ = [(xi,i, ei)i∈N , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)ij∈N×J ] be a production
economy. Let [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] be an allocation and Z ⊂ RL be a set of net trades
that satisfies the following assumptions:
1. Possibility not to trade and additivity: 0 ∈ Z = Z + Z.
2. Feasibility of actual trade: xi − (ei +
∑
j∈J θij) ∈ Z.
3. Optimality: xi − (ei +
∑
j∈J θij)
⋂
Pi(xi) = ∅.
4. Ex post recontracting in consumption: xi −R(xi) ⊂ Z.
5. Ex post recontracting in production: Yj − yj ⊂ Z 1.
1This last condition may represent the maximization profit condition, in the same light of
the condition 4 for the maximization of utility. Any production plan can be bought in exchange
of the actual production plan through the market represented by Z. Z is the net trade inspired
by [24].
23
Let the choice set be defined as follows ∀i ∈ N :
Ci = ei +
∑
j∈J
θijyj + Z. (1.6)
Then [(xi)i∈N , (yj)J∈J , (Ci)i∈N ] is an equilibrium that satisfies the re-contracting
condition.
Notice that in exchange economies, the re-contracting condition is among con-
sumers, here it involves both consumer i and firm j. So, each consumer trades
with each firm offering a feasible plan.
Then, Dagan translates Theorem 1.1.1 that connects the Walrasian equilibrium
and the abstract equilibrium to the production economies through the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.1.5. Let ξ = [(Xi,i, ei)i∈N , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)(i,j)∈N×J ] be a production
economy let [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] be an abstract equilibrium. Given the following as-
sumptions:
A1 For all i ∈ N,Xi is convex and closed.
A2 For all i ∈ N , for all x ∈ Xi, P (xi) is open relative to Xi.
A3 For all i ∈ N , for all x ∈ Xi, for all δ > 0, x′ ∈ Xi : |x′ − x| < δ ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅.
A6 For all i ∈ N,Xi = RL+ and ei ∈ Xi for all j ∈ J , there exists a production
plan (yj)j∈J that satisfies:∑
j∈J yj +
∑
i∈N ei  0;
if an allocation [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] is an equilibrium that satisfies the re-contracting
condition with firms and with consumers, then it is a quasi Walrasian allocation.
1.2 Evolution of abstract equilibrium
Serrano and Volij [31] make a leap forward with respect to Dagan [5] because they
don’t use the initial concept of choice set as given, but they start from the concept
of interactive choice set. This is the way they use to replace the auctioneer with
the construction of the competitive equilibrium through an introspective behavior
of the agents. They imagine an Edgeworth box and they suppose that an allo-
cation x is subject to an arbitrage-free test. Indeed, each agent, starting from
his own endowment, may propose an arbitrage-freeexchange to the others. The
trades are considered achievable in the sense that any contract doesn’t worsen the
previous situation. This interactive algorithm may move forward again until the
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final consumption. In this section, we shall denote the preferred and the weakly
preferred sets as follows.
For any i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi, the preferred and the weakly preferred sets are
defined by:
Pi(xi) = {zi ∈ Xi : zi  xi}.
Wi(xi) = {zi ∈ Xi : zi  xi}.
The following definition introduces the interactive choice sets.
Definition 1
Let ξ be an exchange economy. Fix an allocation x and an agent i ∈ N . The
interactive choice set (ICS) of i is the set Zi recursively defined by:
Z∗xi (0) = {ei}.
For t > 0
Z∗xi (t) = Z
∗x
i (t− 1) ∪
⋃
k∈N\{i}
[Z∗xi (t− 1) + Z∗xk (t− 1)−Wk(xk)].
And finally
Z∗xi = ∪t∈NZ∗xi (t).
An example clarifies the interactive choice set construction. Let us consider
two players i = 1, 2 , two commodities and the initial endowments e1 = (0, 2)
and e2 = (2, 0) with a utility function u(xi) = min{x1i , x2i }. The allocation x is
constant and it gives (1, 1) to each agent.
The interactive choice sets are defined as follows:
At t = 0
Z∗x1 (0) = {(0, 2)},
Z∗x2 (0) = {(2, 0)}.
At t = 1
Z∗x1 (1) = {(0, 2)} ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+),
Z∗x2 (1) = {(2, 0)} ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+),
where (1, 1) is the bundle assigned to each agent, while R2+ is the set of all
weakly preferred bundles to e2 for consumer 2.
At t = 2
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Figure 1.1: Short Sales in ICS [31]
Z∗x1 (2) = Z
∗x
2 (2) = {(0, 2)−R2+} ∪ {(2, 0)−R2+} ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+).
Definition 2
Let ξ be an exchange economy. Fix an allocation x and an agent i ∈ N . The
interactive choice set (ICS) of i is the set Zi defined recursively as follows:
Zxi (0) = {ei}.
For t > 0
Zxi (t) = ∪S⊆N,i∈S[
∑
k∈S
Zxk (t− 1)−
∑
k∈S\{i}
Wk(xk)].
Zxi = ∪t∈NZxi (t).
In this case, the trades are not only between two agents, but an agent may
exchange with any other agent in the economy. The following result shows that
the two processes are equivalent for infinite t.
Proposition 1.2.1. ([30]) Let ξ be an economy and let x = (x1, x2, ...xn) be an
allocation.
Then, for all i ∈ N :
Z∗xi = Z
x
i .
From now on, let us use the second process without loss of generality.
We shall impose the following assumptions on the economy ξ = (xi,i, ei)i∈N :
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A1 For all i ∈ N , the consumption set Xi = RL+;
A2 For all i ∈ N , for all xi ∈ Xi, the preferred set Pi(xi) is open relative to Xi;
A3 For all i ∈ N , for all xi, yi ∈ Xi, yi  xi implies yi ∈ Pi(xi);
A4 For all i ∈ N, ei ∈ RL++.
Let us define the arbitrage-free equilibrium.
An arbitrage-free equilibrium is a pair [(xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ] satisfying the following
conditions ∀i ∈ N :
1. (xi)i∈N is an allocation;
2. ei, xi ∈ Ci;
3.
∑
k∈S Ck −
∑
k∈S\{i}Wk(xk) ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ S,∀S ⊆ N ;
4. Pi(xi) ∩ Ci = ∅.
An arbitrage free - equilibrium is a pair [(xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ] in which xi is the con-
sumer i’s bundle of goods and it belongs to the choice set Ci. By the point 2,
we derive that the choice set is also feasible and by point 4, it respects the utility
maximization. The more innovative point is the third one. It is the re-contracting
or arbitrage freeness condition. It states that the agent i builds his choice set
making exchange with agents of coalitions.
Proposition 1.2.2. Let [(xi, Ci)i∈N be an arbitrage free- equilibrium, then:
• Zxi ⊆ Ci for each i ∈ N ;
• (xi, Zxi )i∈N is an arbitrage free - equilibrium.
Proof. The proposition affirms that if (xi, Ci)i∈N is an arbitrage free - equilibrium,
[xi, Z
x
i ]i∈N is an arbitrage free - equilibrium too and the interactive choice set is
a subset of the choice set. Serrano and Volij suggest a proof by induction. Since,
Zxi (0) = {ei}, ei ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ N . Then, let us assume that Zxi (t−1) ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ N for
some t. Starting from the assumption, (xi, Ci)i∈N is an arbitrage free equilibrium
and so it respects the arbitrage free condition:∑
k∈S
Ck −
∑
k∈S\{i}
Wk(xk) ⊆ Ci, ∀i ∈ S,∀S ⊆ N.
By the induction hypothesis:∑
k∈S
Zxk (t− 1)−
∑
k∈S\{i}
Wk(xk) ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ S,∀S ⊆ N.
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Then, taking the union over coalitions S ⊆ N , we have:⋃
S⊆N,i∈S
[∑
k∈S
Zxk (t− 1)−
∑
k∈S\{i}
Wk(xk)
] ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ N.
Therefore, applying the definition 2 of the interactive choice set, we arrive to the
first statement of the Proposition 1.2.2.:
Zxi (t) ⊆ Ci,
∀i ∈ N .
To prove the second statement of Proposition 1.2.2., we check the four condi-
tions of an arbitrage free - equilibrium. The first one is obvious because (xi)i∈N
is an allocation by definition. The second condition implies the feasibility and the
possibility of actual trade. The feasibility is given by the first stage of construc-
tion of the interactive choice set. The condition 4. is trivially proved because thus
Zi(t)
x ⊆ Ci, Pi(xi) ∩ Zi is an empty set too. The condition 3. is less immediate.
Notice that if:
z ∈
∑
k∈S
Zxk −
∑
k∈S\{i}
Wk(xk) for some t ∈ N.
Therefore, by definition of Zxi (t+ 1), we have z ∈ Zxi (t+ 1) ⊆ Zxi .
So, following Serrano and Volij, the equilibrium will be defined as "arbitrage
free". The aim is to underline the possibility of arbitrage2 of the agents. Propo-
sition 1.2.2 ensures that here is no loss of generality when the choice set Ci is
substituted by Zi.
1.2.1 Connection between ICS and Replica economies
Let m be a natural number. The m fold replica economy ξm of ξ is an economy
with N ×m agents x for which:
• ei = eij;
• Xi = Xij;
• i=ij;
2This is a parallelism with the finance where the term "arbitrage” stands for buying low and
selling high. Makowski and Ostroy [21] extend this notion to explore the differences in marginal
rates of substitution.
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for each (i, j) ∈ N ×m. Here m = {1, ...m}. Fix an allocation x.
Let us define the following sets for i ∈ N and for m ∈ N:
Axi (0) = {ei},
Axi (m) =
⋃
S⊆N×m,(i,1) 6∈S
[
ei +
∑
(k,l)∈S
(ek −Wk(xk))
]
Axi =
⋃
m∈N
Axi (m).
The core of the m-fold replica is represented by means of the following condi-
tion: the allocation x ∈ A(ξ) is in the core of the r-replica economy ξm of ξ if for
all i ∈ N :
Pi(xi) ∩ Axi (m) = ∅.
Moreover, by definition of the set Axi
a ∈ Axi (m)⇔ a ∈ ei + nk
∑
k∈S
(ek −Wk(xk)),
with nk ∈ N and 0 < nk ≤ m for k ∈ S \ {i}, for some S ⊆ N with i 6∈ S.
The m-fold replica and the interactive choice share a common feature: in the
replica economies, they are interactions among copies while in under the arbitrage
economy they are interactions represented by trades.
When the interactions are infinite, both processes determine the same result
according to [31].
Theorem 1.2.3. Let ξ be an economy and let x = (xi, ..., xn) be an allocation in ξ.
For all i ∈ N,Zxi = Axi .
Proof. The connection between the interactive choice sets and the replica economy
expresses the analogy between large coalitions and large contracts.
Following [31], the theorem can be proved by two lemmas.
The first lemma states that the interactive choice set is a subset of the set
interactive set of replica economies.
Lemma 1.2.4. Let ξ be an economy and let x = (xi, ..., xn) be an allocation in ξ.
For all i ∈ N,Zxi ⊆ Axi .
Starting from the assumption Zxi = Axi ,∀i ∈ N , let us take a bundle z ∈
Zi(t+ 1). By definition of interactive choice set:
Zi(t+ 1) =
∑
k∈F
Zk(t)−
∑
k∈F\{i}
Wk(xk).
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And so:
z ∈
∑
k∈F
Zk(t)−
∑
k∈F\{i}
Wk(xk).
For some F ⊆ N, i ∈ F .
By the assertion of lemma Zk(t) ⊆ Ak for all k ∈ F . Let us take another
bundle k and for the statement of lemma, let us obtain:
Zk(t) ⊆ Ak(mk) for some mk, for all k ∈ F.
Taking m as the max{mk : k ∈ F} and recalling that {Ak(m)}m∈N is an increasing
sequence, let us substitute Zk(t) with Ak(mk) in the definition of interactive choice
set:
z ∈
∑
k∈F
Ak(m)−
∑
k∈F\{i}
Wk(xk) for some F ⊆ N, i ∈ F.
There must be sets Sk ⊆ N ×m with (k, 1) ∈ Sk such that:
z ∈
∑
k∈F
(
∑
(j,l)∈Sk
ej −
∑
(j,l)∈Sk\{(k,1)}
Wj(xj))−
∑
k∈F\{i}
Wk(xk)),
for some F ⊆ N , with i ∈ F.
But this can be written without the summation by definition of set A, aban-
doning the integer nk, ei +
∑
k∈F (ek −Wk(xk)) for some integers nk ≥ 0 which is
the definition of Ai and so z ∈ Ai.
The second lemma proves that Axi is a subset of Zx. In this way, at infinite, we
prove that the two sets coincide.
Lemma 1.2.5. Let ξ be an economy and let x = (xi, ..., xn) be an allocation in ξ.
For all i ∈ N,Axi ⊆ Zi(x).
Proof. Let a ∈ Ai. By definition of Ai:
a ∈ ei +
∑
k∈F
(ek −Wk(xk))nk.
for some F ⊆ N and some positive integers nk.
By definition 1 of Zi, we have that:
Zk + Zk+1 −Wk+1(xk+1) ⊆ Zk,∀k ∈ N. (1.7)
where k + 1 means k + 1mod|N |. Applying the same inclusion interactively nk
times we have:
Zk + (nk + 1)(Zk+1 −Wk+1(xk+1)) ⊆ Zk,∀k ∈ N. (1.8)
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Consider an agent j ∈ N \ {i}:
Zj + Zi −Wi(xi) ⊆ Zi. (1.9)
Substituting (1.10) into (1.9) we have:
Zk +
∑
k∈N
(Zk −Wk(xk)) ⊆ Zi. (1.10)
Substituting (1.8) into (1.11) we get:
Zi +
∑
k∈N
[Zk + (Zk+1 −Wk+1(xk+1))(nk + 1)−Wk(xk)] ⊆ Zi, (1.11)
which can be written as
Zi +
∑
k∈N
[Zk −Wk(xk)](nk + 1) ⊆ Zi.
Zi +
∑
k∈F
[Zk −Wk(xk)(nk)−Wk(xk)] ⊆ Zi.
Since 0 ∈∑k∈N(Zk −Wk(xk)) and ek ∈ Zk,∀k ∈ N we get:
ei +
∑
k∈F
(ek −Wk(xk))nk ⊆ Zi.
From the right side of the last equation, we obtain Ai(m).
Therefore, Ai(m) ⊆ Zi.
The previous theorem holds true only for a number of interactions close to
infinity. Re-considering the initial example ([30]) with interactive choice set and
the utility function u(xi) = min{x1i , x2i }, it is possible to prove that replica sets
and interactive choice sets do not coincide in any case.
With two players i = 1, 2 and the endowments e1 = (0, 2), e2 = (2, 0), the
interactive choice set is built as follows. At t = 0
Z∗x1 (0) = (0, 2); Z
∗x
2 (0) = (2, 0).
At t = 1
Z∗x1 (1) = (0, 2) ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+)
Z∗x2 (1) = (2, 0) ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+).
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At t = 2
Z∗x1 (2) = Z
∗x
2 (2) = (2, 0) ∪ (0, 2) ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+).
For the replica economies, it is obvious that Ax1(0) = Zx1 (0) and Ax2(0) = Zx2 (0),
Ax1(1) = Z
x
1 (1) and Ax2(1) = Zx2 (1).
However, the sets at t=2 and for m=2 are different:
Ax1(2) = ((−1, 3)−R2+) ∪ ((2, 0)−R2+) ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+) ∪ ((0, 2)−R2+),
Ax2(2) = ((3,−1)−R2+) ∪ ((2, 0)−R2+) ∪ ((1, 1)−R2+) ∪ ((0, 2)−R2+).
The sets Axi (m) and Zxi (t) are different because, in the first set, agent i cooperates
with agent j exchanging his initial endowments ej, at contrary in the interactive
choice set, when agent i and agent j cooperate, the object of the trade is the own
set Zxj (t). These differences explain why the two sets don’t coincide for a finite
number of interactions.
1.2.2 The equivalence result
The definition of replica economies given through the setsAxi creates the connection
with the convergence theorem of Debreu and Scarf (see [7]).
Theorem 1.2.6. An allocation (xi)i∈N is Walrasian if and only if [(xi)i∈N , (Zxi )i∈N ]
is an arbitrage free equilibrium.
Proof. We have already observed that a WE is an arbitrage free-equilibrium.
Starting from the second claim of the theorem, assume that [(xi)i∈N , (Zxi )i∈N ]
is an arbitrage free equilibrium. Therefore, by the point 4. of its definition,
P (xi)∩Zxi = ∅,∀i ∈ N . By Theorem 1.2.3, P (xi)∩Axi = ∅,∀i ∈ N , so that x is a
shrunk allocation. From this conclusion, let us follow the proof of the Debreu-Scarf
(see appendix at the end of the chapter) and the theorem is proved.
1.2.3 Short sales and convexity
The definition of the interactive choice sets assumes the existence of negative
bundles, that is the assumption that there exists the possibility of short sales. An
example makes it clearer ([31]).
Given two agents 1 and 2 and their initial endowment ei = (30, 30) and e2 =
(9, 9), let us define their preferred sets:
P1(30, 30) = {(x1, x2) : (x1, x2) (30, 30)}
∪{(x1, x2) : (x1, x2) (10, 40)}
∪{(x1, x2) : (x1, x2) (40, 10)}
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Figure 1.2: The difference between Replica economies and Interactive choice set as re-
ported in [31]
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P2(9, 9) = {(x1, x2) : (x1, x2) (9, 9)}.
Thus Z1(0) = (30, 30) and Z2(0) = (9, 9), let us define:
Z1(1) = (30, 30) + (9, 9)− (9, 9) = (30, 30)
and
Z2(1) = (9, 9) + (30, 30)− (30, 30) = (9, 9),
Z2(1) = (9, 9) + (30, 30)− (40, 10) = (−1, 29),
Z2(1) = (9, 9) + (30, 30)− (10, 40) = (29,−1).
We see that the interactive choice set Z2(1) has a negative amount of commodities.
This example shows the meaning of shorts sales, i.e. the agents pay their bundle
by using the upper contour sets of the agents’ preferences.
To overcome this restriction, the convexity of preferences is added as assump-
tion:
A5 For all i ∈ N , for all xi ∈ Xi, the preferred set Pi(xi) is convex.
In this way, the definition of arbitrage free - equilibrium is converted in that one
without short sales.
Arbitrage free- equilibrium without short sales
An arbitrage free-equilibrium is a pair [(xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ] satisfying the following
conditions ∀i ∈ N :
i (xi)i∈N is an allocation;
ii ei, xi ∈ Ci ⊆ RL+;
iii
(∑
k∈S Ck −
∑
k∈S\{i}Wk(xk)
) ∩RL+ ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ S,∀S ⊆ N ;
iv Pi(xi) ∩ Ci = ∅.
We add the constraint of non negative sets on the condition [ii] and [iii]. With
the convexity, the equilibrium is ensured because the agents have the possibility to
find endless opportunities along a direction, even if they don’t have the possibility
of short sales.
1.3 Arbitrage free equilibrium of production economies
In analogy with the previous sections, let us give a notion of arbitrage free-
equilibrium in a production economy.
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A production economy is a triple ξ = [(xi,i, ei)i∈N , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)(ij)∈N×J ] where
(xi,i, ei)i∈N is an exchange economy, (Yj)j∈J is the production set and θij is the
share distribution of profits to the consumers in the firm. An allocation is a pair
[(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] where for all i ∈ N , for all j ∈ J , for all xi ∈ Xi, for all yj ∈ Yj
one has
∑
j∈J yj +
∑
i∈N ei =
∑
i∈N xi.
The interactive choice set with the firms may be defined recursively:
Definition 1
Let [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] be an allocation in the production economy ξ. Let i’s ICS
Z∗xi be defined recursively. At t = 0:
Z∗xi (0) = ei + [
∑
j∈J
θijyj]j∈J .
For t > 0
Z∗xi (t) = Z
∗x
i (t− 1) ∪
⋃
k∈N\{i}
[Z∗xi (t− 1) + Z∗xk (t− 1)−Wk(xk)],
and finally
Z∗xi = ∪t∈NZ∗xi (t).
Definition 2
At t = 0:
Zxi (0) = ei + [
∑
j∈J
θijyj]j∈J .
For t > 0
Zxi (t) =
⋃
S⊂N,i∈S
[
∑
k∈S
Zxk (t− 1)−Wk(xk)],
and finally
Zxi = ∪t∈NZxi (t).
As for the case of pure exchange economies, we can prove that:
Proposition 1.3.1. Let ξ be an economy and let [xi, yj] be an allocation. Then:
Z∗xi = Z
x
i .
Definition of arbitrage free equilibrium in production economy
Let ξ = [(xi,i, ei)i∈N , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)ij∈N×J ] be a production economy. An arbi-
trage free - equilibrium is a pair [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] and (Ci)i∈N that satisfies:
• (xi)i∈N is an allocation;
• ei +
∑
j∈J θijyj ∈ Ci (the agents have the possibility to not re-contract);
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• xi ∈ Ci (the choice set is feasible);
• Ci ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅ (optimality) or Ci ∩ Xi has an empty interior (both the
assertions express the optimality of the choice set);
• ∑k∈S Ck −∑k∈S\{i}Wk(xk) ⊂ Ci,∀S ⊆ N (a new re-contracting condition
with the same logic of [5]).
Proposition 1.3.2. Let [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J , (Ci)i∈N ] be an arbitrage free-equilibrium,
then:
• Zxi ⊆ Ci;
• [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J , (Zi)i∈N ] is an arbitrage free-equilibrium.
The proof of this proposition is trivial, following the same steps of the proposition
1.2.2..
1.3.1 Replica in production economies
A replica economy of the economy ξ, denoted with ξm, consists of a replication
by m-times of ξ, each of whom has the same composition of individuals, firms,
endowments, and corporate ownership for k = 1, ...m. Individuals or firms of the
same type have the same characteristics:
• ui = uik;
• ei = eik;
• Yi = Yik;
• θij = θij,k.
Let us define the set of replica economies in terms of recursive sets also in the
production case.
Definition of replica production economies
Axi (0) = {ei +
∑
j∈J
θijyj} ∀i ∈ N,
Axi (m) = ∪S⊆N×m,(i,1)6∈S[ei +
∑
j∈J
θijyj +
∑
(k,l)∈S
(ek +
∑
j∈J
θkjyj −Wk(xk))].
Axi = ∪m∈NAxi (m).
The core of a replica production economy is given by allocations x such that:
Pi(xi) ∩ Axi (m) = ∅, for each i ∈ N.
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Arbitrage free equilibrium and competitive equilibrium
Theorem 1.3.3. Let ξ be a production economy and let (x, y) = [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ]
be an allocation in ξ. For all i ∈ N , Zxi = Axi .
Proof. The proof follows the same steps of the Theorem 4. of Serrano- Volij (see
[31]).
Let us consider the following assumptions:
A1 For all i ∈ N , the consumption set Xi = RL+;
A2 For all i ∈ N , for all xi ∈ Xi, the preferred set Pi(xi) is open relative to Xi;
A3 For all i ∈ N , for all xi, yi ∈ Xi, yi  xi implies yi  xi, i.e. the preference
are strictly monotone;
A6 For all i ∈ N, ei ∈ Xi,∀j ∈ J , there exists a production plan (yj)j∈J such
that
∑
j∈J yj +
∑
i∈N ei  0.
Theorem 1.3.4. An allocation [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] of the production economy is a
quasi Walrasian equilibrium if and only if [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J , (Zxi )i∈N ] is an arbitrage
free-equilibrium.
Proof. Only an implication must be proved. Let [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J , (Zxi )i∈N ] be an
arbitrage free equilibrium. Then, it satisfies the condition for which:
Pi(xi) ∩ Zxi = ∅ for each i ∈ N.
In addition, by Theorem 1.3.3., we know that for all i ∈ N,Zxi = Axi , so Pi(xi) ∩
Axi = ∅. Therefore, [(xi)i∈N , (yj)(j∈J)] is a shrunk core allocation.
Thus [(xi)i∈N , (yj)j∈J ] satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3. of Debreu and
Scarf (see [7] and the appendix) and by the limit theorem of the core, it is a
Walrasian allocation.
Conclusion
The first chapter should be interpreted as a general overview of concepts of com-
petitive equilibrium. This notion is based on the idea of interactive exchange of
bundles among agents. The notion of abstract equilibrium proposed by Dagan in
1996, has been used to build the arbitrage free equilibrium by Serrano and Volji
in 1998, moving from Dagan’s choice set. In the last paragraph, an extension of
arbitrage free equilibrium to production economies has been proposed. All these
approaches have in common the idea that when the number of agents becomes
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large, the core shrinks to the set of competitive equilibria which respects the arbi-
trage free - equilibrium.
Even if the new approach overcomes a limit of the individualistic view of Wal-
rasian equilibrium, a further limit persists: the construction considered so far al-
ways assumes perfect communication and information among agents. To construct
a notion of arbitrage free-equilibrium under uncertainty and differential informa-
tion, will be the main aim of the next chapters. We shall overview economies with
uncertainty and under differential information ([1], [20], [27], [23], [33], [34], [29])
their competitive equilibria and the relative notion of core (ex-ante, interim and
ex-post) and the equivalence result.
In the third chapter, we propose an extension of the concept of AFE to an
economy with uncertainty and differential information.
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Appendix
The concept of replica economy is introduced to extend the Walrasian theory
to a more general setting. It was mentioned also by Edgeworth to prove that
the contract curve shrinks to the competitive equilibrium when the number of
agents is close to infinite. In general, the replica economy is useful to compare
two realities. Indeed, a comparison between two different situations, adding new
preferences and new endowments, would result more complicated with respect to
the comparison between two situations in which one is the copy of the other one.
The construction of a replica, instead, is easy to handle. It can be considered like
a technical expedient.
If ξ is an exchange economy with n consumer the m-fold replica economy ξm
of ξ is a new exchange economy with mn consumers indicated with (i, j), i =
1, ..., n; j = 1, ...,m. The first index refers to the type of individual and the second
index distinguishes different individuals of the same type.
For any consumer (i, j), it is assumed that:
• The preference relation ij is equal to i.
• The initial endowment eij = ei and so the total endowment of the economy
is represented by:
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
eij = me.
Any allocation of the economy ξ can be considered as an allocation for each
m-fold economy ξm and any Walrasian equilibrium of the initial economy is an
equilibrium for the m-fold replica economy.
Theorem 1.3.5. Equal treatment property [4].
Let us assume that preferences are strictly monotonic, strictly convex and
continuous. In the core, an allocation x assigns the same consumption bundle to
all consumers of the same type.
Let (x11, x1i, ....xnm) be a core allocation of ξm. Then for each type i, and each
j, k = 1, ..,m we have xij = xik.
Proof. Let us prove the theorem by contradiction and let us assume x = (xij)(i=1,...,n;j=1,..m)
is not an equal treatment allocation, i.e. the consumption differs within types.
We suppose that the allocation xi less preferred than the j− replica xij for the
agent i. Let us take an allocation yi = 1m
∑m
j=1 xij and by the convexity, yi i xi
for each agent, with the strict preference for at least one agent. The allocation yi
satisfies the feasibility:
n∑
i=1
yi =
n∑
i=1
ei.
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In this way, the coalition formed by one consumer of each type receives at least one
preferred bundle and so x cannot belong to the core. This is a contradiction.
The equal treatment theorem implies that when the economy is enlarged to
m participants of each type, the resulting allocation is competitive for the larger
economy and consequently it is in the core. From that, the convergence theorem
follows.
Theorem 1.3.6. Limit of the core [7].
Assume that preferences are continuous, strictly convex, strictly monotone and
that there are strictly positive initial endowments. Any allocation in the core of
ξm, x is Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that x∗ ∈ C(ξm). Let us define a set Pi as follows:
Pi(x
∗
i ) = {zi ∈ RL+ : zi + ei  x∗i }
for each i.
Since P (x∗) is a nonempty, open and convex set, it may be written as
∑m
i=1 αizi
withαi ≥ 0 and
∑m
i=1 αi = 1 and with 0 6∈ P (x∗).
By contradiction, assume that 0 ∈ P (x∗). So, for any i and for any α, we can
obtain a bundle αizi ∈ Pi(x∗) such that
∑m
i=1 αizi = 0.
Taking a k ∈ N that tends to infinity and let αki the smallest integer greater
than or equal to k and let define for any i an allocation zij = mαiλij zi.
T The allocation zij + ei belongs to the commodity set Xi since it’s possible to
define it as: zi + ei = t(zi + ei) + (1 − t)ei with t = mαiλij zi. Since the preferences
are continuous, for t which tends to 1 and for a large number m, we have that
zij + ei i x∗i . In this way, we have constructed a coalition that blocks x∗ and this
is impossible thus the allocation is in the core of ξm.
The origin doesn’t belong to the set and consequently there exists a vector
p∗ ∈ RL \ {0} such that p∗z ≥ 0 for any z ∈ P (x∗).
Let us take a bundle x′i i x∗i . Since x′i − ei ∈ Pi(x∗i ), we obtain p∗x′i > p∗ei.
Thus in any neighborhood of x∗i there exists allocation strictly preferred to x∗i , we
obtain p∗x∗i ≥ p∗ei. But
∑m
i=1(x
∗
i − ei) = 0, then p∗x∗i = p ∗ ei.
This theorem asserts that for economies with a large number of agents, core
allocations are approximately competitive. Both the previous theorems use the as-
sumption of convexity of preferences that is an assumption fully independent from
the number of agents in the economy. This means that, without this assumption,
in a non convex economy, when there is a replica, there are new equilibria. Only
a number of replication near to infinity can avoid this problem and so ensure the
existence of an equilibrium (see [15]).
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1.3.2 Production economy
An allocation is a distribution of commodities x = (x1, ...xn) such that there is a
production plan for which the market is clear:∑
i∈N
xi = y +
∑
i∈N
ei such that
∑
i∈N
(xi − ei) ∈ Y.
The core of a production economy is defined as the collection of allocations which
cannot be blocked. An allocation x′ is blocked by an allocation x , if there exists
a coalition S for which:
• ∑i∈S(x′i − ei) ∈ Y ;
• x′i i xi for all i ∈ S and for at least one agent the relation is strictly
preferred.
Theorem 1.3.7. Limit of the core in production economy[7].
Assume that preferences are continuous, strictly convex, strictly monotone and
that there are strictly positive initial endowment, assume that Y is a convex cone.
Then, any allocation in the core of the economy ξm is an equal treatment allocation
and if x is in the core of any replicated economy, it is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. The first step is to prove that a competitive allocation is in the core. So,
let us take a blocking set S and a blocking allocation x∗i such that it respects:
• ∑i∈S(x∗i − ei) ∈ Y ;
• x∗i i xi for all i ∈ S and for at least one agent the relation is strictly
preferred;
• py ≤ 0.
Since, py∗i > pei,∀i ∈ S, we have
∑
i∈S x
∗
i ≥
∑
i∈S pei or py > 0, but this last
one is a contradiction so a competitive allocation is in the core. Let us describe
a replica economy with n types of consumers i and m copies j. The allocation
of this new economy is described by a collection of nonnegative bundles xij such
that:
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
xij −m
n∑
i=1
ei = y.
The term m
∑n
i=1 ei derives from the fact that an allocation in the core assigns the
same consumption to all agents of the same type.
Let us define a set Pi(x∗i ) = {z ∈ RL+|z + ei i xi}. This set is disjointed
from the set Y . If not, we have that
∑m
i=1 αizi = y with αi ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 αi = 1 and
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zi + ei i xi. Let us assume that αizi ∈ Y such that for αi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 αizi = y. For
any copy j, let us define an integer λij such that zij = mαiλij zi. Since the economy
respects the strong convexity, it is possible to write zij + ei = t(zi + ei) + (1− t)ei
with t = mαi
λij
zi, remembering that mαiλij zi ∈ Y . In this way, x∗ is blocked because
zij + ei i x∗i , which is a contradiction. From now on, the proof follows the same
steps of the exchange economies’s case. Let us take a bundle x′i i x∗i . Then,
x
′
i − ei ∈ Pi(x∗i ), by continuity p∗x′i > p∗ei. Therefore, p∗x∗i = p∗ei and the
allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy ξ.
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Chapter 2
The uncertainty and the differential
information economy
Chapter 2 explores the important connection between several notions of core and
of competitive equilibrium, under uncertainty and differential information. The
reference model will be the one of a pure exchange economy with a finite number
of commodities and a finite number of agents.
The chapter is organized as follows:
• Section 2.1 presents the concept of the ex-ante core under uncertainty ([15],
[27], [33]).
• Section 2.2 introduces the asymmetric information of the agents, dealing with
the case of ex-ante differential information economies ([34], [1], [20], [17]).
• Section 2.3 focuses on the interim core and the constrained market equilibria
([6], [8]).
• Section 2.4 studies the ex-post core and the rational expectations equilibria
([9], [3]).
The different notions of core analyzed turn out to be equivalent when the uncer-
tainty is solved and the economy is one with complete information ξ. The core
notions may differ for two reasons: the meaning of feasibility; the meaning of
improvement.
The allocation could be physically and "informationally" feasible:
i. When the private information becomes public and so verifiable, no other
restrictions are necessary to define the feasibility.
ii. When the private information is unverifiable, the allocation has to be mea-
surable with respect to the information of the agents.
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The mechanism of "improving upon" an allocation changes depending on the con-
figuration of utility:
i. If the agents enter into a coalition at an ex-ante stage, the ex-ante expected
utility is the right configuration to compare allocations.
ii. If the agents form the coalition at the interim stage, the utility is represented
through the conditional expected utility (conditional to the information).
iii. If the agents form the coalition at the ex-post stage, the utility will depend
on the realized state of nature.
2.1 The Arrow-Debreu model under uncertainty
Arrow and Debreu [27] introduced uncertainty in the analysis of competitive equi-
librium by means of an exogenous space of states of nature and the concept of
contingent commodities. The idea of their model is that commodities can be dis-
tinguished not only by their physical features, but also by the environmental event
in which the items are available (such as a particular date or place). They consid-
ered the possibility that goods may depend on the states of nature in which they
are consumed.
In accordance with these observations, they describe the economic environment
through three variables:
1. Decision variables. They are controlled and chosen by the economic agents.
2. Environmental variables. They are not controlled by any economic agent.
3. All others variables. They are a mix of the previous ones.
A state of the environment is a complete specification of the environmental vari-
able, an event is a set of states. In this type of economy, the contract consists of
the purchase (or sale) of a good at a specified date and location if and only if the
event occurs.
The states of nature are identified with the possible outcomes of uncertainty.
The set of all possible states of nature Ω has the following characteristics:
• All the elements in Ω are mutually exclusive;
• Ω is exhaustive;
• Ω is known to everybody;
• Ω is a finite set.
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The state of nature is denoted by ω ∈ Ω.
For any physical commodity l = 1, ..., L and for each state of nature ω ∈
Ω, a unit of (state) contingent commodity xl(ω) is a title to receive a unit of
physical good l if and only if the state ω occurs. Accordingly, a state-contingent
consumption bundle is specified by:
x = (x1(ω), .., xL(ω)) ∈ RLΩ+ .
The consumption set of consumer i is Xi ⊆ RLΩ+ .
The agent i’s preference i has an expected utility representation. For any
xi, yi ∈ Xi, xi i yi if and only if∑
ω∈Ω
pii(ω)ui(ω, xi(ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
pii(ω)ui(ω, yi(ω)),
where pii(ω) is the probability that consumer i assigns to the state ω.
Consumer i’s utility function for actual consumption in each state ω is:
ui(ω, ·) : RL+ → R.
The utilities have an ex-ante nature because the variables describe the possible
consumption before the revelation of uncertainty [15].
The initial endowment of consumer i ∈ N is:
ei = (e1(ω), ..., eL(ω)) ∈ RLΩ+ .
A price system p is a function defined by:
p : Ω→ RL+.
The agent i’s budget set at price p is defined by:
Bi(p, e) = {xi ∈ Xi;
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)xi(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)ei(ω)},
so that, the budget set depends on contingent goods.
The market with uncertainty takes place at two time periods, date 0 and date
1. The sequence of events is:
1. At t = 0. All markets are open. Individuals choose x ∈ RLΩ+ and pay prices
p ∈ RLΩ+ , but they ignore the state of nature that will be realized at the time
of consumption;
2. At t = 1. Once uncertainty is revealed and the state of nature becomes
known, the contracts contingent to state ω are executed i.e. the goods are
delivered and consumed while the contract contingent to void states are
destroyed.
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There are markets for any contingent commodity. Their features are:
• Markets open before the realization of uncertainty.
• Each contingent commodity has a price.
• Deliveries are contingent.
• All individuals have the same information and this symmetry is common
knowledge.
Formally, the market economy under uncertainty represents a particular case
of the Walrasian economy because the information is symmetric across economic
agents. Therefore, the Walrasian concept can be applied to this economy. A "State
Contingent Economy" (or an Economy under Uncertainty) is characterized by:
ξ = {(Ω, pi); (Xi, ui, ei)i∈N} where N represents the set of the agents, Ω the set
of all possible states of nature, pi the common prior, Xi represents the consumption
set and the remaining elements the utility function and the initial endowment of
agent i.
For this economy, it’s possible to define the Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium under
uncertainty.
A pair (x∗, p∗) with x∗ ∈ RLΩ+ and p∗ ∈ RLΩ+ represents an Arrow-Debreu
Equilibrium 1 if:
• For all i ∈ N, x∗i maximizes i on Bi(p, e):
Bi(p, e) = {xi ∈ Xi;
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)xi(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)ei(ω)}.
• x∗ is feasible in each state ω ∈ Ω:∑
i∈N
x∗i (ω) ≤
∑
i∈N
ei(ω).
This is the specification of a market in which all the features are settled before
the beginning of the trade and so there is no incentive to modify the plan or to
reopen the market. In the Arrow- Debreu economy at time t = 0, agents have
incomplete information about the state of environment, but all the agents have
the same information. In the differential information model that we are going to
introduce, there may be differences about the capacity of agents to discern the
states.
1Also called Walrasian expectations equilibrium.
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2.2 The model under differential information
In this section, we take into account the possibility that traders have different
information structures, presenting an overview of models with asymmetric infor-
mation. Radner [27] was the first author that criticized the previous economy
introducing the information structure concept.
Indeed, his framework is not only affected by the uncertainty about the states
of nature, but also by the phenomenon of differential information.
From his theories forward, several models of differential information have been
developed. To analyze the new framework, it is necessary to consider the timing
of process: ex-ante, interim and ex-post stage. In the ex-ante stage, the agents
take decision only using their private information; in the interim stage, the agents
know their own type and they update their information; in the ex-post stage, the
state of nature is realized and agents consume according to contracts subscribed
at the ex-ante or interim stage.
2.2.1 The ex-ante differential information economy
The Radner economy is an ex-ante differential information economy because the
agents decide what to consume based on their private information, before the open-
ing of the market. A pure exchange economy with differential information consists
of a finite number of agents each of whom is characterized by a random utility
function, a random initial endowment, a prior as before and a private information
structure. So it is given by ξ = ((Ω,F , ), xi, ui, ei,Fi, pi), i ∈ N where:
• (Ω,F) is a measurable space. Ω denotes the set of states of nature, F
represents the set of all events. An information correspondence for the agent
i is a nonempty valued correspondence:
Pi : Ω→ F .
Pi(ω) represents the event in F observed by i when ω is realized. This
means that the agent i, in the state ω, only knows that the state is in
Pi(ω), but he is not able to distinguish two states in Pi(ω). Usually, the
information correspondence matches with an agent’s knowledge having the
following characteristics:
i. The agent always includes the true state in the set of states. So for any
ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ Pi(ω);
ii. The agent uses his information to make inferences about the state. If
ω
′ ∈ Pi(ω), Pi(ω′) = Pi(ω).
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F represents the events (a subset of Ω) to which the agents assign a proba-
bility of occurrence;
• Fi is a (measurable) partition of (Ω,F) in the sense given before. The
consumer i isn’t able to discriminate among the states of nature belonging
to any element Pi(ω) of Fi;
• ui : Ω × RL+ → R is the random utility function of agent i. The utility
function respects the invariance property (Fi measurability functions of ω);
• pi is the common prior of all agents.
The (ex-ante) expected utility of the agent i:
Vi(xi) =
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω, xi(ω))pi(ω).
An allocation x assigns a commodity bundle xi(ω) to each agent i in each state
ω.
It is a function xi : Ω→ RL+,Fi-measurable and physically feasible:∑
xi(ω) =
∑
ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω.
Let us define the Radner competitive equilibrium.
Denote by Xi the set of all functions xi : Ω→ RL+ which are Fi-measurable, i.e.
informationally feasible from the point of view of agent i. Given a price system
p : Ω→ RL+, the budget set of agent i is given by:
Bi(p) = {xi ∈ Xi :
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)xi(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)ei(ω)}.2
A pair (p∗, x∗), where p is the system price and x = (x1, ...xn) is an allocation, is
a Radner equilibrium if:
i. For all i ∈ N, xi ∈ Xi and xi maximizes the ex-ante expected utility of i on
Bi(p);
ii.
∑
i∈N xi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈N ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω;
iii.
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω)xi(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω)ei(ω),∀i ∈ N .
The interpretation of the Radner equilibrium follows the same logic of the Wal-
rasian equilibrium. The agents maximize their ex-ante expected utility under their
budget constraint. The main difference with respect to the WE is that the budget
set includes the informational constraints. Notice that when each trader has per-
fect information, the model gives back the Arrow-Debreu model under uncertainty.
2Notice that consumption bundles in the budget set are constants over the states of nature
that the agent i is not able to distinguish.
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2.2.2 Ex-ante core in differential information economies
Many of the core notions for an economy with asymmetric information share the
same basic assumptions about the impact of information on an agent’s consump-
tion decisions: if an agent is partially informed about the reality, this imperfect
information restricts his choice of consumption plans, according to his private
information (see [29]). The Radner economy is characterized by the concept of
private core, in which the agents do not communicate each other when they join
a coalition (the name private derives from this kind of sharing information rule).
Formally this means that an allocation in the private core will be information-
ally measurable with respect to each agent private information and so is also the
allocation improving the status quo.
An allocation x = (x1, ...xn) is said to be a private core allocation for the
economy if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Each xi is Fi-measurable, i.e. xi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ N ;
• ∑i∈N xi(ω) ≤∑i∈N ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω;
• there does not exist a coalition S and an assignment (yi)i∈S such that:
1.
∑
i∈S yi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω;
2. yi is Fi - measurable (or yi ∈ Xi), ∀i ∈ S;
3. Vi(yi) > Vi(xi), ∀i ∈ S.
Each xi is Fi- measurable ∀i ∈ N and has the property that no groups of agents
within a coalition can redistribute their initial endowments, based on their own
private information, making each better off within the coalition. The private core
of the economy ξ is the set of all feasible allocations which are not private blocked
by any coalition. Notice that when agents have perfect information, the private
core is the ex-ante core of an Arrow - Debreu economy.
The equivalence theorem for the private core
The equivalence result of Debreu and Scarf may be applied also in the differential
information economy with some differences [17].
Let us denote by WE(ξ) and C(ξ) respectively the set of all Radner Equilibria
and the private core.
Theorem 2.2.1. Let x be an allocation in the economy ξ. If x ∈ WE(ξ), then
x ∈ C(ξ).
Proof. Let (p, x) a Radner equilibrium. Assume by contradiction that x 6∈ C(ξ).
So there exists a coalition S and an assignment (yi)i∈S such that:
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• Each yi is Fi-measurable;
• ∑ yi(ω) ≤∑ ei(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω;
• Vi(yi) > Vi(xi)∀i ∈ S.
By definition of Radner equilibrium, xi is feasible and maximizes Vi(xi) on Bi(p, ω).
Thus yi 6∈ Bi(p, ω). Knowing that yi is Fi-measurable, we have that for each i ∈ S:∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)yi(ω) >
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)ei(ω).
This implies: ∑
i∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)yi(ω) >
∑
i∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)ei(ω).
This is a contradiction of the feasibility of y on S, so the theorem is proved.
To prove the inverse inclusion, we need to introduce the replicas.
2.2.3 Replica in differential information economy
If m is any positive integer, then the m-fold replica economy of ξ, denoted by ξm,
is a new differential information economy with mn agents indexed by (i, j), i =
1, ..., n, j = 1, ...,m such that each agent (i, j) has the same characteristics of agent
i; that is, ∀j ∈ {1, ...m}:
• Fij = Fi;
• eij = ei;
• uij = ui;
• piij = pii.
Notice that all the agents (i, j), j = 1, ...m are copies of agent i.
Any allocation x = (x1, ..., xn) of ξ gives rise to an allocation x = (x11, ..., xnm)
for the m-fold replica economy ξm with xij = xi for j = 1, ...,m and i = 1, ..., n.
The equivalence result of Debreu and Scarf has validity also in the presence of
asymmetric information. For this part, we will refer to the section 2.2.2 of Meo
dissertation (see [25]).
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2.3 The type-agent economy
In this section, we analyze a model with differential information in which agents
take their decision at the interim stage. Following De Clippel [6], let us introduce
the interim core using the notion of type-agent economy. The agents are still
partially informed when they decide what to consume but, when they consume,
the state of nature is commonly known and publicly announced. This timing
avoids any problem of incentive compatibility and measurability constraint3.
Let us denote the economy by ξ = (Ω, ui, ei,Fi, pi). The conditional probability
pi(ω|E) of an event E is:
pi(ω|E) = 0 if ω 6∈ E or
pi(ω|E) =
(
pi(ω)
pi(E)
)
iff ω ∈ E.
The interim expected utility Vi(xi|Pi(ω)) is:
Vi(xi|Pi(ω)) =
∑
ω′∈Pi(ω)
ui(xi(ω), ω
′
)pi(ω
′|Pi(ω)) = Vi(xi|ω).
We introduce now market conditions and constrained market equilibria (De
Clippel and Wilson).
An allocation rule a is a constrained market equilibrium if it is feasible and
there exists a price system p : Ω→ RL+ such that for each ω ∈ Ω:
ai ∈ argmax Vi(a′i|Pi(ω)) on the set
Bi(p, ω) := {a′i ∈ RLΩ+ |
∑
ω′∈Pi(ω)
p(ω
′
)a
′
i(ω
′
) ≤
∑
ω′∈Pi(ω)
p(ω
′
)ei(ω
′
)}.
Bi(ω) is the budget set of the agent i in the state ω ∈ Ω. So, a constrained market
equilibrium allocation is a feasible allocation for which there exists a price system
such that, for each ω and for each agent i, it maximizes the interim expected utility
function. Intuitively, each agent, using only his own information, maximizes his
expected utility function under the additional constraint that he may not sell
3Problems of incentive compatibility constraint occur whenever the agents take decisions at
the ex-ante stage, but they receive private information which is not publicly verifiable before the
consumption takes place.
Notice that the measurability constraint, like the one introduced in the previous section, refers
to the case in which the state doesn’t become public. In this hypothesis, the trade of an agent
has to be measurable with respect his private information ([12]).
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contingent commodities associated with states that he knows. In this case, the
invisible hand specifies a price for each commodity in each state in order to clear
all the markets.
Then, let us introduce the set D(a, a′ , ω) of agents that prefers to receive,
at the interim stage given their private information, the allocation a′ instead of
keeping allocation a. Given the allocation rules a, a′ , let D(a, a′ , ω) denote the set
of deviators:
D(a, a
′
, ω) := {i ∈ N | Vi(a′i|Pi(ω)) > Vi(ai|Pi(ω))},
for each ω ∈ Ω.
An allocation rule a′ is strictly feasible when proposed against a if:∑
i∈D(a,a′ ,ω)
a
′
i(ω) ≤
∑
i∈D(a,a′ ,ω)
ei(ω),
for each ω ∈ Ω, the inequality being strictly for some ω ∈ Ω. This notion will be
used to define the type agent core in the next section.
2.3.1 Type-agent Core and the other interim core notions
Before to define the De Clippel type-agent core, we recall other definitions of
interim core notions. The first two are given by Wilson (1978):
• The coarse core. The re-allocation of initial endowment can happen only
through contingent events which are common knowledge for everyone in the
coalition. So, the CC is the set of all feasible allocations which cannot
be blocked by any coalition when agents do not need to communicate. The
coarse core is based on the assumption that a coalition can focus its potential
objection on an event if and only if the event is commonly known to all the
members of the coalition. An allocation x : Ω→ RLN+ is said to be a coarse
core allocation for the economy if the following conditions hold:
– Each xi is ∧i∈NFi - measurable;
–
∑
i∈S xi(ω) =
∑
i∈S ei(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω;
– there does not exist a coalition S and a function y : Ω → RLN+ such
that:
∗ ∑i∈S yi(ω) = ∑i∈S ei(ω),∀ω, yi is ∧i∈SFi - measurable and
∗ Vi(yi|ω) > Vi(xi|ω),∀i ∈ S,∀ω ∈ Ω.
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• The fine core. It is the extreme case in which a coalition can make an
objection choosing any informational event which can be discerned by pooling
the private information. The FC is the set of all feasible allocations that
cannot be blocked by any coalition given a perfect communication system.
An allocation x : Ω→ RLN+ is said to be a fine core allocation for the economy
if the following conditions hold:
– Each xi is ∨i∈NFi - measurable;
–
∑
i∈S xi(ω) =
∑
i∈S ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω;
– there does not exist a coalition S and a function y : Ω → RLN+ such
that:
∗ ∑i∈S yi(ω) = ∑i∈S ei(ω),∀ω, yi is ∨i∈SFi - measurable and
∗ Vi(yi|ω) > Vi(xi|ω)∀i ∈ S,∀ω ∈ Ω.
• We introduce now a general definition of interim core, without deviators.
The interim core is the set of all feasible allocations rule that cannot be
blocked in the following sense: an allocation rule a is blocked if there exists
another allocation rule a′ and a family of coalitions S = {S(ω)} in each state
of nature ({S(ω)} ⊆ N,∀ω ∈ Ω) such that:
– The coalition S(ω) is non-empty for at least one ω ∈ Ω;
– i ∈ S(ω)⇒ i ∈ S(ω′) for each ω′ ∈ Pi(ω);
–
∑
i∈S a
′
i(ω) =
∑
i∈S ei(ω);
– Vi(a
′
i|Pi(ω)) > Vi(ai|Pi(ω)),∀ω ∈ Ω,∀i ∈ S.
Notice again that measurability constraints are ignored because the state becomes
public when consumption takes place.
Let us analyze deeply the type-agent core. An allocation rule a is blocked if
there exists an allocation rule a′ that is strictly feasible when proposed against a.
The type agent core is the set of feasible allocation rules that are not blocked.
We recall below the well-known relationship between the type-agent core, the
coarse core and the fine core. The equivalence between the interim core and the
type agent core will be presented later with the notion of fictitious economy.
The coarse core and type-agent core
Let S be a coalition, an event E ⊆ Ω is common knowledge among the members
of S if it can be written as a union of elements of Pi for each i ∈ S. An allocation
rule is feasible for the coalition S if:∑
i∈S
ai(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω.
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The coalition S has a coarse objection against an allocation rule a if there exists
an allocation rule a′ feasible for S and an event E that is commonly known to
each member of the coalition S such that:
Vi(a
′
i|Pi(ω)) > Vi(ai|Pi(ω)).
for each i ∈ S, for each ω ∈ Ω.
We have seen that the coarse core is the set of feasible allocation rules against
which no coalition has a coarse objection4.
Theorem 2.3.1. The type-agent core is a subset of the coarse core.
The fine core and the type - agent core
Let a be an allocation rule. A coalition has a fine objection against the allocation
a if there exists an event E and an allocation rule a′ feasible for S such that the
following properties are true at each ω ∈ E, for each i ∈ S:
1. ∩i∈SPi(ω) ⊆ E;
2. Vi(a
′
i|E ∩ Pi(ω)) > Vi(ai|E ∩ Pi(ω)).
The first point defines the fine core as the intersection of all private states Pi(ω)
of each agent i that, shared, becoming common, and so a subset of the common
event E.
The second point indicates that the coalition is not blocked.
The fine core is the set of all feasible allocation rules against which no coalition
has a fine objection.
2.3.2 The type core equivalence
We report some main results which are valid in a type agent economy (see [6]).
Theorem 2.3.2. Suppose that each agent has a strictly positive amount of each
good in each state of the economy. Then the set of constrained market equilibria
is not empty.
Theorem 2.3.3. The set of constrained market equilibria is a subset of the type-
agent core.
4The coarse objections are based on events that are common knowledge among the members
of the coalition instead the fine objections are based on events that can be discerned by pooling
the information of the members of the coalition.
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Theorem 2.3.4. Suppose that each agent’s utility function is strictly concave in
each state of the economy and that each agent is endowed with a strictly positive
amount of each good in each state of the economy. Then, the type-agent core
shrinks to the set of constrained market equilibria as the number of replicas m
tends to infinity.
These theorems have been proved by De Clippel (see [6]). We recall below the
construction of the fictitious economy functional to the equivalence result.
The construction of a fictitious economy
In order to prove the previous theorems concerning the equivalence result, De Clip-
pel uses a fictitious economy defined with uncertainty and symmetric information
constructed as follows.
Let ξ be the fictitious economy (Ω, ui, ei,F , pi) where Ω is the set of the states
of nature, ui is the utility function of type-agent (i, E), ei is the initial endowment
function of type-agent (i, E). The set of type agents is N , the set of good is
RL+. The type-agent (i, E) is represented by a couple where i is any agent of
the original economy and E an atom of his information partition. All the agents
have the same beliefs regarding the probability of occurrence and they don’t have
private information.
The utility of type agent (i, E) for the bundle x ∈ RL+ at ω equals ui(x, ω) if
ω ∈ E and zero otherwise. Since we are in an Arrow-Debreu economy, type-agents
decide today how to redistribute their endowments when the state will be common
knowledge, i.e. the fictitious economy is like an economy under uncertainty. Each
agent in the original economy ξ gives rise to as many type-agents as are the events
in his information partition.
An allocation rule in the fictitious economy is denoted by:
a : Ω→ RLN+ .
There is a natural correlation between allocations of the original economy and
allocations of type agent economy. Given an allocation rule a in the type agent
economy, its corresponding allocation in the original economy is:
ai(ω) = a(i,Pi(ω))(ω),∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Similarly, the allocation rule a in the type-agent representation, associated to the
allocation rule a of the initial economy, is ∀(i, E) ∈ N :
a(i,E)(ω) = ai(ω) if ω ∈ E,
a(i,E)(ω) = 0 if ω ∈ Ω \ E.
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For the type-agent representation, the initial endowment function is:
e(i,E) : Ω→ RL+.
where the endowment of type agent (i, E) is defined ∀(i, E) ∈ N by:
e(i,E)(ω) := ei(ω) if ω ∈ E,
e(i,E)(ω) := 0 if ω 6∈ E.
Given the initial endowment e in the type-agent economy, its corresponding in the
original economy is:
ei(ω) = e(i,Pi(ω))(ω),∀i ∈ N,∀ω ∈ Ω.
An allocation a is feasible for coalition S ⊆ N if as usual:∑
(i,E)∈S
a(i,E)(ω) ≤
∑
(i,E)∈S
e(i,E)(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Notice that in the fictitious economy, the expected utility has the ex-ante configu-
ration because we are in an Arrow-Debreu model. The core is the set of allocation
rules a feasible for N and such that there do not exist a coalition S and allocation
rule a′ that dominates a over S.
Proposition 2.3.5. Let a be an allocation rule that belongs to the type-agent core.
Then the associated allocation rule a belongs to the core of the type-agent repre-
sentation of the economy.
Proof. The allocations are feasible in both economies. Indeed, for each ω ∈
Ω,
∑
i∈N ai(ω) ≤
∑
i∈N ei(ω) implies that:∑
i∈N
a(i,Pi(ω))(ω) ≤
∑
i∈N
e(i,Pi(ω))(ω),
and so ∑
(i,E)∈N
a(i,E)(ω) ≤
∑
(i,E)∈N
e(i,E)(ω).
Suppose that there exists an allocation rule a′ that dominates an allocation rule
a in a coalition S. If we consider the relation between allocation rule of original
economy and fictitious economy, we know that a′i := a(i,Pi(ω))(ω) for each couple
(i, ω) ∈ N×Ω such that ω ∈ Pi(ω) and a′i := 0 for each other couple (i, ω) ∈ N×Ω.
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Notice that, for each ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ D(a, a′ , ω) if and only if (i, Pi(ω)) ∈ S. So, we
have: ∑
i∈D(a,a′ ,ω)
a
′
i(ω) =
∑
i∈Ns.t.(i,Pi(ω))∈S
a
′
i(ω)
=
∑
i∈Ns.t.(i,Pi(ω))∈S
a
′
(i,Pi(ω))
(ω)
=
∑
(i,E)∈S
a
′
(i,E)(ω)
≤
∑
(i,E)∈S
e(i,E)(ω)
=
∑
i∈Ns.t.(i,Pi(ω))∈S
e(i,Pi(ω))(ω)
=
∑
i∈Ns.t.(i,Pi(ω))∈S
ei(ω)
=
∑
i∈D(a,a′ ,ω)
ei(ω).
and a contradiction.
With similar arguments one can prove the following.
Proposition 2.3.6. Let a be an allocation rule that belongs to the core of the type-
agent representation of the economy. Then the associated rule a belongs to the
type-agent core.
A similar correspondence holds true for the competitive equilibria as proved in
the two following propositions:
Proposition 2.3.7. Let a be a constrained market equilibrium. Then, the associated
allocation rule a is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the type-agent representation
of the economy.
Proof. We know, as in Proposition 2.3.2, that a is feasible for N . Let p be the price
system associated to a. Now, let us consider the type-agent (i, E) ∈ N noticing
that a(i,E) ∈ B(i,E)(p) as the allocation rule ai ∈ Bi(p) for each ω ∈ E. Let us take
another allocation rule a′(i,E) ∈ B(i,E)(p) and let us prove that the expected utility
associated to a(i,E) is greater or at least equal to the expected utility associated to
a
′
(i,E):
V(i,E)(a(i,E)) ≥ V(i,E)(a′(i,E)).
Given the preferences of the type-agent (i, E), a(i,E)(ω) := 0 for each ω ∈ Ω \ E.
Let ω ∈ E and let a′(i,E) ∈ RLΩ+ defined as a
′
i(ω
′
) := a
′
(i,Fi(ω))(ω
′
) for each ω′ ∈ Ω.
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Then, a′i ∈ B(p, ω). For the initial hypothesis ai maximizes the utility of the
agents under the budget constraint:
V (a
′
i|Pi(ω)) < V (ai|Pi(ω)).
Since V (a′i|Pi(ω))pi(Pi(ω)) = V(i,E)(a′(i,E)) and V (ai|Pi(ω))pi(Pi(ω)) = V(i,E)(a(i,E)),
we can prove that:
V(i,E)(a(i,E)) ≥ V(i,E)(a′(i,E)).
Proposition 2.3.8. Let a be an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the type-agent repre-
sentation of the economy. Then the associated allocation rule a is a constrained
market equilibrium.
Proof. It’s analogous to the previous one.
The presence of symmetric uncertainty in the fictitious economy allows us to
apply the standard notion of the ex-ante core of an Arrow Debreu economy and
to verify the validity of the previous theorems 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. In the type-
agent economy, the set of Arrow-Debreu equilibria coincides with the core of replica
economies.
2.4 The ex-post core and the rational expectations
equilibria
Let us define the equilibria in the ex-post economy ξ. We consider again a mea-
surable space (Ω,F) where F represents the set of all events and Ω denotes the set
of states of nature. The commodity space is RL+. Each agent i ∈ N is described
as before by a measurable partition of (Ω,F): Fi is the partition information of
agent i and pi is the common prior that represents the relative probability of each
state. The common prior is strictly positive in each state ω ∈ Ω.
The utility function is state-dependent:
ui : Ω×RL+ → R
and such that for any x ∈ RL+, the function ui(·, x) is F -measurable. It represents
the (ex-post) preference of agent i.
The initial endowment function of agents is described by:
e : Ω×N → RL+
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such that e(ω, i) represents the initial endowment of agent i in the state of nature
ω.
An assignment is a function x:
x : Ω×N → RL+
such that for any ω ∈ Ω, the function x(·, i) is F - measurable.
An assignment is a feasible allocation when:∑
i∈N
x(ω, i) ≤
∑
i∈N
e(ω, i),
for each ω ∈ Ω.
For studying the ex-post equilibria, we need to deal with two economies: ξ and
ξ(ω). The economy ξ is the differential information economy until now described,
while ξ(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω is a complete information economy in which the initial
endowment of each agent is e(ω, i) and the utility function is ui(ω, ·).
2.4.1 The ex-post core
Let us define the ex-post core of the economy ξ and then let us prove that it rep-
resents the core corresponding to the families of complete information economies
(ξ(ω))ω∈Ω. Let x be an allocation, let S ⊆ N be a coalition and let ω0 ∈ Ω. An
assignment y is an ex-post improvement of x for S ′ at ω0 if:
• The assignment y is feasible: ∑i∈S y(ω0, i) ≤∑i∈S e(ω0, i);
• ui(ω0,y(ω0, i)) > ui(ω0,x(ω0, i)),∀i ∈ S.
An allocation is an ex-post core allocation if no coalition S ⊆ N has an ex-post
improvement upon x at any ω ∈ Ω. The ex-post core of ξ, C(ξ) is the set of all
ex-post core allocations of ξ.
Theorem 2.4.1. [10] C(ξ) is non-empty if the economy ξ satisfies the following
conditions:
i. For any ω ∈ Ω, e(ω, i) 0 (no commodity is absent from the market in each
state).
ii. For each i ∈ N , for any x ∈ RL+, e(·, i) is Fi - measurable (the agents know
their own endowment in each state).
iii. For each i ∈ N, ui(·, x) is Fi-measurable (the utility is state dependent and
known by each agent in any state).
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Moreover, the ex-post core of ξ coincides with the following set:
C(ξ) = {x|x is an assignment and x(ω, ·) ∈ C(ξ(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω}.
Proof. Let X be defined as:
X = {x|x is an assignment and x(ω, ·) ∈ C(ξ(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω}.
First of all, we prove that the set X is non-empty and then that the core of the
economy with complete information coincides with the core of the ex-post economy.
It is true that C(ξ(ω)) is non empty for all ω ∈ Ω (see, e.g., Aumann, 1964,
1966, and Hildenbrand, 1968, 1974) if the following conditions hold:
i. For any ω ∈ Ω, e(ω, i) 0.
ii. For each i ∈ N, ui(·, x) is Fi-measurable.
Let A1, ....Ak all the atoms partition of the field F . For any 1 ≤ j ≤ k, let
ωj ∈ Aj and xj ∈ C(ξ(ωj)).
Define x : Ω × N → RL+ by x(ω, i) = xj(i) for all ω ∈ Aj and for all i ∈ N .
Then x is a well-defined assignment in ξ. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ k and ω ∈ Aj, then e(ω, i) =
ej(ωj, ·) and ui(ω, i) = ui(ωj, ·). Therefore, the economies ξ(ω) and ξ(ωj) coincide
and x(ω, ·) = x(ωj, ·) which implies that x(ω, ·) ∈ C(ξ(ω)),∀ω ∈ Ω, i.e.x ∈ X.
The proof that X ⊆ C(ξ) is satisfied.
Let’s show now that C(ξ) ⊆ X. To prove our claim, we suppose by contradic-
tion that x ∈ C(ξ) and x 6∈ X.
So, there exists another state of nature ω0 for which x(ω0, ·) ∈ X and x(ω0, ·) 6∈
C(ξ(ω0)). From here, there exists a coalition S and an allocation y feasible and
for which ui(ω0,y(i)) > ui(ω0,x(ω0, i)) for all i ∈ S. Let us consider the atom
information partition containing A(ω0) and a function z : Ω × N → RL+ defined
by:
z(ω, i) =
{
y(i) if ω ∈ A(ω0)
e(ω, i) otherwise.
So z is an assignment in ξ. Moreover, z is an ex-post improvement of S upon
x on ω0, which contradicts that x ∈ C(ξ).
2.4.2 The rational expectations equilibria
The rational expectations equilibrium is defined by a pair (p,x) where p is the
price system and x is the allocation, consistent with the information, the budget
constraint and the utility’s maximization, as formalized below.
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In the ex-post framework, the price assumes a great importance. It becomes
the variable that the agents analyze to make conjectures for taking a decision. It
is described as a non zero function:
p : Ω→ RL+.
Let us introduce σ(p) the smallest subfield G of F for which p is G-measurable.
It is the subfield generated by p and it represents the additional information that
agents may infer from the prices. The budget set of agent i is still defined in each
state ω and it is given by:
Bi(p, ω) = {x ∈ RL+ | p(ω)x ≤ p(ω)e(ω, i)}.
A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair (p,x) such that:
• For all i ∈ N , x(·, i) is σ(p) ∨ Fi-measurable.
• For any ω ∈ Ω and for all i ∈ N , x(ω, i) ∈ Bi(p, ω).
• For all i ∈ N , if x : Ω → RL+ is σ(p) ∨ Fi-measurable and satisfies x(ω) ∈
Bi(p, ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, then
Vi(·,x(·, i)|σ(p) ∨ Fi) ≥ Vi(x(·)|σ(p) ∨ Fi).
This is the notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy ξ and it
coincides with a selection of the Walrasian equilibrium correspondence generated
by the family of economies (ξ(ω))ω∈Ω with perfect information in each state ω.
Theorem 2.4.2. [10] The set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations of ξ
coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium allocation of ξ5:
RE(ξ) = {x|x is an assignment and x(ω, ·) ∈ W (ξ(ω)) ∀ω ∈ Ω}.
Proof. Let a set Y (ξ):
Y (ξ) = {x|x is an assignment and x(ω, ·) ∈ W (ξ(ω))∀ω ∈ Ω}.
5When the following assumptions are satisfied:
i. For any ω ∈ Ω, e(ω, i) 0.
ii. For any ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, e(·.i) is Fi-measurable.
iii. For any ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, ui(·,x) is Fi-measurable.
iv. For any ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, ui(·,x) is continuous, increasing and strictly quasi concave on RL+.
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Let us prove that the set Y ⊆ RE(ξ) and RE(ξ) ⊆ Y . Taking a state ω′ ∈ Ω, we
prove that x(ω′ , ·) ∈ W (ξ(ω′)).
We consider a rational expectation equilibrium (p,x) of ξ and we prove that
(p,x(ω)′) is a competitive equilibrium for the economy ξ(ω′)6. Let S the set
of agents i for which the theorem is proved and let an allocation a ∈ Bi(ω′ , p).
Denoting by Ai(ω
′
) the atom σ(p)∨Fi that contains the state of nature ω′ , let us
define y : Ω→ RL+ by:
y =
{
a, if ω ∈ Ai(ω′)
0, otherwise.
So, y is σ(p) ∨ Fi-measurable function. As p(ω) = p(ω′), e(ω, i) = e(ω′ , i) for
ω ∈ Ai(ω′), then y ∈ Bi(ω, p),∀ω ∈ Ω. This means that, since i ∈ S and each
agent i in S follows the theorem 2.4.2:
Vi(·,x(·, i)|σ(p) ∨ Fi) ≥ Vi(y(·)|σ(p) ∨ Fi).
Thus the utility function ui(·, i) is continuous, strictly increasing, and quasi-
concave on RL+:
Vi(y(·)|σ(p) ∨ Fi) = ui(·,y(·)),
and
Vi(x(·, i)|σ(p) ∨ Fi) = ui(·,x(·, i)).
So:
ui(ω
′
, a) = ui(ω
′
,y(ω
′
)) ≤ ui(·,x(·, i)).
The result is that x(ω′ , i) maximizes ui(ω
′
, ·) on Bi(ω′ , p), for all i ∈ S. Now, it
remains to prove that Y ⊆ RE(ξ).
Let an allocation x ∈ Y . Then, x is an allocation in ξ and x(ω, ·) ∈ W (ξ(ω)),∀ω ∈
Ω. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium price p(ω) ∈ RL+ such that (p(ω),x(ω, ·))
is a competitive equilibrium for ξ(ω). Since, we suppose that the utility is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and continuous on RL+, the equilibrium price is strictly
positive for all states in Ω.
Let F composed by the atom informations A1, ...Ak and for every 1 ≤ j ≤
k, ωj ∈ Aj. Then, let define the price function p : Ω → RL+ such that p(ω) =
p(ωj) and p is F -measurable. Hypothesizing that for any i ∈ N, e(·, i) is Fi-
measurable and ∀x ∈ RL+,∀ω ∈ Ω, ui(·, x) is Fi-measurable, we have ξ(ω) = ξ(ωj)
and so x(ω, ·) = x(ωj, ·). From these conditions, we obtain that (p(ω),x(ω, ·)) is
a competitive equilibrium for ξ(ω).
6Remember that x belongs to the budget set:
x(ω
′
, i) ∈ Bi(ω′ , p) for i ∈ N.
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To prove the theorem, it’s necessary also to prove that x(·, i) is σ(p) ∨ Fi-
measurable7.
Let suppose that ω1, ω2 ∈ A, then p(ω1) = p(ω2). Therefore:
Bi(ω1, p) = Bi(ω2, p).
That means
ui(ω1, p) = ui(ω2, p).
In this way, p(ω1) and p(ω2) are competitive equilibria prices of ξ(ω1) and of
ξ(ω2), but thus the utility is strictly quasi concave, the economy has a unique
competitive equilibrium and x(ω1, i) = x(ω2, i) which affirms that x(·, i) is σ(p)∨Fi
- measurable.
In this way, the pair (p,x) is a rational expectation equilibrium for the economy
ξ, thus respects the price measurability and the optimality. It remains to show
that if an assignment is a rational expectations equilibrium, it is also a competitive
equilibrium assignment for the economy ξ(ω)8.
Let consider a coalition S(ω) such that x(ω, i) maximizes ui(ω, ·) on Bi(ω, p).
Then pi(S(ω)) = pi(N). Let us consider an allocation y as before. We have that
for all ω ∈ Ω, ui(ω,y(ω)) ≤ ui(ω,x(ω, i)) and therefore:
Vi(·,x(·, i)|σ(p) ∨ Fi) ≥ Vi(y(·)|σ(p) ∨ Fi)
on Ω. This is the inequality that satisfies the theorem.
The Rational expectations equilibria can assume three configurations. They
are said to be:
1. Fully revealing if the price function reveals to each agent the complete infor-
mation: σ(p) = F .
2. Partially revealing if the price function reveals partial information.
3. Non-revealing if it does not disclose any particular information.
Proposition 2.4.3. Let ξ be an economy and (p, x) a fully revealing rational expec-
tations equilibrium. Then, x is an ex-post core allocation of ξ.
Proof. Since the equilibrium is fully revealing, it coincides with the case of com-
plete information and uncertainty. Therefore, the proof is analogous to that one
used for the equivalence between WE(ξ) and C(ξ).
7x(·, i) is constant on the atoms of σ(p) ∨ Fi.
8The thesis of the theorem is the last thing to prove, after having proved the hypothesis.
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Conclusion
This chapter presents a general overview of models of exchange economies with
uncertainty and differential information. These models introduce new aspects in
the classical Walrasian framework.
The symmetric and perfect information of the environment fall down and make
space for several theories, closer to the real world.
The survey begins with the classical Arrow and Debreu theory of economies
under uncertainty. They introduce the possibility to have several states of nature
and a probability to occur.
Then, Radner introduced a model with uncertainty and with differential infor-
mation. The model introduced by De Clippel is presented. In this case, choices
take place at the interim stage. Finally, we present the rational expectations equi-
libria and the ex-post core. For each of these economies, the equivalence result is
analyzed and presented.
In the next chapter, a new equilibrium concept is described. It involves un-
certainty and differential information, but, simultaneously, a construction of the
equilibrium inspired by the choice set notion, instead of the price-taking behavior.
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Chapter 3
Arbitrage condition in differential
information economies
It is the aim of this chapter to join the theories presented in Chapter 1 and 2
under a new notion of equilibrium. I shall define an economy in which the main
concept of equilibrium is based on trade without prices, following in this way the
ICS construction. Furthermore, this trade takes place under uncertainty and
differential information. Therefore, the new equilibrium concept is characterized
by the following main features:
• The possibility of arbitrage (see [5], [31], [24]);
• Uncertainty and differential information (see [27], [23], [34]).
The structure of the chapter is as follows:
• Section 3.1 introduces the model, with the definition of arbitrage condition,
weakly preferred set and preferred set. The last part is focused on the con-
figuration of the core and the possible equivalence result in an ex-ante stage
setting. In this section, the uncertainty and asymmetric information scenario
is formalized like in the Radner model;
• section 3.2 describes arbitrage free condition using the concept of deviators
(see [6]) and so focusing on the interim stage of a differential economy;
• section 3.3 deals with the ex post core and rational expectations equilibrium
concept (see [10]);
• the last section analyses the incentive compatibility constraint issues (see
[32], [22], [14], [11]).
The main proofs of this section follow [31], [6].
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3.1 The model
Let us consider an economy with a finite set of agents N and a finite number of
commodities L. Each agent will be characterized by a random utility function,
a random initial endowment, a private information structure and a prior. Let us
denote the economy by ξ = ((Ω,F), Xi, ui, ei,Fi, pi) with i ∈ N , where:
• (Ω,F) is the information structure in which Ω is a finite set of states of
nature and F is the subset of Ω that represents the events to which the
consumers assign a probability pi, with pi(ω) > 0,∀ω ∈ Ω;
• Xi = RL+ is the commodity space of consumer i;
• ei : Ω→ RL+ is the random initial endowment of agent i;
• ui : Ω × RL+ → R+ is the state-dependent utility function of agent i. It is
monotone, continuous and concave ∀ω ∈ Ω;
• P(Ω) is the family of all partitions of Ω and Fi ∈ P(Ω) is the private infor-
mation of agent i. It is assumed that when the future state of the economy
is ω, agent i cannot discriminate the states and so he only knows that ω
belongs to the event in Fi(ω) of his partition containing ω.
To describe the arbitrage condition, let us introduce the ex-ante preferred and
weakly preferred sets:
Pi(xi) = {zi ∈ RLΩ+ |Vi(zi) > Vi(xi)}
∀i ∈ N .
Wi(xi) = {zi ∈ RLΩ+ |Vi(zi) ≥ Vi(xi)}
∀i ∈ N .
Notice that the notion of preferred sets, in this section, is defined considering
the ex-ante expected utility.
In the economy ξ, the behavior of agents is described by means of the ex-ante
interactive choice set Z (see [31].) The set Z is affected by the timing of the process
for two reasons: the sequence of trades according to the arbitrage free equilibrium
concept and to the revelation of uncertainty according to the Radner model.
Precisely:
At τ = 0 (ex-ante stage) the consumer doesn’t know the state in which he
will consume at time τ = 1. At time τ = 0, a sequence of trades takes place (for
which the timing is t = 0, 1, 2, ...) like in the arbitrage free scheme. At τ = 1,
when uncertainty is solved, he only knows that ω ∈ Fi(ω). Therefore, the agent
i exchanges his own bundle with the others proposing a trade which improves all
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the parts involved in the process. His preferences are defined ex-ante and so the
notion of ICS given an allocation x : N → RL+, involves Wj(xj):
Zxi (0) = {ei}.
Zxi (1) =
⋃
j∈N
[Z∗xi (0) + Z
∗x
j (0)−Wj(xj)] ∩ Gi.
∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, with xj ∈ Gi, with Gi defined by:
Gi = {z : Ω→ RL+ s.t. z is Fi -measurable}.
This exchange procedure can be extended to infinite defining:
Zxi (t) =
⋃
S⊆N,i∈S
[∑
j∈S
Zj(xj)(t− 1)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi, t ∈ N.
The uncertainty is revealed at τ = 1 and the trades are fulfilled in the realized
states. Trades in the ICS of i are required to be measurable and compatible with
the private information of agent i.
3.1.1 The ex-ante arbitrage free condition
An ex-ante arbitrage free - equilibrium in the economy with differential information
is composed by a pair (xi, Ci)i∈N , where xi ∈ Gi is the bundle assigned by the
private allocation x to agent i and Ci is the choice set of the agent i.
Ci is a function:
Ci : Ω→ RL+
and also a subset of Gi,∀i ∈ N . As before, the choice set allows the optimization
of the expected utility and it supports the ex-ante arbitrage free condition. It is
feasible and contains the actual trade. Then, formally, an ex-ante arbitrage free -
equilibrium is a pair (xi, Ci)i∈N satisfying the following conditions:
1. (xi)i∈N is an allocation;
2. ei, xi ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ N ;
3. Ci ⊇
[∑
j∈S Cj −
∑
j∈S\{i}Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi with j ∈ S, S ⊆ N ;
4. Pi(xi) ∩ Ci = ∅.
Notice that, according to the definition of choice set, agent i proposes only trades
which are compatible with his own private information.
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A particular case of choice set is represented by the ex-ante budget set which
defines Walrasian expectations equilibrium:
Bi = {xi ∈ Gi|pxi ≤ pei}∀i ∈ N
with p : Ω→ RL+.
Taking the features of the choice set, let us show this property. By conditions
defining a Walrasian expectations equilibrium, we have ei, xi ∈ Bi = Ci. Let us
prove that:
Ci ⊇
[
Ci +
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
Cj −
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi.
Consider a bundle z s.t.
z = γi +
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
γj −
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
wj ∈ Gi,
with γi ∈ Bi, γj ∈ Bj, wj ∈ Wj(xj). Since pγj ≤ pej and pγi ≤ pei, we have:
pz = pγi +
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
(pγj − pej) ≤ pei +
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
pej − pwj. (3.1)
But, p(ej − wj) ≤ 0 since, for monotonicity of preferences,
wj j xj ⇒ pwj ≥ pej.
So, the equation 3.1 gives:
pz ≤ pei and z ∈ Bi = Ci.
The choice set and the interactive choice sets are subsets of privately measurable
functions Gi and moreover, they are interrelated by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1.1. Let ξ be a differential information economy and let the pair
(xi, Ci)i∈N satisfies conditions 1.− 4. . Then:
i. Zxi ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ N ;
ii. (xi, Zxi )i∈N is an ex-ante arbitrage free- equilibrium.
Proof. Let us prove by induction that Zxi ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ N . (xi, Ci)i∈N is an ex-ante
arbitrage free equilibrium, then Zxi (0) = {ei} ⊆ Ci,∀i ∈ N . Now, assume that
Zxi (t− 1) ⊆ Ci for some t, ∀i ∈ N .
Since (xi, Ci) satisfies the condition 3.:
Ci ⊇
[∑
j∈S
Cj −
∑
j∈S\{i}
Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi
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with j ∈ S, S ⊆ N , by induction, the condition becomes:
Ci ⊇
[∑
j∈S
Zxj (t− 1)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi
with j ∈ S, S ⊆ N . Consequently:
Ci ⊇
⋃
S⊆N
[∑
j∈S
Zxj (t− 1)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi.
The right side implies, by definition of Zxi (t), that Zxi (t) ⊆ Ci.
The first point of the proposition is proved.
Now, let us show that Zxi satisfies the conditions 1.−4. The first and the second
conditions are trivially satisfied. The fourth condition derives from the proof of
[i.] The third condition is satisfied thanks to the definition of interactive choice
set. Indeed, taking a bundle z:
z ∈ Zxi (t− 1) =
[∑
j∈S
Zxj (t)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Wj(xj)
] ∩ Gi.
Thus Zxi (t) is an increasing sequence in t, z ∈ Zxi (t+ 1) ⊆ Zxi .
Replica economies in an ex-ante differential information economy
The m-fold replica economy of a differential information economy ξ, denoted by
ξm is a new differential information economy with mn agents, such that each agent
(i, j), j = 1, ..m has the same characteristics of agent i:
• Fij = Fi;
• eij = ei;
• uij = ui;
• piij = pii.
The core of a replica economy can be expressed by means of feasible sets very close
to the interactive choice sets.
Fix an allocation x and an agent i ∈ N . Let us define the following sets:
Axi (0) = {ei} ∀i ∈ N.
Axi (m) =
⋃
S⊆N×m,(i,1) 6∈S
[
ei +
∑
(k,l)∈S
(ek −Wk(xk))
] ∩ Gi.
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Axi =
⋃
m∈N
Axi (m).
The core of the m-fold replica is represented by the following condition: the allo-
cation x ∈ A(ξ) is in the core of the m-replica economy ξm of ξ if for all i ∈ N :
Pi(xi) ∩ Axi (m) = ∅.
We remark that the previous condition refers to a strong private core notion. In
differential information economies, due to the measurability restriction imposed
on allocations, the strong and weak core are not equivalent.
Theorem 3.1.2. Let ξ be a differential information economy and let (xi)i∈N be an
allocation. For all i ∈ N,Zxi = Axi .
Proof. The proof follows the same steps of the theorem 1.2.3.
3.1.2 Ex-ante arbitrage differential core
Let us consider the coalition S and an assignment (xi)i∈S. We say that x is an
S-allocation if it is ex-ante feasible:∑
i∈S
xi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈S
ei(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω.
The feasible allocation is an ex-ante core allocation if there does not exist a coali-
tion S and an S-allocation (x′i)i∈S such that for all i ∈ S, x′i ∈ W (xi) and for some
i ∈ S, x′i ∈ Pi(xi).
3.1.3 The equivalence result
If the differential information economy ξ satisfies the assumption listed before, i.e.
1. For all i ∈ N , for all ω ∈ Ω, the consumption set Xi = RL+;
2. upper semicontinuity of state-dependent utilities;
3. strict monotonicity of state-dependent utilities;
4. strictly positivity of the initial endowment in each state.
Theorem 3.1.3. An allocation is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium if and only
if (xi, Zxi )i∈N is an ex-ante arbitrage-free equilibrium.
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Proof. We start from the assumptions that (xi, Zxi )i∈N is an ex-ante arbitrage free
equilibrium. By condition 4. of the definition of ex-ante arbitrage free equilibrium:
Pi(xi) ∩ Zxi = ∅,∀i ∈ N.
By theorem 3.1.2:
Pi(xi) ∩ Ai = ∅, ∀i ∈ N.
which implies that xi is an ex-ante core allocation of the replica economy. By
Debreu-Scarf theorem for the ex -ante economy, it is a Walrasian expectations
equilibrium.
So, we have proved that (xi, Zxi )i∈N is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium.
3.2 Arbitrage condition in a type-agent economy
In this section, we introduce a notion of arbitrage free equilibrium for an economy
at the interim stage. Let us recall that the type agent economy refers to an economy
in which each agent i is characterized by the signal that he receives. So, a type-
agent is defined by particular agent i together with an event in his information
partition.
In this contest, let us introduce the deviators concept. Given two allocation
rules a, a′ : Ω→ RLN+ , the deviators are agents which prefer in each state to have
a
′ instead of a, therefore the set of deviators is given by:
D(ai, a
′
i, ω) := {i ∈ N |Vi(a
′
i|Pi(ω)) > Vi(ai|Pi(ω))}.
The interim expected utility, with Pi(ω) denoting the event in Fi containing the
realized state of nature ω, is expressed as follows:
Vi(ai|Pi(ω)) = 1
pi(Pi(ω))
∑
ω′∈Pi
ui(ω
′
, ai(ω
′
)).
The concepts of weakly preferred sets and preferred sets need to be re-formulated.
The sets are described as follows ∀i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, and can be considered as
interim concepts:
Pi(ai, ω) = {a′i ∈ RLΩ+ |Vi(a
′
i|Pi(ω)) > Vi(ai|Pi(ω))},
Wi(ai, ω) = {a′i ∈ RLΩ+ |Vi(a
′
i|Pi(ω)) ≥ Vi(ai|Pi(ω))}.
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3.2.1 The constrained or interim arbitrage free condition
Let define an interim choice set as a function Ci : Ω→ RL+. A pair [ai(ω), Ci(ω)]i∈N
is an interim arbitrage free equilibrium if it satisfies the following properties:
i. There is the possibility of no trade for each agent i in each state, so ei(ω) ∈
Ci(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ N .
ii. The allocation rule ai(ω) ∈ Ci(ω) for all i ∈ N , for each ω ∈ Ω.
iii.
∑
k∈S Ck(ω)−
∑
k∈S\{i}Wk(xk, ω) ⊆ Ci(ω),∀i ∈ N,∀ω ∈ Ω,∀S ∈ Si(ω)
where Si(ω) = {S ⊆ N : Pi(ω) = Pk(ω)∀k ∈ S}.
iv. The agent optimizes his own utility in the choice set in each state i.e. Ci(ω)∩
Pi(ai(ω)) = ∅, ∀i ∈ N,∀ω ∈ Ω.
Notice that condition [iii.] in the definition that we propose is defined only with
respect to those coalitions whose members receive in the state ω the same infor-
mation of agent i.
A particular Ci(ω) is represented by a budget set on which the agent i maxi-
mizes his interim expected utility at a vector price p ∈ RLΩ+ in a given constrained
market equilibrium.
Let
Bi(ω) = {ai ∈ RLΩ+ |
∑
ω∈Pi(ω)
p(ω)ai(ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Pi(ω)
p(ω)ei(ω)}.
Proposition 3.2.1. Let (a, p) be a constrained market equilibrium, then [ai(ω), Ci(ω)]i∈N,ω∈Ω
with Bi(ω) = Ci(ω) is an interim arbitrage free-equilibrium.
Proof. Given the condition [iii.] the proof is similar to the one for a complete
information economy.
For the next step, it’s important to consider the fictitious economy, i.e. the
above mentioned type -agent economy.
Let ξ = (a(i,E), u(i,E), e(i,E),F(i,E)). Recall that the set of type agents is N , the
set of goods is L, the set of possible states is Ω and each agent i is associated with
an event in his information partition. The difference with respect to the economy
ξ is that it is characterized by uncertainty and symmetric information.
Given an interim arbitrage free equilibrium [ai(ω), Ci(ω)]i∈N of ξ the choice set
Ci(ω) is associated to the state contingent choice set of type agent (i, E) C(i,E)
which we can define as follows;
C(i,E)(ω) := Ci(ω) if ω ∈ E.
C(i,E)(ω) := R
L
+ if ∀ω ∈ Ω \ E.
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The allocation for the type-agent (i, E) is:
a(i,E)(ω) : Ω→ RL+;
defined as follows:
a(i,E)(ω) := ai(ω) if ω ∈ E.
a(i,E)(ω) := 0 if ω ∈ Ω \ E.
The initial endowment function for the type-agent (i, E) is:
e(i,E)(ω) : Ω→ RL+
where the endowment for type agent (i, E) is:
e(i,E)(ω) := ei(ω) if ω ∈ E.
e(i,E)(ω) := 0 if ω 6∈ E.
An allocation is feasible for a coalition S if:∑
(i,E)∈S
a(i,E)(ω) ≤
∑
(i,E)∈S
e(i,E)(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀S ⊆ N .
An allocation rule a′ dominates an allocation rule a for a coalition S if a′ is feasible
for S and
V(i,E)(a
′
(i,E)) > V(i,E)(a(i,E)) for each (i, E) ∈ S,
where in the type-agent economy, we refer to the standard ex-ante core notion of
a model with only uncertainty.
Conversely, if [a(i,E)(ω), C(i,E)(ω)] is an arbitrage free - equilibrium of the type-
agent economy, the choice set C(i,E)(ω) is associated to the following choice sets
(Ci(ω))i∈N,ω∈Ω:
Ci(ω) := C(i,Pi(ω))(ω);
where C(i,Pi(ω))(ω) is the projection of C(i,Pi(ω)) on the state ω ∈ Ω.
The next proposition extends to interim equilibrium the correspondence already
known (see [6]) for constrained market equilibria.
Proposition 3.2.2. Let [ai(ω), Ci(ω)]i∈N,ω∈Ω an interim arbitrage free equilibrium
in ξ, then [a(i,E)(ω), C(i,E)(ω)](i,E)∈N ,ω∈E is an arbitrage free equilibrium of ξ and
conversely.
73
Replica in fictitious economy
The m-fold replica economy of a fictitious economy ξ denoted by ξm is a new
fictitious economy with nm type-agents such that ∀j ∈ {1, ...m}:
• e(i,E) = e(ij,E);
• V(i,E)(·) = V(j,E)(·).
Fixing an allocation a and a type agent (i, E), let us define the following sets:
A
x
(i,E)(ω)(0) = {e(i,E)(ω)} if ω ∈ E;
A
x
(i,E)(ω)(m) =
⋃
S⊆N×m,(i1,E)6∈S
[e(i,E)(ω) +
∑
(j,F )∈S
(ek,F )(ω)−W (j,F )(a(j,F )(ω))].
A
x
(i,E) =
⋃
m∈N
A
x
(i,E)(m).
The core of a replica economy can be expressed using suitable intersections. The
allocation a(i,E) is a shrunk core if and only if:
P(i,E)(a(i,E)) ∩ A(i,E)(m) = ∅,∀(i, E) ∈ S.
3.2.2 The characterization of the core in the fictitious econ-
omy
Let us denote by xi the fictitious economy. Given an allocation a, we say that it
is a core allocation when it cannot be blocked by a coalition in the ex-ante sense.
For showing the limit of the core, let us retrace the same steps made for the
Radner economy in the arbitrage scheme.
Definition of the interactive choice set
At t = 0:
Z(i,E)(0) = {e(i,E)},∀(i, E) ∈ N ,∀ω ∈ E.
Z(i,E)(0) = ∅,∀ω ∈ Ω \ E.
For t > 0:
Z(i,E)(t) =
⋃
S⊆N ,(i,E)∈S
[ ∑
(j,F )∈S
Z(j,F )(t− 1)−
∑
(j,F )∈S\{(i,E)}
W (j,F )(a(j,F ))
]
,
for t ∈ N.
Where the set W is defined using the ex-ante utility of the type-agent (j, F ).
Proposition 3.2.3. Let (a(i,E)(ω), C(i,E))(i,E)∈N an arbitrage free equilibrium of the
fictitious economy ξ. Then:
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i. Zx(i,E) ⊆ C(i,E),∀(i, E) ∈ N ;
ii. [a(i,E), Z(i,E)](i,E)∈N is an arbitrage free- equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2.4. Let ξ be the fictitious economy and let (a(i,E))(i,E)∈N be an alloca-
tion. For all (i, E) ∈ N , Zx(i,E) = Ax(i,E).
Proof. The proof follows the same steps of the theorem 1.2.3.
3.2.3 The equivalence result
The equivalence result between the interim (or constrained) arbitrage free equilib-
rium and the constrained market equilibrium introduced by Wilson and studied
by De Clippel, can be proved using the usual steps. In particular:
• We first show the equivalence in the fictitious economy ξ between arbitrage
free equilibrium and Arrow-Debreu equilibrium;
• We deduce the equivalence in the original economy ξ.
3.3 The arbitrage free rational expectations equi-
librium
In this section, we introduce a notion of arbitrage free equilibrium at the ex post
stage and prove its equivalence with Rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
introduced in section 2.4. We shall consider the economy ξ(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω,
instead of ξ. In this way, we deal with an economy with complete information for
each state of nature ω.
The new economy is defined by ξ(ω) = (N,L, e(ω, i), ui(ω, i)) where N is the
finite set of agents, L the finite set of goods, ui(ω, ·) for each agent is the utility
function, the initial endowment for agent i is e(ω, i); that is the initial endowment
of agent i in the state ω. The function ui(·, x) is Fi-measurable, continuous, strictly
increasing and quasi-concave on RL+. The choice set function of agent i in each
state ω ∈ Ω is:
C : Ω×N → RL+.
The allocation function x of agent i in each state ω ∈ Ω is:
x : Ω×N → RL+,
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where x(·, i) is F -measurable, ∀i ∈ N . We shall use the notation x(ω, i) = xi(ω)
and C(ω, i) = Ci(ω) to denote the bundle of commodities and the choice set
assigned to i in the state ω ∈ Ω. The feasibility is expressed ad follows:∑
i∈N
x(ω, i) ≤
∑
i∈N
e(ω, i);
for all agent i ∈ N and for each ω ∈ Ω.
The weakly and the preferred sets are defined ex post. In each state ω ∈ Ω:
Wi(xi(ω)) = {z ∈ RL+|ui(z, ω) ≥ ui(xi(ω), ω)}.
Pi(xi(ω)) = {z ∈ RL+|ui(z, ω) > ui(xi(ω), ω)}.
An ex post arbitrage free-equilibrium is a pair [x,C] for each ω ∈ Ω,∀i ∈ N
such that:
1. x is an allocation;
2. xi(ω), ei(ω) ∈ Ci(ω);
3. Pi(xi(ω)) ∩Ci(ω) = ∅;
4. The ex post arbitrage free condition holds:∑
j∈S
C(ω, j)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
W(x(ω, j)) ⊆ C(ω, i)
∀S ⊆ N, j 6= i;
All these conditions follow the same logic of Serrano, Volij and Dagan (see [5],
[30]).
Let us define the interactive choice sets.
Definition of Interactive choice sets
The interactive choice set is recursively defined as usual, but with reference to
ω ∈ Ω. At t = 0:
Z(ω, i)(0) = {e(ω, i)} for each ω ∈ Ω,∀i ∈ N.
At t > 0:
Z(ω, i)(t) =
⋃
j∈S,S⊆N
[∑
j∈S
Z(ω, j)(t−1)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
W(x(ω, j))
]
. and Z(ω, i) = ∪t∈NZ(ω, i)(t).
The choice set and the interactive choice are linked by the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.3.1. Let [x,C] be an arbitrage free rational expectations equilibrium.
Then:
• Z(ω, i) ⊆ C(ω, i),∀i ∈ N,∀ω ∈ Ω;
• [x,Z] is an arbitrage free rational expectations equilibrium too.
Notice that the Proposition holds true simply because the economy correspond-
ing to each ω ∈ Ω has the same characteristics of those studied in the first chapter
for the case of complete information. So, the attention can be limited to the
arbitrage free REE in which the choice set is actually interactive.
3.3.1 Replica in ex-post economy
The m-fold replica economy of the state dependent economy ξ(ω), denoted by
ξm(ω) is a new perfect information economy with nm agents, such that each agent
(i, j), j = 1, ..m has the same features of agent i, ∀j ∈ {1, ..m}, for each ω ∈ Ω:
• ui(ω, x) = uij(ω, x);
• e(ω, i) = e(ω, ij).
The core of the m - fold replica can be expressed by means of feasible sets close to
the interactive choice set. Fix an allocation x and an agent i ∈ N .
Define the following sets ∀i ∈ N and for each ω ∈ Ω:
Axi (ω)(0) = {e(ω, i)}.
Axi (ω)(m) =
⋃
S⊆N×{1,..m},(i,1)6∈S
[
e(ω, i) +
∑
(k,l)∈S
e(ω, kl)−W(x(ω, kl))
]
.
Axi (ω) =
⋃
m∈N
Axi (m),∀ω ∈ Ω.
The core of the m-fold replica is represented by the following condition: the allo-
cation x ∈ A(ξ(ω)) is in the core of the r-replica economy ξ(ω)m of ξ(ω) if for all
i ∈ N , for each ω ∈ Ω:
P(x(ω, i)) ∩ Axi (ω)(m) = ∅.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let ξ be a differential information economy and let x be an allo-
cation. For all i ∈ N and for each ω ∈ Ω,Zxi (ω) = Axi (ω).
Proof. The proof follows the same steps of the theorem 1.2.3., since the considered
economies have the same features of a complete information economy, for each
ω ∈ Ω.
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Proposition 3.3.3. Each rational expectations equilibrium (x,p) is an ex-post ar-
bitrage free equilibrium when we choose as choice set the state dependent budget
set, i.e. when ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω:
Ci(ω) = Bi(p, ω) = {z ∈ RL+ : p(ω)z ≤ p(ω)ei(ω)}.
Proof. Conditions 1 and 2 are obviously satisfied. Fix i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. We want
to show condition 3 for Pi(xi(ω)) and Ci(ω). Assume by contradiction that there
exists:
z ∈ Pi(xi(ω)) ∩Ci((ω)).
Then z ∈ Bi(p, ω) = Ci(ω) and ui(ω, z) > ui(ω, xi(ω)).
Consider the atom Ai(ω) in the σ-algebra σ(p) ∨ Fi containing ω. Define z : Ω→
RL+ as follows
z(ω) =
{
z if ω ∈ Ai(ω)
0 otherwise.
Then z(·) is σ(p)∨Fi-measurable by definition and from p(ω) = p(ω) and e(ω, i) =
e(ω, i),∀ω ∈ Ai(ω) we have, by definition of rational expectations equilibria:
Vi(ui(·, z(·))|σ(p) ∨ Fi) ≤ Vi((·, x(·, i))|σ(p) ∨ Fi).
Since ui is Fi - measurable, we see that: Vi(ui(·, z(·))|σ(p) ∨ Fi) = ui(·, z(·)) and
Vi(ui(·, x(·, i))|σ(p) ∨ Fi) = ui(·, x(·, i)) . So we conclude that for the agent i in
the state ω:
ui(ω, z) ≤ ui(ω, x(ω, i))
which is a contradiction. Finally, to prove condition 4, fix ω ∈ Ω and consider the
vector:
z ∈
∑
k∈S
Bk(ω, p)−
∑
k∈S,k 6=i
Wk(x(ω, k))
Then z =
∑
k∈S gk −
∑
k∈S,k 6=iwk, with
pgk ≤ pek(ω) and uk(ω,wk) ≥ uk(ω, x(ω, k)).
Define wnk = wk +
1
n
v, with v > 0. By monotonicity of state dependent utility
functions, we have that
uk(ω,w
n
k ) ≥ uk(ω, x(ω, k)).
Hence, with a construction similar to the previous one, we can see that pwnk >
pek(ω)∀k,∀ω and so, in the limit,
p.wk = limnpw
n
k ≥ ek(ω)
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for each k ∈ S. As a consequence
pz =
∑
k∈S
pgk −
∑
k∈S
k 6=i
pkwk ≤
∑
k∈S
pek(ω)−
∑
k∈Sk 6=i
pkek(ω) = piei(ω).
which implies x ∈ Ci(ω) = Bi(p, ω) and the conclusion is proved.
3.3.2 Arbitrage free rational expectations equilibrium
The main result of this section follows. It gives a new characterization of REE
which does not defined on prices.
Theorem 3.3.4. A pair (x, p) is a rational free expectations equilibrium if and only
if [x,Z] for each ω ∈ Ω and ∀i ∈ N is an ex post arbitrage equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that [x,Z] is an arbitrage free expectations equilibrium.We know
that Zxi (ω) = Axi (ω),∀ω,∀i by theorem 3.3.2.. Then P(x(ω, i)) ∩ Axi (ω)(m) =
∅,∀i,∀ω ∈ Ω, and consequentially the allocation x is in the core of each replica
economy ξm(ω), i.e. x
⋂∞
m>1C(ξ
m(ω)).
By [10], x belongs to the set RE(ξ),x is an allocation, x ∈ W (ξ(ω)) = REE.
So x is a rational expectations equilibrium.
Conclusions, further remarks and open questions
This chapter analyzes several cases of differential information economies in which
competitive equilibria can be characterized through arbitrage free conditions. In
the first section, the case of an ex-ante differential information economy is studied,
The main issue of this part consists in the measurability constraint imposed on
agent’s trades, Indeed, also if the reasoning of proof follows the same logic of
Serrano and Volji ([31]) we use privately measurable trades at each step of the
recontracting process by introducing the set Gi.
It is worth to point out that, assuming that feasibility of allocations is de-
fined with no free disposal, each no-free disposal ex ante arbitrage free equilibrium
satisfies the following Coalition Incentive Compatibility Property:
(CIC): It is not true that there exists a coalition S ⊂ N and two states
ω, ω
′
, ω 6= ω′ with ω′ ∈ Pi(ω),∀i ∈ S and such that
ui(ω, ei(ω) + xi(ω
′
)− ei(ω′)) > ui(ω, xi(ω)),∀i ∈ S
This condition, introduced in [18] states that the members of a coalition S cannot
benefit by announcing to the members of the complementary coalition a false state
that they cannot distinguish from the true one. This property of arbitrage free
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Walrasian expectations equilibrium follows from previous theorem 3.1.3 and from
Theorem 5.1 in [18].
In the second section, the framework is that of an interim differential infor-
mation economy in which the arbitrage free condition is satisfied in the fictitious
economy and then extended to the original interim differential information econ-
omy as in De Clippel ([6]).
The third section shows the case of the ex-post differential information economies
and provides, under measurability of utility functions with respect to private in-
formation characterization of Rational expectations equilibria as arbitrage free ra-
tional expectation equilibria. In a recent paper, [16], He and Yannelis define com-
petitive equilibria for ambiguous asymmetric information economies, economies
in which agents maximize Maxmin expected utilities. It would be interesting for
future research to investigate characterization of Maxmin expectations equilibria
in terms of non arbitrage conditions.
Incentive compatibility constraint
One final remark is still relative to incentive compatibility. Until now, the described
models of differential information are enriched by the asymmetric information and
at the same time, they don’t need incentive compatibility constraint or because
the lack of information is symmetric, or thanks to the measurability or because the
event is announced. From now on, our framework is characterized by a situation
in which each agent only knows his information and the system is characterized
by null communication. It describes a world in which the agent i could lie to
obtain a profit from the asymmetric information, i.e. he may mystify the reality
to have an advantage. For this reason, an incentive constraint (see [32], [19], [20])
is necessary to arrive to a state of equilibrium. The incentive constraint should
induce the players to be honest with respect to their knowledge about the event
E. It is not necessary of course when the event is measurable by each agent i ∈ N
and for all ω ∈ Ω. The new challenge is to allow the exchange among the agents
to respect the arbitrage free- condition, following the previous logic.
A way to express the incentive compatible constraint may be to link the trade
to the credibility of each agent. To do that, we insert a variable βi which resumes
the credibility degree of each agent i. If it is positive, the ith agent has credibility
and so all other agents j ∈ N, i 6= j make an exchange with him. If the variable
βi assumes a value equal 0, the agent i is alone in the market, he is marginalized
from the other players because they don’t trust him and so they decide to make
no trade.
The utility of agent i changes, incorporating his own βi.
Vi(xi(ω)|E) = pi(ω|E)ui(xi(ω), βi, ω).
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where {
ui(xi(ω), βi, ω) = ui(xi(ω), ω) if βi ≥ 0
ui(xi(ω), βi, ω) = 0 if βi = 0
(3.2)
With this definition, all the agent have an incentive to be honest for having a
positive utility. The new notation allows us to obtain the re-formulation of the
weakly and preferred set.
Pi(xi(ω), βi, ω) = {xi ∈ RLΩ+ |Vi(zi(ω), βi, ω) > Vi(xi(ω), βi, ω)}.
∀j, i ∈ N.
Wi(xi(ω), βi, ω) = {xi(ω) ∈ RLΩ+ |Vi(zi(ω), βi, ω) ≥ Vj(xj(ω), βj, ω)}
∀j, i ∈ N.
If the agent i lies, he doesn’t have a positive expected utility and his bundle
loses any value.
The interactive choice set is again recursively defined:
Z∗xi = ei(ω),∀i ∈ N,∀ω ∈ Ω.
Then at t = 1, the agents make conjectures about nature’s states with the common
knowledge of the economy at t = 0. Therefore, they exchange their own bundle
with the other ones in a convenient trade for all the parts of the process. The
preference is defined with respect to the common prior pi and the state of nature
ω.
Z∗xi (1) = Z
∗x
i (0)
⋃
j∈N
[Z∗xi (0) + Z
∗x
j (0)−Wj(xj(ω), βj, ω)]
∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, with xj(ω) ∈ RLΩ+ .
The liar will decide to say the truth because, otherwise, his expected utility
will be zero and no one makes exchange with him.
The characterization of the core and of the arbitrage condition is the same
because the incentive credibility constraint avoids the problem of a mystification
of the reality. Indeed, if an agent decides to lie his credibility decreases and the
βi becomes equal zero, giving an expected utility equal zero. So, he won’t lie for
avoiding this risk.
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Appendix
Correspondance
A correspondence φ : X → 2Y is a function from X to the family of all subsets of
Y .
The graph of a correspondence φ : X → 2Y is defined by:
Gφ = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ φ(x)}.
A correspondence φ : X → 2Y has open (closed) graph if the set Gφ = {(x, y) ∈
X × Y : y ∈ φ(x)} is open (closed) in X × Y .
Let φ : X → 2Y be a correspondence.
1. φ is closed at x if (xn, yn)→ (x, y) and yn ∈ φ(xn) for any n imply y ∈ φ(x).
It is closed (has a closed graph) if it is closed at any x ∈ X.
2. φ is upper hemi-continuous (u.h.c.) at x if, for any open set V containing
φ(x), there exists a neighborhood U of x such that φ(x′) ⊂ V for any x′ ∈ U .
φ is upper hemi continuous if it is upper hemi -continuous at any x ∈ X.
3. φ is lower hemi-continuous (l.h.c.) at x if, for any open set V with φ(x)∩V 6=
∅, there exists a neighborhood U of x such that φ(x′)∩V 6= ∅ for any x′ ∈ U .
A correspondence φ is lower hemi continuous if it is lower hemi-continuous
at any x ∈ X.
4. φ is continuous at x if φ is both upper hemi-continuous and lower hemi-
continuous at x. It is continuous if it is continuous at any x ∈ X.
Concavity
Let X be a convex subset of RL and let f : X → R be a function.
1. A function f is concave if for x, x′ ∈ X, f(αx + (1 − α)x′) ≥ αf(x) + (1 −
α)f(x
′
) for α ∈ [0, 1].
82
2. A function f is convex if −f is concave.
3. A function f is quasi-concave if {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ α} is convex for any α ∈ R.
4. A function f is quasi-convex if (−f) is quasi-concave.
Preferences
A relation R is a correspondence from X to 2X . The properties of R are defined
as follows:
1. R is reflexive if, for any x ∈ X, x ∈ R(x);
2. R is irreflexive if, for any x ∈ X, x 6∈ R(x);
3. R is complete if, for any x, x′ ∈ X, x′ ∈ R(x) or x ∈ R(x′);
4. R is transitive if, x′′ ∈ R(x)′ and x′ ∈ R(x), implies x′′ ∈ R(x);
5. R is negatively transitive if, x′′ 6∈ R(x′) and x′ 6∈ R(x), implies x′′ 6∈ R(x);
6. R is symmetric if x′ ∈ R(x) implies x ∈ R(x′);
7. R is asymmetric if x′ ∈ R(x) implies x 6∈ R(x′);
8. R is anti-asymmetric if x′ ∈ R(x) and x ∈ R(x′) implies x′ = x.
Define a relation R : X → 2X by R(x) = {x′ ∈ X : x′  x}. The properties of
(or R) are defined as follows:
1.  is reflexive if, for any x ∈ X, x  x.
2.  is complete if, for any x, x′ ∈ X, x′  x or x  x′ .
3.  is transitive if x  x′ and x′  x′′ implies that x  x′′ .
4.  is weakly monotonic if x′ ≥ x implies x′  x.
5.  is monotonic if x′  x implies x′  x.
6.  is strongly monotonic if x′ > x implies x′  x.
7.  is non-satiated if, for any x ∈ X, there is x′ ∈ X such that x′  x.
8.  is locally non-satiated if, for any x ∈ X, for any ε > 0 there is a x′ ∈
Bε(x) ∩X such that x′  x.
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9.  is convex if x′  x and x′′  x implies αx′ + (1 − α)x′′  x for any
α ∈ [0, 1].
10.  is semi-strictly convex if x′  x implies αx′ +(1−α)x  x for any α ∈ (0, 1]
and x ∼ x′ implies αx′ + (1− α)x  x for any α ∈ [0, 1].
11.  is strictly convex if x′  x and x′′  x and x′ 6= x′′ implies αx′+(1−α)x′′ 
x for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Boundary condition
Each individual’s utility function u : X → R satisfies the boundary condition
for any x ∈ X:
{y : u(y) ≥ u(x)}is closed relative to RL
That is, all the indifference curves are asymptotic to the axes. The interpretation
of the boundary condition is that some amount of each commodity is required for
subsistence.
Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium
Let ξ = {(Xi, ui, ei) : i ∈ N} be an exchange economy satisfying the following
assumptions for each i ∈ N .
a. Xi is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of RL;
b. ui : Xi → R+ is quasi-concave and continuous;
c. ei ∈ intXi.
Then ξ has a free disposal equilibrium, i.e.there exist (p∗, x∗) ∈ ∆ × X with
X = Πi∈NXi such that:
(1) ∀i ∈ N, x∗i ∈ pii(p∗) := {ui(xi) ≥ ui(x′i),∀x′i ∈ Bi(p∗)}, where Bi(p∗) := {xi ∈
Xi : p
∗xi ≤ p∗ei};
(2)
∑
i∈N x
∗
i ≤
∑
i∈N ei.
Optimality of Walrasian equilibrium
• A pair (p, x) ∈ ∆×X is a Walrasian equilibrium if x is feasible and x′i i xi
implies that px′i > pei ≥ pxi,∀i ∈ N ;
• a pair (p, x) ∈ ∆ × X is a quasi Walrasian equilibrium if x is feasible and
x
′
i i xi implies px′i ≥ pei,∀i ∈ N .
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Equilibrium of abstract economy
An equilibrium for the abstract economy is x∗ ∈ X such that, for any i ∈ N
1. x∗ ∈ Ai(x∗);
2. Pi(x∗) ∩ Ai(x∗) = ∅.
Core allocation
An allocation x ∈ X is a core allocation for ξ = {(Xi, ui, ei) : i ∈ N} if:
1.
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ei;
2. There does not exist a coalition S ⊆ N and (x′i)i∈S ∈
∏
i∈S Xi such that∑
i∈S x
′
i =
∑
i∈S ei and x
′
i i xi,∀i ∈ S.
and C(ξ) denotes the set of all core allocations for ξ.
85
Bibliography
[1] Beth Allen and Nicholas C Yannelis. “Differential information economies:
introduction”. In: Economic Theory 18.2 (2001), pp. 263–273.
[2] Carlos Alvarez et al. Price-Takers vs. Great Numbers: Rethinking the Edgeworth-
Walras Convergence on Perfect Competition à La Debreu-Scarf. 2008.
[3] Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao. “Ex-post core, fine core and rational expec-
tations equilibrium allocations”. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 74
(2018), pp. 128–138.
[4] KC Border. Core of a replica economy. 2006.
[5] Nir Dagan. “Recontracting and competition”. In: Journal of Economic Lit-
erature (1996).
[6] Geoffroy de Clippel. “The type-agent core for exchange economies with asym-
metric information”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 135.1 (2007), pp. 144–
158.
[7] Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf. “A limit theorem on the core of an econ-
omy”. In: International Economic Review 4.3 (1963), pp. 235–246.
[8] Chiara Donnini, Maria Gabriella Graziano, Marialaura Pesce, et al. Fairness
properties of constrained market equilibria. Tech. rep. Centre for Studies in
Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, 2010.
[9] Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin Shitovitz. “Competitive and core
allocations in large economies with differential information”. In: Economic
Theory 18.2 (2001), pp. 321–332.
[10] Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin Shitovitz. “Rational expectations
equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information”.
In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 34.4 (2000), pp. 527–535.
[11] Sjur Didrik Flåm and L Koutsougeras. Private information, transfer utility,
and the core. SNF, 2007.
86
[12] Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli, and Rajiv Vohra. “Incentives and the core
of an exchange economy: a survey”. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics
38.1 (2002), pp. 1–41.
[13] Douglas Gale. Strategic foundations of general equilibrium: dynamic match-
ing and bargaining games. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[14] Gianluigi Greco et al. “Non-transferable utility coalitional games via mixed-
integer linear constraints”. In: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 38
(2010), pp. 633–685.
[15] Jerry R Green, Andreu Mas-Colell, and Michael D Whinston.Microeconomic
theory. 1995.
[16] Wei He and Nicholas C Yannelis. “Equilibrium theory under ambiguity”. In:
Journal of Mathematical Economics 61 (2015), pp. 86–95.
[17] Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García, and Nicholas C Yannelis. “An
equivalence theorem for a differential information economy”. In: Journal of
Mathematical Economics 41.7 (2005), pp. 844–856.
[18] Carlos Hervés-Beloso, EmmaMoreno-García, and Nicholas C Yannelis. “Char-
acterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilib-
rium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces”. In: Economic Theory 26.2
(2005), pp. 361–381.
[19] Stefan Krasa, Akram Temimi, and Nicholas C Yannelis. “Coalition structure
values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?” In: Journal
of Mathematical Economics 39.1 (2003), pp. 51–62.
[20] Darin Lee and Oscar Volij. “The core of economies with asymmetric informa-
tion: an axiomatic approach”. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 38.1
(2002), pp. 43–63.
[21] Louis Makowski and Joseph M Ostroy. “Arbitrage and the flattening effect
of large numbers”. In: journal of economic theory 78.1 (1998), pp. 1–31.
[22] Suhas Mathur, Lalitha Sankar, and Narayan B Mandayam. “Coalitions in
cooperative wireless networks”. In: IEEE Journal on Selected areas in Com-
munications 26.7 (2008).
[23] Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite. “Core convergence with asym-
metric information”. In: Games and Economic Behavior 50.1 (2005), pp. 58–
78.
[24] Andrew McLennan, Hugo Sonnenschein, et al. “Sequential bargaining as a
noncooperative foundation for Walrasian equilibrium”. In: Econometrica 59.5
(1991), pp. 1395–1424.
87
[25] Claudia Meo. “Characterizations and existence of equilibria in differential
information economies”. PhD thesis. 2002.
[26] Oskar Morgenstern. “Thirteen critical points in contemporary economic the-
ory: An interpretation”. In: Journal of Economic Literature 10.4 (1972),
pp. 1163–1189.
[27] Roy Radner. “Equilibrium under uncertainty”. In: Handbook of mathematical
economics 2 (1982), pp. 923–1006.
[28] David Schmeidler and Karl Vind. “Fair net trades”. In: Econometrica: Jour-
nal of the Econometric Society (1972), pp. 637–642.
[29] Ulrich Schwalbe. The core of economies with asymmetric information. Vol. 474.
Springer Science; 1999.
[30] Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra, and Oscar Volij. “On the failure of core con-
vergence in economies with asymmetric information”. In: Econometrica 69.6
(2001), pp. 1685–1696.
[31] Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij. “Walrasian allocations without price-taking
behavior”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 95.1 (2000), pp. 79–106.
[32] Rajiv Vohra. “Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core”.
In: Journal of Economic Theory 86.1 (1999), pp. 123–147.
[33] Robert Wilson. “Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy”. In:
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1978), pp. 807–816.
[34] NC Yanellis. Lecture notes in General Equilibrium Theory. 2003.
88
